


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


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
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
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Dedicated
By Kind Permission
To

Major Dr. His Highness Rukn-al-Daula,
Nusrat-i-Jang Saif-al-Daula Hafiz-ul-Mulk,
Mukhlis-al-Daula wa Muin-al-Daula Al-Haj
NAWAB SIR SADIQ MOHAMMAD KHAN SAHIB BAHADUR
ABBASI V.,
G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., K.C.V.O., LL.D.,
Nawab Ruler of Bahawalpur

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FOREWORD

IN the political theory of Islam as a world-historic movement, the Caliphate as an institution occupies the central position. Dr. Amir Hasan Siddiqi's short but brilliant treatise is the best study of the subject during the Middle Ages that has yet seen the light.

The author is not concerned with the theories evolved from the inner consciousness of the latter-day thinkers, but with the Caliphate as a historic fact. The civilization of Ajam, one aspect of which he carefully surveys, is the connecting link between the civilization of ancient Rome and Persia and the civilization of modern Europe. By the end of the ninth century the lands of Islam had become too extensive to be governed from a single centre and the Caliph inevitably ceased to be the 'administrative head' of the faithful. He represented, nevertheless, the unity and brotherhood of Islam. How was this unity, the basis of Islamic culture and social life, to be reconciled with the 'administrative decentralization' with the exigencies of practical life?

Dr. Amir Hasan's work, a contribution of permanent value to the study of Islam, tells us how Muslim Asia strove to answer that question during a period of

four hundred years. Both the Caliphate and the Sultanate were necessary institutions, and on their proper co-ordination depended the peace and prosperity of Muslim nations. The careful array of facts which the author has put together from the original authorities and his balanced, critical judgment will, I am sure, win for him the gratitude of all sane and sober students of Oriental institutions.

Aligarh.

Mohammad Habib,
Professor of History.

INTRODUCTION

THE subject treated in this book was presented as a thesis for the degree of Ph.D. at the London University in 1934. The original purposes with which this subject was undertaken were : (1) to survey the development in the eastern Islamic provinces of the theory of the Sultanate and its relations with the Caliphate, from the time when the classical theory of the undivided temporal sovereignty of the Caliphs had broken down, to the establishment of the Safavid dynasty ; (2) to correlate the theoretical expositions with the actual course of events, showing to what extent theory and practice were in agreement or in opposition and reacted on one another.

While the general outlines of such a survey are already to be found in the standard works of Barthold, *Caliph and Sultan*, published in Russian in Mir Islama, (St. Petersburg 1912) and Arnold, *The Caliphate*, (Oxford 1924), neither work deals with these particular aspects of the subject with the fulness which is desirable for a satisfactory conclusion on the problem.

After a survey of the subject in general and of the materials already available, I found it necessary to divide the work into three sections : (1) a historical survey of the relations between the Caliphate and the

independent dynasties in Persia down to 1258 A.D. (2) a similar survey of the functions of the Sultanate between 1258 and 1500 A.D. (3) the development of the theory of the Sultanate. The wide extent of the ground to be covered compelled me to limit myself for the present to the first section alone, together with a preliminary discussion of the contemporary development of political theory.

The final object of the present book, therefore, is to show the circumstances and the steps by which the provincial Amirs in Persia became independent of the Abbasid Caliphate ; how as a necessary consequence of the curtailment of the temporal power of the Caliphate by the Shī'as, the Sultanate was created by the Sunnis ; and how the inevitable conflict between the two institutions brought about their downfall in Persia.

The absence of all the official records both at the centre and the provinces, paucity of information regarding the actual subject, and the extraordinary length of the period, have rendered my task extremely difficult. In fact, without the official records, it is impossible to establish the true relations between the central and provincial governments ; but an effort has been made to throw some new light on the subject by collecting from a variety of sources all the materials bearing on it, in much fuller detail than has previously been done.

In treating the subject, certain minor dynasties, especially of the Shī'as, have been left out, since they had no direct bearing on the subject. On the other

hand, in order to comprehend the true significance of the relationship between the Caliphate and the Tahirids, I have traced the latter's relations from the very beginning of the dynasty, although my period begins from 232/846—a date from which definite signs of weakening of the Caliphate are evident.


I should like to acknowledge my deep gratitude to Professor H. A. R. Gibb whose able guidance enabled me to produce this work; and to express my thanks to Mr. V. F. Minorsky for kindly looking through the chapters and suggesting numerous improvements.

My thanks are also due to my friend and colleague, Mr. Sheikh Abdur Rasheed, M.A., LL.B. (Alig.) for going through the proofs and making necessary corrections.

It will not be out of place to mention that an Urdu version of the book has already been published by Dar-ul-Mussanaffin with a foreword by Allama Syed Sulaiman Nadvi. I am deeply grateful to my friend Mr. Sibtain Ahmad who has by his excellent translation made it accessible to Urdu-knowing people.


Aligarh,
28th Feb., 1942

Amir Hasan Siddiqi.



CONTENTS

FOREWORD by Prof. Mohammad Habib	vii
INTRODUCTION	ix
CHAPTER I. Caliphate and Minor Dynasties of Persia	1
„ II. Caliphate under the Buwayhid Régime and its Relations with Persian Rulers			49
„ III. Caliphate and Sultanate	106
„ IV. The last phase in the struggle between Caliphate and Sultanate	157
BIBLIOGRAPHY	177
INDEX	182



CHAPTER I

Caliphate and Minor Dynasties of Persia

IN order to form a correct estimate of the relations between the Caliphate and the Minor Dynasties of Persia down to the establishment of the Buwayhid power, it is necessary to give a general survey of the political condition at Baghdād, which had reduced the already corrupted institution of the Caliphate into a mere formality.

The period under review opens with the deplorable reign of the Caliph Mutawakkil (232-47/847-61), and is characterised by two significant features:—

1. Reaction against the Mu'tazilite doctrines and its repercussions in the sphere of politics.
2. The ascendancy of the Turks and the consequent weakening of the authority of the Caliphate.

The enlightened and progressive spirit of the Caliph Māmūn (198-218/813-33) that favoured rationalization and the free discussion of so many beliefs was not followed by his immediate successors, who, misunderstanding the spirit of free thought, dogmatized those views and made non-subscription to them punishable. So it was that Caliph Wāthiq (227-32/842-47), though luxurious and devoted to his own pleasures,

yet was determined to see that the people did not believe in the doctrine of an 'Uncreated Qur'ān.' His zeal in this matter was so great that he actually instituted a sort of permanent inquisition¹ to enquire into the conduct of the public in respect of this particular belief; and severely punished those who persisted in this view.² The sudden reversion to orthodoxy during the reign of the Caliph Mutawakkil—a bigoted Sunni—was due to strong reaction against the Mu'tazilite doctrines; and led to indiscriminate persecution of every other sect. The time and circumstances also suited the policy of persecution. It was quite in keeping with the proclivities of the less enlightened Turkish prætorians who were in ascendancy during this period.³ The general public had also a stern way with any one who was suspected of advanced views.⁴ The policy of persecution which was directed especially against the Shī'as also found its expression in vexatious enactments passed against the Jews and Christians.⁵ The Caliph Mutawakkil had conceived such hatred against the Shī'a sect that in 236/850, he ordered

¹ Levy, *Baghdād Chronicle*, p. 102.

² Ṭabarī, III, p. 1348. Ahmad Ibn Naṣr al-Khuzā'i's head was struck off by the Caliph Wāthiq himself on this question in 231/846. So great was Wāthiq's zeal for his doctrine of the 'Created Qur'ān' that he exchanged with the Byzantine Emperor only those prisoners who believed in his doctrine. Cf. Ṭabarī, III, p. 1353.

³ Levy, *Baghdād Chronicle*, p. 104.

⁴ Ibn Athīr, VIII, p. 98. The great historian Ṭabarī, who died in 310/922 could only be buried by night in his house because the mob assembled and would not allow his body to be buried by day, declaring that he was a Rāfid (Shī'a) and even a heretic.

⁵ Ṭabarī, III, p. 1389.

the demolition of the tomb of the Prophet's martyred grandson, Husayn, son of 'Alī, at Karbalā; and all other buildings around it.¹ A man, who was reported to have reviled Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Āīshah and Ḥafsaḥ, was ordered by him to be whipped to death. The order was publicly carried out and his body was thrown into the Tigris without even having prayers offered for him.² The supporters of the orthodox tradition, who had been the victims of religious persecution during the period of the immediate successors of the Caliph Māmūn, had the upper hand now and were in a mood for revenge. They formed themselves into a reforming committee and paraded the streets, carrying on a door-to-door enquiry into the beliefs of the people and inflicting summary punishment upon dissenters. The persecution did not stop at Shī'as but was also directed against the members of rival Muslim sects differing from their own in minor points.³ In Gibbon's words, the reformers "invaded the pleasures of domestic life, burst into the houses of plebians and princes, spilt the wine, broke the instruments, beat the musicians and dishonoured, with infamous suspicions, the associates of every handsome youth."⁴ This religious intolerance was not stopped till the reign of the Caliph Rādī (324-29/934-40), who considering the reform a greater evil

¹ Tabarī, III, p. 1407; Ibn Athīr, VII, p. 36.

² Tabarī, III, p. 1424.

³ Levy, *Baghdād Chronicle*, p. 149. Shāfi'is were sometimes beaten with sticks almost to the point of death.

⁴ Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, vol. VI, LII, p. 62; quoted from Ibn Athīr, VIII, pp. 229-30.

than the original malpractices, issued a manifesto against the Hanbalīs.¹

The ruthless persecution against the Shī'as stirred up their latent hatred against the 'Abbāsīd rule and must have furthered their dissemination. In the words of E. G. Browne, "It seems to have encouraged rather than repressed the development of several most remarkable religious and philosophical movements, notably amongst the former the Qarmāṭian or Ismā'īlī propaganda which culminated in the establishment of the Fatimid Anti-Caliphate of North Africa and Egypt and amongst the latter the philosophical fraternity known as the Ikhwānu's-Ṣafa or 'Brethren of Purity'."²

The Zanj rebellion which was the outcome of the Zaydite propaganda³ soon showed how successfully an 'Alid revolt might be launched and how the local conditions in the south of 'Irāq favoured such an undertaking. It was by far the most formidable rising that the 'Abbāsīds had ever had to deal with. For nearly fourteen years (256-70/869-83) this great rebellion caused the utmost alarm and anxiety to the Caliphate, especially at a time when the Persian provinces were in revolt. It would have been quite possible for the strong hand of Muwaffaq and his son Abu'l-'Abbās to suppress the rebellion of the Saffarīds, and restore the Caliphate to its original glory and grandeur but for this prolonged and stubborn resistance.

¹ Levy, *Baghdād Chronicle*, pp. 149-50.

² Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, vol. I, p. 339.

³ Tabarī, III, p. 1742; Ibn Athīr, VII, p. 139.

During the progress of this rebellion, a Shī'a movement—more formidable in its aims and objects and fraught with more serious consequences to the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate—was started by one of the votaries of the Ismā'īlī sect, named 'Abd Allāh b. Maymūn al-Qaddāh in 260/873-74.¹ In 297/909 his grandson Sa'id b. Al-Ḥusayn, on the receipt of favourable reports from North Africa, crossed over thither and succeeded in founding the Fatimid Caliphate there by overthrowing the Aghlabid dynasty. In 356/969 his followers wrested Egypt also from the house of al-Ikhshīd.² Thus the Shī'a propaganda ultimately succeeded, if not in overthrowing the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate, at least in setting up a rival Caliphate. The establishment of a rival Caliphate, which included even the holy cities, was a serious blow to the prestige of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate and, in consequence of this, its spiritual monopoly was broken.

The movement did not stop at this but left its legacy at work in the territory of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate itself. The Ismā'īlī doctrines were also espoused by a certain Hamdān b. Al-Ash'ath nicknamed Qarmaṭ (from whose surname the term *Qarāmitah* is derived). The Qarmaṭians succeeded in founding a State independent of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate in Al-Ahsā; and their missionaries formed lasting hotbeds of agitation in Khurāsān, Syria and Yaman.³ They had become a political

¹ Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, vol. I, p. 394; quoted from *Fihrist*, pp. 186-87.

² *Ibid.*, p. 397; quoted from *Fihrist*, p. 187.

³ Masignon, Art. on Qarmaṭians in the *Encyclopædia of Islām*.

pest ever ready to attack the possessions of the Caliphate; and to plunder the caravans of pilgrims. During the whole of the Caliph Muktafi's reign (289-95/902-908) they made several attacks upon pilgrims returning from Mecca, and carried their plundering raids to the very gates of Baghdād.¹ A series of victories that enabled them to subdue Syria brought them within reasonable distance of the Metropolis of Islam. In 317/929 they invaded Mecca itself, and, to the great horror of the Muslims, carried off the sacred Black Stone which they kept for twenty years.² Ten years after they were reported to be still levying black-mail on pilgrim caravans. Their unceasing and dangerous activities always kept the Caliphate busy, indirectly encouraged ambitious governors to raise the standard of revolt; and thus, in no small measure, contributed to the downfall of the Baghdād Government.

The second characteristic of this period was the ascendancy of the Turks, who, through sheer force of circumstances, had become absolute masters of the 'Abbāsīd Empire. It was an evil day for the Caliphate when Mu'taṣim (218-27/833-42) introduced the Turkish element into the army. The tyranny, lawlessness and the ever-increasing number of the Turks obliged the Caliph to remove the seat of government from Baghdād to Surrā Man Ra'a³ (Samarrā) in 221/836.⁴ The

¹ Ibn Athīr, VII, p. 387.

² *Miskawayh*, I, p. 201; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 226; Ibn Athīr, VIII, p. 153.

³ It means 'gladdened is he who hath beheld it,' though a Baghdādī interpretation of the phrase ran: "Whosoever saw it (with the Turks settled there) rejoiced at Baghdād's being rid of them." Cf. Muir, *Caliphate*, p. 509.

⁴ Ibn Athīr, VI, p. 319.

transfer of the seat of government made the position of the Caliphs more precarious than before. Being cut off from the people of Baghdād and surrounded by these savage and self-seeking men of violence, the Caliphate stood in greater danger of being subordinate to the ever-growing power of the Turkish generals than would have been the case at Baghdād. There it became easy for them to assume the rôle of Caliph-makers and with each new succession they contrived to arrogate increasing authority to themselves. The mischievous seeds sown by the Caliph Mu'taṣim were soon to bear bitter fruits which were reaped by the Caliph Mutawakkil. The latter, by his unscrupulous policy of religious persecution, had alienated the sympathies of various sections of his people, and by his harsh treatment even drove his own son to enter into a conspiracy with the Turks. This cost him his life in 247/861.¹ Though the parricide did not long survive to reap the fruits of the conspiracy, his mischievous act was fraught with evil consequences for his successors, This was the first occasion that an attack was made on the person of a Caliph by the Turks; and this act served as the overture to a series of arbitrary appointments, depositions, blindings and murders. This precedent dealt a fatal blow to the traditional respect that was felt for the person of the Caliphs,² who were now treated in a most humiliating way.³ That the Turks

¹ Tabarī, III, pp. 1459-60.

² But the institution must not be too closely linked with the misfortunes of its holders.

³ The Turks dragged the Caliph Mu'tazz (251-55/866-69) by the feet, and

had become the virtual masters of the Caliphs can well be illustrated by a story related by the author of *Kitāb al-Fakhrī*, Ibn at-Ṭiqtaqa, who says : " When Mu'tazz was appointed as Caliph, his courtiers held a meeting and, summoning the astrologers, asked them how long he (the Caliph) would live and how long he would retain his Caliphate. A wit, present in the gathering, said, ' I know this thing better than the astrologers, ' Being asked to specify the time, he replied, ' So long as the Turks please, ' and everyone present laughed." ¹

Even the re-transfer of the Caliph's court to Baghdād and the short-lived revival of the power of the Caliphate due to the strong personalities of Muwaffaq and his son, the Caliph Mu'tadid (279-89/892-902) could not for long suppress the power of the Turks. No doubt their influence was much lessened ; nevertheless, their support was sought by various prominent Wazīrs who attained great distinction during this period. Owing to the insecurity of their position, all the Wazīrs, with the single honourable exception of 'Alī Ibn 'Isā, used their position more to serve their own ends than the interests of the State. The first object of the Executive was the amassing of wealth. Dismissal on account of charges of corruption and consequent confiscations had become the rule, so much so that, in an indirect way, it constituted a new source of income to the State ; and a new department had to be opened

after stripping off his shirt, exposed him to the burning sun. Oppressed by the severe heat, he lifted his feet alternately and the Turks slapped him with their hands. Finally they put him to death. Cf. Ṭabarī, III, p. 1710.

¹ Ibn at-Ṭiqtaqa, p. 333.

to deal with it.¹ The views of one of the greatest Wazīrs of the time, Ibn al-Furāt throw sufficient light on the character of most of the high officials of the State. He used to say, "It is better to remove the affairs of the king in a wrong direction than to let them stand still aright."² In short, the whole administration had become so corrupt that it was almost impossible for an honest person to serve the State. In spite of the fact that the Empire so badly needed the services of a statesman like 'Alī Ibn 'Isā, the latter was made to vacate his position several times through the undue influence that worked on the Caliph Muqtadir.³

The final decline of the 'Abbāsīd dynasty set in after the murder of Muqtadir in 320/932. The Turkish party came again into power and the same scene was repeated which had occurred after the murder of the Caliph Mutawakkil in 247/861. Such a state of things encouraged many a ruling Amīr to extend his influence over Baghdād itself, and by making the Caliph a puppet, virtually, govern the whole Empire. A keen conflict arose between various competitors for the mastery of Baghdād, and, one after the other, several of these

¹ Zaydān, trans. Margoliouth, p. 233; quoted from Hilāl al-Šābī, *Kitab al-Wuzarā*, p. 306.

² *Ibid.*, p. 232; quoted from Hilāl al-Šābī, *Kitab al-Wuzarā*, p. 119.

³ *Miskawayh*, I, pp. 40-41; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 45. One of the charges which led to the dismissal of 'Alī Ibn 'Isā from the Wazirate, on one of these occasions, was that he had not been able to exact the customary fines from discharged officers. Cf. Bowen, 'Alī Ibn 'Isā, p. 145; quoted from Hilāl al-Šābī *Kitab al-Wuzarā*, p. 79. His reply to such demands was, "I will not behave unjustly with officials whom I have trusted." Cf. *Miskawayh*, I, p. 43; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 48.

aspirants held the post of Amīr al-Umarā—an office especially created for them. Since most of the powers of the Wazīr were taken over by the Amīr al-Umarā, the Wazirate lost its importance and glamour. The jurisdiction of the Wazīr was restricted to suits between persons unconnected with the Government; cases in which officials or soldiers were involved were no longer tried by the Wazīr as the representative of the Caliph but by the Secretary of the Amīr.¹ These ambitious Amīrs fixed a daily allowance for the Caliph, and appropriated all the revenue themselves.² Besides, they also introduced the innovation of having their names conjoined along with that of the Caliph in Friday prayers and coinage.³

Although very little actual power was left with the Caliphs by this time, yet since they still commanded the respect and prayers of all pious Muslims, it was not safe for any one openly to defy their orders, as that would have entailed the alienation of the sympathies of the public. For this reason, the acquisition of power necessitated a judicious compromise between real authority and seeming obedience. In fact, the Caliphs, though responsible for the administration, were no longer in a position to carry it on in their own way; nevertheless orders were still issued in their names while their hands were being continually forced by

¹ Bowen, *‘Alī Ibn ‘Isā*, p. 365; quoted from *Hilāl al-Sābi*, p. 317.

² *Miskawayh*, I, p. 352; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 396.

³ Ibn Athīr, VIII, p. 241. Ibn Rāiq's name was ordered to be mentioned from all pulpits. Both Bachkam and Tuzūn's names appear on the coinage minted at Baghdād. Cf. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, p. 190, and *Additions*, p. 256, respectively.

influential Amīrs.

That this anomalous position at the Metropolis of Islām had turned the institution of the Caliphate into a mere figure-head can be easily understood by a glance at the juridical position that the legists of Islām have assigned to the institution ; and an examination of its actual working at this time. It is one of the difficulties in the way of the student that no earlier exposition of the office of the Caliphate was written, or if written has survived, than that of 'Alī Ibn Muḥammad al-Māwardī (381-450/991-1058) whose *Al-Aḥkām al-Sultānīyah* or 'The Laws concerning Rulership' was published in the first third of the fifth century. Nevertheless, an examination of Māwardī's book will show that, although it was written at a time when very little political power was left with the Caliph, yet the theoretical exposition of the institution which it contains relates in fact, in its main principles, to an earlier period. Since he bases his arguments and conclusions on historical practice and the opinions of earlier jurists, we are justified, in the absence of any strictly contemporary exposition of the functions of the Caliph, in accepting his theory (shorn of those peculiar features which evidently reflect the usage of his own times and which will be dealt with later) as representing the juridical view of the pre-Buwayhid period jurists.¹

¹ The analysis of the exposition given by Māwardī and the investigation of the sources and materials from which it was derived is one of the most urgent tasks which requires to be done in the field of Islamic political thought. It forms no part, however, of the subject of the present essay which begins with the institution already fully developed both in theory and practice. For our purposes it is immaterial whether the main principles of Māwardī's

According to Māwardī, the institution of the Caliphate is considered necessary to provide leadership in succession to the Prophet for the preservation of religion and the administration of temporal affairs.¹ And it is obligatory² on the people to appoint an Imām by the consensus of the community. Although, during this period, the people, as a whole, actually speaking, had not even the slightest hand in the appointment of a Caliph, yet, to preserve the form, a show of public ratification was made. The election of a Caliph by the consensus of the community was reduced only to an oath of allegiance taken by the whole of the people, either by their consent, or otherwise, to an already appointed Caliph. The ceremony may be considered quite formal, but it was essential for the completion of the election. More importance was attached to the oath of allegiance by important personalities like Qādis. Such persons, on the other hand, were very careful about their oath of allegiance, and they were averse to doing anything which was against the strict letter of the law.³

exposition go back to the first, second or third century—since it must be assumed, (i) that a definite juridical view of the Caliphate existed by the third century, and (ii) in the absence of any attempt to controvert Māwardī's exposition that the latter did in fact represent that juridical view. However, the very fact that Māwardī introduced 'Amirs by Force' shows that his main theory regarding the office of the Caliphate did not belong to his own period but to the pre-Buwayhid period.

¹ Māwardī, p. 2. From the above description it is evident that the institution had a double function to perform, religious as well as temporal.

² Māwardī, p. 3.

³ Ibn Athīr, VII, 93. Qādī Abū Ahmad b. Rashīd refused to pay homage to the Caliph Mu'tazz on the ground that he had withdrawn himself previously.

The author says that on the occasion of a vacancy there are two categories of people in the community, the first comprising all those who possess the right of electing the Imām and the other consisting of those who put forward a claim to sovereignty. The electors are supposed to possess the following three qualifications: (1) Uprightness in all its respects; (2) Capacity to judge the qualifications that a leader must possess; (3) Discretion and good judgment enabling them to choose the persons most deserving of the office.¹ The real electors were in most cases, either the Turkish generals or the Wazīrs; and most of them being unscrupulous and ambitious men were devoid of uprightiness in any form; in consequence of this they could not make proper use of the second and third qualifications which, in most cases, they were possessed of. In selecting the Caliph they were actuated by their own personal motives rather than the qualifications of the candidates.²

As regards the qualifications necessary for the office of the Caliph, Māwardī names the following:—(1) Uprightness in all its respects; (2) Requisite juridico-theological knowledge to determine the significance of points of Sharī'ah in difficult cases; (3) Freedom from defects of hearing, sight and speech; (4) Freedom from physical infirmities; (5) Intelligence and sagacity which provide insight for governing the people and conducting the affairs of the State; (6) Courage and boldness

¹ Māwardī, p. 4.

² Examples will be found below.

to defend the boundaries of the State and to fight the enemies of Islām; (7) Descent from the tribe of Quraysh.¹ Since the hereditary system generally prevailed, the field of choice was very limited and the electors had, in practice, to select from amongst the sons or the brothers of the deceased or dethroned Caliph. Even within this limited circle, no due consideration was paid to the above qualifications in selecting a candidate. To give a colour of legitimacy and regularity a formal proceeding was carried out and the chief dignitaries of the court, military commanders and religious heads were invited to deliberate on the determination of the above points but the choice used to be made by influential persons long before such an assembly was held.² The qualifications Nos. 3 and 4 were duly observed throughout the whole of this period. They were so deep-rooted in the minds of the people that the blinding of a claimant was considered quite enough to prevent him from succeeding to the

¹ Mawardi, pp. 4-5.

² *Miskawayh*, I, p. 3; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 2. While electing the successor of the Caliph Muktafi the Wazir asked the opinion of important persons, amongst others of Ibn al-Furāt, who said, "Why should you introduce a man who will govern, and knows our resources, who will administer affairs himself, and regard himself as independent? Why not deliver the empire to a man who will leave you to administer it?" It was owing to such considerations that the candidature of Abu'l-'Abbās 'Abd Allāh son of Mu'tazz was rejected, and Muqtadir who was of tender age was elected. In the same way when Mūnis urged the candidature of the son of Muqtadir, Abu'l-'Abbās, he was successfully opposed by Abu Ya'qūb Ishāq b. Isma'il Nūbakhtī in the following words, "After all the trouble which we have taken to get rid of a sovereign with a mother and an aunt and eunuch are we going to have the same thing over again?" *Miskawayh*, I, p. 242; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 273.

throne. The seventh qualification was the most essential and was most rigidly observed. The strict adherence of the Sunnī sect to this last qualification was due to several supposed traditions attributed to the Prophet Muḥammad.¹ The claims of the 'Abbāsīd family were further strengthened by various supposed traditions put forward in their favour.² It was chiefly due to these settled traditions that the Turks, though masters of everything, could not conceive of putting up a candidate outside the family of 'Abbās. This limitation caused the 'Abbāsīd family to be regarded in some sort as sacred in the minds of all Sunnī people and it was primarily due to this that an appearance of political unity was preserved throughout the Sunnī Muslim world excepting Spain.

Māwardī holds the indivisible character of the Caliphate when he says, "That at one time there cannot be more than one Imām."³ This principle was strictly observed by the Sunnīs and its observance gave further stability to the institution of the Caliphate. Again, in order to legalise the despotic character of the institution which resulted from the hereditary system, the author upholds the practice by which the reigning Caliph appoints his own successor.⁴

According to Māwardī, there are ten duties to be

¹ Suyūṭī, trans. Jarrett, p. 8. "The Princes shall be of the Quraysh the just among them rulers of the just, and the wicked rulers of the wicked."

² Suyūṭī, trans. p. 13. It is related from Abū Hurayrah that the Messenger of God said to 'Abbās, 'In you shall rest prophecy and sovereignty.'

³ Māwardī, p. 7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

performed by a Caliph: (1) To uphold the fundamental principles of the Muslim religion; (2) To decide law-suits and to settle disputes; (3) To defend Muslim territories; (4) To administer the penal law; (5) To guard the frontiers by keeping garrisons and making preparations for war; (6) To fight those who refuse to accept Islām or to submit upon terms laid down for non-Muslims; (7) To levy taxes and imposts according to law; (8) To pay the annuity from the State treasury; (9) To appoint trustworthy men and councillors for the administration of different districts and for fiscal purposes; and (10) Personally to inspect and control the administration.¹ If the Caliph discharged and fulfilled these duties the people were required to discharge two duties on their part: (1) To render him obedience; and (2) To render him assistance.² It is obvious that no Caliph, during this period of degeneration, did or could fulfil all the conditions laid down by the jurists, but the provision for deposing a defaulting Caliph could not be made operative owing to the lack of power to enforce it, and to support of the interested persons who were responsible for raising a candidate to the throne of sovereignty. The two chief causes which involved forfeiture were deterioration of morals and physical infirmities.³ The provision for deposition due to the first cause was a useful instrument in the hands of the interested parties. As

¹ Kremer, *The Orient under the Caliphs*, trans. Khuda Bakhsh, pp. 265-66 quoted from Māwardī, p. 15.

² Māwardī, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

long as the Caliph complied with their demands no one questioned his morals, but the moment he did not agree with them his morals were called in question; and he was asked to vacate the throne by self-deposition. His consent was taken forcibly and attested by the Qādīs before he was brought before an assembly to declare his own deposition. If the Caliph did not agree to the arrangement settled by the interested parties, he was threatened with death, or blinded.¹

Under such conditions the absolute obedience claimed on behalf of the Caliphate from the governors could not be expected. The first minor dynasty which arose in Persia was that of the Ṭāhirids whose relations with the Caliphate we will now trace.

CALIPHATE AND THE TAHIRIDS

The founder of the Ṭāhirid dynasty, as its name implies, was Ṭāhir Dhu-l-Yamīnayn who descended from Rāziq who was in the service of Abū Muḥammad Ṭalhā b. 'Abd Allāh al-Khuzā'i, Viceroy of Sijistān. His son, Muṣa'b governed the town of Būshang in the province of Hirāt, and was secretary to Sulaymān Ibn Kathīr al-Khuzā'i, the chief of the 'Abbāsīd mission.²

¹ *Misk.* I, pp. 290-91; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, pp. 330-31. On the occasion of the deposition of the Caliph Qāhir, the Qādī who was sent to attest the document declaring the former's abdication, was very much upset when the Caliph refused to submit. The Qādī said, "What use was it to summon us to a man who had not been forced to submit?" On hearing this, 'Alī Ibn 'Isā remarked, "His conduct is notorious and therefore he must be deposed." To this the Qādī replied, "It is not for us to establish dynasties—that is accomplished by the men of the swords. We are only suited and required for attestation." The next morning the Caliph was found blinded.

² *Ibn Khallikān*, *Dé Slane*, trans. I, pp. 649-50.

He was succeeded in the government first by his son Ḥusayn (199/814-15) and then by his grandson, Ṭāhir who subsequently passed into the service of the Caliph Māmūn.¹

It is an established fact that Māmūn's victory over Amīn was achieved through the supreme effort of Ṭāhir as general, and therefore it was quite natural on the part of Māmūn to give high positions to Ṭāhir and other members of his family. After Māmūn's accession to the Caliphate in 198/813, Ṭāhir was appointed the Governor of Al-Jazīrah and financial administrator of the Sawād with the position of Military Commander at Baghdād,² and his son 'Abd Allāh was entrusted with the duty of pacifying the western parts of the Empire. In 206/821-22, 'Abd Allāh was appointed Governor of the regions between Al-Rakka and Egypt, and at the same time received the supreme command in the battle against one of Amīn's followers named Naṣr b. Shabath who surrendered to 'Abd Allāh in 209/825.³ In the same year 210/825-26 he went to Egypt by order of the Caliph Māmūn, easily succeeded in restoring order there, and conquered Iskandariyah for the Caliphate.⁴

Since both the conquest and consolidation of the 'Abbāsid Empire were due to the loyal and valuable services of the Ṭāhirids, the latter were allowed to play the rôle of partners in the Empire. But although he

¹ Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 208.

² *Tabarī*, III, p. 1039.

³ *Ibid.*, III, p. 1067; *Ibn Athīr*, VI, p. 256.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, p. 1091.

recognized their services and amply rewarded them by assigning important positions to them, Māmūn was shrewd enough to keep them away from their home in Khurāsān where their influence, if misused, would have endangered the safety of the Empire, much though their presence was needed in those troublesome regions which demanded closer attention for pacification.

Ṭāhir being ambitious, was not satisfied with his position at Baghdād and naturally wanted to be the Governor of his own province, Khurāsān. This is best explained in Ṭāhir's own words. When someone said to him, "May you well enjoy the rank which you now hold and which none of your rivals in Khurāsān have ever reached," he replied: "That is what I am unable to enjoy since I cannot see the old women of Būshang climbing up to the roofs of the houses that they may get a sight of me as I pass by."¹ However, it was Māmūn himself who provided the cause which led Ṭāhir to make a successful effort to get away from Baghdād. It is a well-known story that one day Māmūn, on seeing Ṭāhir, was reminded of his brother Amīn who was killed by the former, and burst into tears.² This created some suspicion in Ṭāhir's mind, and when he found out the cause of Māmūn's weeping³ and also that the latter had conceived a violent hatred against him (Ṭāhir), he, with the assistance of

¹ *Ibn Khallikān*, De Slane, trans. I, p. 650.

² *Tabarī*, III, pp. 1041-42; *Ibn Athīr*, VI, p. 255; *Ibn Khaldūn*, III, p. 251; *Ibn Khallikān*, De Slane, trans. I, pp. 652-53.

³ *Ibn Khallikān*, De Slane, trans. I, pp. 652-53. Māmūn was reported to say the following words: "Ṭāhir shall not escape me."

the Wazīr, got himself transferred to Khurāsān where he had his influence and dynastic support. That Māmūn had lost all confidence in Ṭāhir is proved by the fact that he at first was unwilling to send him to the eastern provinces; and it was only through the Wazīr's deception that he consented to appoint Ṭāhir as Governor of Khurāsān on condition that the Wazīr would himself stand guarantee for Ṭāhir's good behaviour.¹ Obviously it was the extreme hostility displayed by Māmūn towards Ṭāhir that led the latter to drop the former's name from the *Khuṭbah* in 207/822,² thus signifying his independence at a time when the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate was at its height. The desperate attempt of Ṭāhir was nipped in the bud by the sudden and premature removal of Ṭāhir himself from the scene, either from some natural cause or from poison believed to have been administered to him by a slave-girl who was presented to him by Māmūn with such instructions.³

The appointment of Ṭalḥa in his father's place was perhaps intended to hush up the suspicion that was aroused on the sudden death of Ṭāhir.⁴ The third appointment of 'Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir in his brother's place gave the dynasty a hereditary character and local authority and position which previous governors had never enjoyed. It may be noted here that 'Abd Allāh's

¹ *Tabarī*, III, p. 1042. The Wazīr made Māmūn believe that there were disturbances in Khurāsān which could not be quelled by any one but Ṭāhir.

² *Ibid.*, III, p. 1064; *Ibn Athīr*, VI, p. 270.

³ *Ibn Khallikān*, De Slane, trans. I, p. 653.

⁴ Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 208.

appointment was not based on favouritism but on his own personal merits. Besides, Māmūn placed in him the highest confidence and treated him with the utmost consideration.¹ But during the time of 'Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir, the dynasty reached its zenith and had so firmly established itself that it was not easy to transfer them to any part of the Empire. Even the Caliph Mu'tasim (218-27/833-42) who bore some grudge against him did not dare dismiss him, but in order to remove him could only encourage secret plans of murder.² On the other hand 'Abd Allāh fulfilled the expectations of the 'Abbāsids and never betrayed the trust reposed in him. Even when he found out the evil intentions of Mu'tasim against his own life he did not adopt the absurd plan taken by his own father under similar circumstances. However, he took care not to leave his country for long periods and always considered himself safe only within his own dominions. For this reason 'Abd Allāh, though a man of religious character, had to forego the pleasure of fulfilling the sacred duty of performing the pilgrimage.³

After the death of 'Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir in 230/844 the Caliph Wāthiq appointed Ishāq b. Ibrāhīm al-Mus'abī, as Governor of Khurāsān but, for certain reasons, this appointment was cancelled before the departure of the new governor, and Ṭāhir b.

¹ *Ibn Khallikān*, De Slane, trans. 2. II, p. 49.

² *Gardizi*, p. 7. It is related that Mu'tasim had conceived a hatred for 'Abd Allāh before he became Caliph. During his Caliphate, he sent a slave girl to 'Abd Allāh with instructions to poison him, but the slave girl being infatuated by him, disclosed the secret.

³ *Gardizi*, p. 2.

'Abd Allāh was appointed in his father's place.¹ The last appointment of Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir in 248/862 was made in consideration of the services rendered by 'Abd Allāh and his family.² Thus we see that it was through force of circumstances that the government of Khurāsān remained in the family of Ṭāhir till it was extinguished by Ya'qūb b. Layth in 259/872.

The Ṭāhirids paid a fixed amount of annual tribute to the Caliphate regularly. According to Ibn Khūrdādhbih³ the tribute paid by 'Abd Allāh in 211-12/826-27 consisted of 44,846,000 dirhams, thirteen thoroughbred horses, 2,000 sheep, 2,000 Ghuzz slaves, valued at 600,000 dirhams, 1,187 pieces of stuff, and 1,300 pieces of iron. In the year 221/836, according to Qudāma,⁴ 'Abd Allāh bound himself to pay in all thirty-eight million dirhams out of an annual income of forty-eight million dirhams which, according to Ṭabarī,⁵ was the amount received in the year of the death of 'Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir, 230/844 from all sources.

The Ṭāhirids remained, on the whole, loyal supporters of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate. They did not even take any advantage worth the name of the sudden decline of the Caliphate after the murder of

¹ Barthold, Art. on 'Abd Allāh in *Encycl. of Islām*.

² Ṭabarī, III, p. 1506; Ya'qūbī ed. Houtsma, II, p. 604 says that Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh, Military Commandant at Baghdād declined an offer to go to Khurāsān as he knew that his brother Ṭāhir had intended his son to succeed him.

³ *Bib. Geog. Arab*, VI, p. 38; Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 220.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 250; Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 220.

⁵ Ṭabarī, III, pp. 1338-39. Ya'qūbī puts the taxes from Khurāsān at forty-two million dirhams. See *Bib. Geog. Arab*, VII, p. 308.

Mutawakkil at the hands of the Turks in 247/861. Their passive attitude might be accounted for three facts:

Firstly, as already mentioned, the Ṭāhirids had become a sort of junior partners in the Empire. They had the best provinces under their control and were quite independent as far as their internal administration was concerned. Their territory comprised Rayy and Kirmān in addition to Khurāsān proper and the lands east thereof as far as the Indian frontier and northward to the boundary of the Caliph's Empire.¹ They were in sole enjoyment of the whole of the one-fifth of the booty raised in their wars against the non-Muslims; and received thirteen million dirhams from 'Irāq independently of gifts.² Besides holding the important province of Khurāsān, the post of the Military Commander at Baghdād was also occupied by one of the members of this family. The monopoly of this post had raised their position so much that at one time they had become, in a measure, protectors of the Caliphate when its fate hung in the hands of the Turks. In 251/865, Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir was so important at Baghdād that he was actually playing the rôle of a Caliph-maker and shared in deciding the fate of the Caliphate between Musta'in and Mu'tazz. Thus we see that the Ṭāhirids had become a party with the Turks to the exploitation of the revenues of the Caliphate.³

¹ Barthold, art. on Ṭāhirids, *Encycl. of Islām*.

² Ya'qūbī, *Bib. Geog. Arab*, VII, p. 308.

³ Ṭabarī, III, p. 1640; Ibn Athīr, VII, p. 107; Ibn Khaldūn, II, p. 290.

Secondly, it was only during the reign of 'Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir that any possible successful effort could be made for independence, but the Caliphate though showing some signs of decline, was not yet so weak as to ensure the success of such an effort. 'Abd Allāh was prudent enough to continue his dependence on the Caliphate and reap the best advantage he could within the limits of his own rights. Moreover, he and his son Ṭāhir, being good Muslims, might not have liked the idea of figuring as heretics in the public eye by severing all their connections from the Caliphate.

Thirdly, the sudden weakening of the authority of the 'Abbāsids coincided with the degeneration of the Ṭāhirids. The last of them, Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir, who succeeded his father in 248/862, was of tender years and was a weak ruler devoted to his own pleasures. His own territories were not safe in such a weak ruler's hands. It was during his reign that the 'Alid Ḥasan b. Zayd captured Ṭabaristān in 251/866 and renounced his allegiance to the Caliph Musta'in;¹ and finally Muḥammad himself was defeated by Ya'qūb and taken prisoner in 259/837.² Under such circumstances, it was to the advantage of the Ṭāhirids themselves that they kept up the connection with the 'Abbāsid Caliphate.

Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh was one of the parties with the Turks in deposing Musta'in and raising Mu'tazz to the Caliphate. One-third of the whole of the revenue was to be appropriated by Muḥammad; and two-thirds between the Turks and Mawālī.

¹ Gardizi, p. 10.

² Ibid.

The Ṭāhirids generally obeyed the orders of the Central Government and carried them out with all sincerity and honesty of purpose. If needed, the Baghdād government would send some support from the Capital to the help of these governors. At the time of the appointment of Ṭalḥā in 207/822 to the government of Khurāsān, the chief of Ushrusana' Kāwūs who had consented to pay tribute to Māmūn, revolted against the authority of the Caliphate; consequently a force was sent from Baghdād under the command of Aḥmad b. Abū Khālīd for the subjugation of that country. Ṭalḥā was pleased to receive such assistance from the central government and with its help was able to achieve his object.¹ Sometimes these governors would take the initiative themselves and suppress such revolts. When a certain 'Alid, Muḥammad b. Al-Qāsim, appeared as pretender to the Caliphate, 'Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir took proper steps against such pretensions, defeated Muḥammad b. Qāsim who surrendered to 'Abd Allāh and was sent by him to the Caliph Mu'taṣim in 219/834.² One of the greatest revolts during this period came from Mazyār b. Qārīn who had embraced Islām and was appointed Governor of Tabaristān, Rūyan and Dunbāwand by the Caliph Māmūn.³ After the latter's death in 218/833, Mazyār began to show signs of returning to heresy and of revolting against the central authority. 'Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir had denounced to the Caliph the "misdeeds,

¹ *Tabari*, III, p. 1066.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1166.

³ Minorsky, Art. on Mazyār in *Encycl. of Islām*, p. 436.

tyranny and apostacy of Mazyār.”¹ The open breach between the Caliphate and Mazyār occurred in 224/838-39 when the latter refused to pay tribute to the Ṭāhirids; and would not listen to the representations of the Caliph’s ambassador. Meanwhile, he conferred various honours on Bābak, on Mazdak and other Magians who had ordered the demolition of places of worship of Muslims.² The famous Afshīn, being covetous of Khurāsān, secretly encouraged Mazyār’s resistance to his rival ‘Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir.³ As soon as the Caliph Mu’taṣim heard that Mazyār had had homage paid to himself and levied Kharāj, he despatched urgent orders to ‘Abd Allāh to fight against him and sent considerable forces from Baghdād to his assistance. The combined forces of the Caliph and ‘Abd Allāh proved too much for Mazyār who was arrested and brought by ‘Abd Allāh personally to Baghdād where he was ordered to be given 400 lashes under which he died and his body was exposed.⁴

The two religious movements, those of the ‘Alids in Ṭabaristān and Khārijites in Sijistān, which were opposed to the Caliphate were always put down by the Ṭāhirids.⁵ In carrying out the orders and serving the cause of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, the Ṭāhirids were also promoting their own interests. Being Sunnīs, their religious interests coincided with those of the

¹ *Isfandiyār*, trans. Browne, p. 152.

² *Ibid.*, p. 153.

³ *Ṭabarī*, III, p. 1268; *Isfandiyār*, p. 155.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Isfandiyār*, p. 154.

⁵ *Gardizī*, pp. 5 and 8.

'Abbāsids, and thus the enemies of the Caliphate were naturally their enemies. The suppression of any other religious movements in their dominions was also a political necessity; and the conquest of new territories was more to their own advantage than to that of the Caliphate.¹ Besides, the Ṭāhirids were amply rewarded for their loyalty by the Caliphs and they were always favoured in their eyes. It was due to the Ṭāhirids' influence at Baghdād that Ya'qūb, the Ṣaffārid was denounced as a heretic and rebel against the lawful government,² and the government of Khurāsān, Rayy, Fārs, Qazwīn, Zurjān along with the post of the Military Commander of Baghdād was entrusted to the incapable and pleasure-loving ruler, Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir as soon as the latter was set free from the hands of Ya'qūb in 263/876.³ The last named post continued to be held mainly by the members of the Ṭāhirid family.⁴

The Ṭāhirids ruled Khurāsān in accordance with the maxims of government recommended to 'Abd Allāh by his father Ṭāhir when he was appointed to the

¹ Ya'qūbī, *Bib. Geog. Arab*, VII, p. 308. The whole of the booty was appropriated by the Ṭāhirids. All the lands conquered by them were also given to them. 'Abd Allāh sent his son Ṭāhir on a campaign into the Ghūzz country and conquered several places for the Caliphate, where none had penetrated before him. See Barthold, p. 212.

² Ṭabarī, III, p. 1887.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1895; *Ibn Athīr*, VII, p. 201.

⁴ Barthold, art. on Ṭāhirids, in *Encycl. of Islām*. The last of the Ṭāhirids to hold the office of Military Commander at Baghdād was 'Ubayd Allāh b. 'Abd Allāh who died in 300/913. His son Muḥammad b. 'Ubayd Allāh was for a period Commandant of the eastern half of Baghdād and was dismissed from office in 301/913. See *Arab*, p. 45.

government of Dayār Rabī'a in 206/821.¹ There is very scanty information regarding the actual administration of the Ṭāhirids, but whatever information has come down to us goes to prove that they, being very pious Muslims, always tried to rule their country in accordance with the strict laws of the Sharī'ah. To settle the quarrels amongst the inhabitants over the use of water for artificial irrigation for which the Muslim books did not provide any definite laws, 'Abd Allāh invited the Faqīhs of Khurāsān and instructed them to work out, in consultation with some Jurists from 'Irāq, the legal principles regarding the use of water. The book of "Canals" (*Kitāb al-Qunīy*) composed by them served as a guide in similar matters.² This shows that the Ṭāhirids were anxious to act in accordance with Islamic laws; and, in the absence of definite laws, they did not use their autocratic powers. As regards 'Abd Allāh b. Ṭāhir's equity, justice and efficiency of government, if we are to believe Ya'qūbī, "he ruled Khurāsān as none had ever ruled it before."³ He was greatly concerned in the public welfare irrespective of classes. He especially

¹ *Ṭabarī*, III, pp. 1046-62; Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddimah*, pp. 304-11. The maxims of government presented by Ṭāhir to his son have been taken as a model of good government. According to Māmūn's remark, Ṭāhir did not leave out anything. A copy of these maxims was sent to every governor with instructions that he should rule the province accordingly. Ṭabarī says that 'Abd Allāh always acted upon it. Obedience to God and the Prophet's commands, allegiance to the Caliph and practice of Sharī'ah in governing the country are specially enjoined. Free access for the subjects and their well-being in every respect is much insisted upon.

² *Gardizī*, p. 8.

³ *Barthold*, p. 213; quoted from *Ya'qūbī*, II, p. 586.

took up the cause of the agriculturists, and introduced free universal education. He used to say "knowledge must be accessible to the worthy and unworthy; it will look after itself and not remain with the unworthy."¹ Ṭāhir b. 'Abd Allāh is also spoken of as a beneficent ruler and a pious person.² The Ṭāhirids took great care in providing comforts to the caravans for pilgrimages.

In conclusion we can say that the Ṭāhirids being orthodox Sunnīs were staunch supporters of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate. They helped the institution of the Caliphate in all its activities, and by crushing all anti-Caliphate movements in their territories, alleviated their troubles to a great extent. They waged wars against non-Muslims, provided due facilities to the pilgrim caravans and ruled their territories justly and efficiently. Having thus won the best opinion of the ruling Caliphs from Māmūn downwards, they enjoyed peacefully the government of the richest province of the Caliphate, but continued paying the tribute, though with slight variations, to the central government in accordance with terms agreed upon by both parties.

By adhering to the cause of the 'Abbāsīds at a time when the Caliphate was being robbed of all its temporal authority, they fulfilled the expectations of the 'Abbāsīds and justified the confidence reposed in

¹ Barthold, p. 213, quoted from *Gardizī*, p. 8.

² *Gardizī*, p. 9. He was so pious and unassuming that he did not like to be addressed by the title "Rashīd" as he thought he did not deserve such an epithet.

them. No doubt, through various circumstances, they had become hereditary governors, irremovable from their position ; but in no way should they be regarded as independent of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate, as most of the modern writers on Islamic History have tried to assert. The first dynasty that openly contested the political supremacy of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate in Persia, was that of the Ṣaffārids whose relations with the Caliphate are now being traced.

CALIPHATE AND THE SAFFARIDS

The last ruler of the Ṭāhirid dynasty was Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir (248-59/862-72) who ruled Khurāsān and also Sijistān as one of its appendages. He was a prince of tender years and was more devoted to his own pleasure than the administration of the country.¹ The central government at Baghdād was also paralysed by the tyranny and dissensions of the Turks. The political condition of the Caliphate being thus weakened at the centre as well as in the Persian provinces, the Khārijites resumed their activities and robbed the people of the peace and security to which they had been accustomed during the rule of the Ṭāhirids before Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir. Although the details of the situation in Sijistān are not clear, it would seem that a band of volunteers, called Mutawwīa was formed to protect the people from the depredations of the Khārijites. At the head of these volunteers stood one Dirham b. Naṣr b. Ṣālih, who

¹ *Gardizi*, p. 10.

seized Zarang, drove out the Ṭāhirid prefect Ibrāhīm b. Ḥusayn from Sijistān and ultimately made himself the master of the province.¹ These volunteers had set up a sort of democracy and the most able and deserving person from among themselves was elected as their chief. Thus this organization gave an opportunity to any person possessed of real talent to come to the fore. Ya'qūb, the son of a coppersmith and the founder of the Ṣaffārid dynasty, belonging to the town of Qarnīn in Sijistān near Zarang, was one of the volunteers of the Mutawwīa; and through his intrepidity, boldness and organizing capacity, found his way to the leadership.² When once Ya'qūb became the leader he soon showed his organizing capacity and administrative ability. His energetic suppression of the robber bands and the security he obtained for traffic won for him the admiration of all, and his exercise of the principles of equality amongst his followers enabled him to win the support of the poor Sijistānīs, whose national pride was, no doubt, gratified by the emergence of a leader from among themselves.

Though the 'Abbāsīd Caliphs stood in theory for the principle of impartiality, they did not treat the

¹ Nöldeke, p. 177.

² According to the usual account, Ya'qūb, by killing in a single combat the most dreaded captain of the Khārijites named Ammān, gave the first practical proof of his bravery, which led him to such eminence among his fellows that Dirham thought it expedient to leave the leadership to Ya'qūb by setting out for Mecca for the pilgrimage and finally settling down in Baghdād. Cf. Nöldeke, p. 178. According to *Ibn Aṭhūr*, VII, p. 124, Dirham was captured by the Ṭāhirid governor and sent to Baghdād where he served the Caliph.

Muslims on the whole on terms of equality. As the Umayyads had favoured the Arabs, so the 'Abbāsids favoured the Khurāsānīs and neglected the interests both of the Arabs and of the other peoples of Persia. This partiality was hardly to be tolerated; and thus we see this new movement, originally started to suppress the Khārijites, eventually turned against the weak administration of the Ṭāhirids themselves, and ultimately against the Caliphate which supported them in all their doings.

Ya'qūb and his brother Amr had no religious compunction in opposing the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate when it could not establish justice and equity in Sijistān. Their attitude towards the institution of the Caliphate can be well explained by the reply of Ya'qūb when he was asked by Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir for a deed of investiture from the Caliph at the time of his conquest of Khurāsān. Ya'qūb drew his sword from under his prayer-mat and told the messenger of Muḥammad that that was his deed and authority¹. The same attitude was shown by Amr at the time of his receiving the deed of investiture for the province of Māwarā al-Nahr. When the deed was presented to Amr, the latter asked the messenger what it meant. On receiving the envoy's explanation that it was the thing he had asked for from the Caliph, Amr replied, 'Of what use will it be to me? The province cannot be taken

¹ The 'Abbāsids, owing to the support given to them by the Khurāsānīs were bound to give them all high positions in Persia and the government of other provinces.

² *Gardīzī*, pp. 12-13.

from the hands of Ismā'il the Sāmānid except with the aid of a hundred thousand naked swords.'¹ No doubt Ya'qūb and his brother Amr caused prayer to be offered for the Caliph as the general Commander of all the Faithful, and inserted the latter's name on the coins current in their dominions; but this signified only a sort of religious recognition of the institution. Even this much was, perhaps, not due to their belief in the religious significance of the Caliphate, but was the outcome of political motives. At this time, when the Caliph's authority was considered infallible, and he was, in fact, as well as in theory, the head of the Islamic empire, it was very difficult for any governor to hold his own against the Caliphate; and still more for a usurper who had nothing, but the sword upon which to base his right. Hence for the success of their policy, the Ṣaffārids required to have some sort of nominal relationship with the Caliphate, otherwise there was every danger of alienating the sympathies of their own subjects, which were their main support in their struggle against the Caliphate. The importance of a deed of investiture from the Caliph cannot better be gauged than by the fact that Amr, who succeeded his brother Ya'qūb, was only given recognition as lawful ruler by the 'Ulamā and the volunteers for the faith, when he had secured his patent of sovereignty from the Caliph;² and to gain public opinion Amr, on another occasion,

¹ *Gardizi*, p. 18; *Ibn Khallikān*, De Slane, trans. IV, p. 326.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

exhibited the standard despatched from Baghdād in the court of his dwelling-house for three days at Nīshāpur.¹ For these reasons, the Ṣaffārids were obliged to come to terms with the Caliphate and ask for the confirmation of their claims over those territories which they had conquered even against the wishes of the Baghdād government; and to continue the name of the Caliph in the Khutbah and coinage even after they had come to a final breach with the central government, and were declared heretics and usurpers against the lawful government.²

How ambitious were the brothers to curtail even this nominal authority of the Caliph is evident from the fact that Ya'qūb was the first to introduce his name in the Khutbah along with that of the Caliph,³ and Amr was the first ruler to have his name inscribed on gold coins.⁴ The latter innovation on the part of a

¹ *Ṭabarī*, III, p. 2133.

² There is no historical evidence to show that the Ṣaffārids ever discontinued the name of the Caliph in the Khutbah and there is no coin which does not bear the Caliph's name during their regime. Cf. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*.

Upon Ya'qūb's conquest of Khurāsān against the wishes of the Caliphate, he was declared a heretic and a rebel against the legitimate authority before the caravan of pilgrims which was at that time in Baghdād on its return journey in 261/875. (*Ṭabarī*, III, p. 1887.)

Amr was also declared a heretic before the pilgrims and orders were issued throughout the Islamic empire that he should be cursed from all the pulpits. (*Ṭabarī*, III, p. 2106.)

³ *Narshakhī*, p. 77. It is related that in 261/875, the Caliph ordered the exclusion of the name of Ya'qūb from the Khutbah and the inclusion of that of Naṣr, the Sāmānid at Bukhāra.

⁴ Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, Add. IX, p. 177. On a gold coin minted in the year 275 A.H. Amr's name appears along with his father's. It should be noted that the Ṭāhirids were not allowed to put their names on gold coins in Persia.

governor in the East almost signified his independence. There is no evidence to show that the Ṣaffārids ever paid any regular tribute to the Baghdād government, although Ya'qūb, if Khallikān¹ is to be trusted, agreed to pay in two-thirds of the taxes furnished by all the provinces which he governed. Their insatiable nature and want of moderation would not allow them to be content with what they had already gained, but they were bent upon excluding the temporal power of the Caliphate from Persia, and, if possible, from Baghdād itself.² In fact they were trying to anticipate the Buwayhids by taking over all the political power into their hands and allowing the Caliph to remain as a nominal religious head.

¹ *Ibn Khallikān*, De Slane, trans. IV, p. 320.

² In 261/875 the Caliphate tried to reconcile Ya'qūb by granting him the government of Khurāsān, Tabaristān, Jurjān, Rayy, and Fārs as well as the military governorship of Baghdād. (*Ṭabarī*, III, p. 1892.) But Ya'qūb insisted on coming to Baghdād to settle the terms of the treaty. The Caliph was well aware of his intention of capturing Baghdād itself and consequently made preparations to oppose him and ultimately by giving the colour of holy war to his movements against the Ṣaffārid, succeeded in repelling the attack. Ya'qūb was defeated near Dayār al-'Āqūl in 262/876 and after this never condescended to come to terms with the Baghdād government which made one more effort to come to a good understanding with Ya'qūb; but the latter's reply to the Caliph's messenger again shows his attitude towards the Caliphate. He said, "Take back the answer that I am ill; if I die then we will have peace from one another, but should I recover, nothing shall settle matters between us except the sword. If I lose all my territory, I shall return to the coarse bread and onions which was the food of my youth." Cf. *Ibn Athir*, VII, p. 226. *Ibn Khallikān*, De Slane, trans. IV, p. 321.

Amr was not only confirmed in all his brother's possessions, but was also given the honour of getting his name inscribed on the standards, lances and shields in the government office at Baghdād. Cf. *Ṭabarī*, III, p. 2115. But his insatiable nature led him to oblige the Caliph to grant him the deed of investiture for the province of Māwarā al-Nahr which was under the Sāmānids. This led him to a war with Ismā'il who defeated him and sent him a prisoner to Baghdād in 287/900. Cf. *Ṭabarī*, III, p. 2194.

Whatever their actual intentions, the Ṣaffārids did certain things which made them appear as the champions of the orthodox faith and faithful allies of the Caliphate. Both Ya'qūb and Amr waged wars against infidels in the East and sent magnificent presents to the Caliph. Ya'qūb enlarged his dominions by conquests in the mountainous region to the East and contributed much to the gradual rise of Islam in the country now known as Afghānistān.¹ But the object of the holy war was perhaps to extend their territories and to secure booty; and the despatch of costly presents to the Caliph only to keep him in good humour in order to secure recognition or to plead their cause for a fresh province upon which they had closed their greedy teeth; and also perhaps to figure as the champions of Islam in the public eye.

The Ṣaffārids also fought against both the Khārijites and the 'Alids and with the same political objects in view. Ya'qūb, though he himself is supposed to have been a Khārijite in the beginning of his career,² yet came into prominence by fighting against them as has been shown above. After the defeat of Muhammad the Ṭāhirid, when he was making his case for the

¹ Nöldeke, p. 182. In 259/871 Ya'qūb sent an embassy to the Caliph Mu'tamid with the idols which he had captured in Kabul or the neighbouring lands. Amr also carried his arms into the eastern heathen lands as is shown by the large presents he sent to Baghdād in 283/896. Besides 400,000 dirhams, he sent a number of camels and especially a bronze image richly decked with precious stones of a goddess having four arms. There were a number of other idols upon the car on which it was borne. Cf. Nöldeke, p. 200.

² Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 216.

government of Khurāsān, in token of his profound attachment to the Caliphate, he sent the head of a Khārijite captain who, in the neighbourhood of Hirāt, for thirty years had dared to call himself 'Commander of the Faithful.'¹ When Ḥasan, the ruler of Ṭabaristān, gave refuge to Ya'qūb's opponent 'Abd Allāh, he declared war against him and defeated him. He sent a most deferential account of his victory over the 'Alid dynasty of Ṭabaristān to the Caliphate and announced to the Commander of the Faithful that he had in his custody sixty members of the family of 'Alī in 260/873.² Amr also took the field against Rafī' when he revolted against the authority of the Caliphate and by joining the 'Alid prince of Ṭabaristān had embraced the Shī'a creed and caused the public prayer to be offered for the 'Alid. He hunted Rafī' from place to place and finally sent his head to the Caliph in 284/897.³ In both cases the object was to secure the possession of Khurāsān.

The revolt of the Ṣaffārids against the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate should, by no means, be considered as a Persian revolt against Arab domination. That there was not even the vestige of Persian nationalism in those times is evident from the absence of any concerted action of various Persian rulers against the Caliphate. As has already been shown, the Ṣaffārids were always busy fighting the other Persian rulers, and

¹ *Tabarī*, III, p. 1882; *Nöldeke*, p. 184.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1884.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 2160.

on several occasions they allied themselves with the Caliphate against them. That Ya'qūb was a Muslim first of all cannot be illustrated better than by his refusal of an alliance with the leader of the Zanj against their common enemy, *i.e.*, the Caliphate. Ya'qūb's despatch of a Quranic verse in reply to the peace overtures, "Say to infidels, I do not worship that which you worship," is characteristic of his orthodoxy.¹ Nor were the Ṣaffārids inspired by any ideal of a pre-Islamic king in Persia. In the absence of any settled government they could not establish a regular system of administration; but whatever principles they applied in governing their dominions were more in keeping with the teachings of Islam than with the pre-Islamic idea of kingship.² They considered themselves equal even to their soldiers; formed all their plans themselves and directed their executive personally as far as possible. Even a ruler of extensive dominions, Ya'qūb continued to live as a simple soldier. In his tent he slept upon his shield without any attendants. Both the brothers supervised the administration of their country and delivered justice personally. As regards any fixed rules for revenue collection, they

¹ *Ibn Athir*, VII, p. 201.

² The Sāsānid king remained hidden, inaccessible and invisible even to the highest dignitaries of his court. Cf. *Christensen*, p. 97; *Huart*, p. 145. The king showed himself in public only on rare occasions amidst great pomp and show which was intended to impress the onlookers, for nobody durst raise his voice in the presence of the king. Cf. *Christensen*, p. 98; *Huart*, p. 147. In great battles which were directed by the king himself, a throne of considerable grandeur was set up in the centre of the army. Cf. *Christensen*, p. 63; *Huart*, p. 15.

had none; they applied their own laws in accordance with their needs¹

In short, the relations of the Ṣaffārids with the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate were not so anomalous as they appear. The Ṣaffārids were willing to show the traditional regard for the religious institution of the Caliphate, but the exigencies of right and justice and the weak rule both at the centre and in the provinces prompted them to set up a new rule. Their want of moderation came in the way of their achieving any permanent results for the dynasty.² But they were the first in Persia to contest the political supremacy of the 'Abbāsīds and were bent upon reducing their temporal power to the minimum. Fortunately for the Caliphate, the emergence of these dissenters coincided with the period of Muwaffaq and his son Mu'tadīd who were strong enough to curb their ambition. They themselves also contributed to this result by antagonising both the Khārijites and 'Alids at the same time. Although both the brothers were defeated and died without fulfilling their ambition, yet they succeeded in asserting the right of the subordinate princes to share with the Caliphate the two outward insignia of sovereignty, i.e., the inclusion of their names in the Khutbah and on the coinage in their dominions, and moreover, established a precedent in

¹ Noldeke, pp. 193-94; *Mīr Khwānd*, p. 710.

² But the strength of the ties uniting the Ṣaffārids with the population of Sijistān is shown by the reappearance and maintenance of the dynasty (except for a short interval under Ghaznavids and Saljuqids) down to the fifteenth century. Cf. *Zambaur*, p. 200.

governing their territories without any regular payment to Baghdād. Thus the Ṣaffārīds set the example for the curtailment of the temporal power of the Caliphate in Persia. These concessions once extorted from the Caliphate, had to be *nolens volens* bestowed by the Caliphs themselves upon their successors, *i.e.*, the Sāmānīds whose relations with the Caliphate we shall trace in the following pages.

CALIPHATE AND THE SAMANIDS

The relations of the Sāmānīds¹ with the Caliphate naturally fall into two periods; the first from 261/874, when they first come into direct relationship with the Baghdād government, till 333/944; the second from 334/945, when the Caliphate came under the tutelage of the Buwayhīds, till their downfall at the hands of Mahmūd of Ghazna in 384/999. Since their relations during the second period form part of the next chapter they will be dealt with later.

Ruling as subordinates to the Khurāsānī government, the Sāmānīds came into direct relationship with the Abbāsīd Caliphate only after the conquest of Khurāsān by Ya'qūb, when in 261/874 the Caliph Mu'tamid granted to Naṣr, the founder of the dynasty, the patent of sovereignty to govern the provinces of Māwarā al-Nahr which he had already been governing under the Ṭāhirīds.² The Caliph gave an order for the exclusion of the name of Ya'qūb from the Khutbah in

¹ See article on the Sāmānīds in the *Encycl. of Islām*.

² *Ibn Athīr*, VII, p. 193.

those regions and the inclusion of Naṣr's name instead.¹ Thus the concession of mentioning the governor's name in the Khutbah after that of the Caliph, which had been extorted by Ya'qūb, was voluntarily given by the Caliph himself to the Sāmānid Amīr. On the death of Naṣr in 279/892, his brother Ismā'īl was installed in his place and in addition to Māwarā al-Nahr, Ismā'īl after his victory over Amr in 287/900 was given the government of Khurāsān which by right of conquest already belonged to him.²

There is no evidence as to any regular tribute paid by the Sāmānids to the central government from the time of the grant of the province of Khurāsān to them after the defeat of Amr. In fact ever since the defeat of Muhammad b. Tāhir in 259/871 neither of the governors who were given the government of Khurāsān paid any regular tribute nor were they willing to do so. The defiant attitude of various governors had involved the Baghdād government in costly wars. Under such circumstances the Caliphate was, perhaps, glad to have the opportunity of entrusting the government of this province to one of its loyal governors on the same conditions as it was ruled by the defiant ones. Since the inclusion of the name of a governor on a gold coin in the East signified his independence, we can date the political independence of the Sāmānids, so far as any regular tribute is concerned, at the latest, from the year 295/907 in which

¹ *Narshakhi*, p. 77.

² *Ṭabarī*, III, p. 2195; *Ibn Athir*, VII, pp. 346-47.

year there appears a gold coin on which the name of the Sāmānid Amīr Ahmad b. Ismā'il appears along with that of the Caliph.¹ By the year 306/918, however, it becomes quite clear that the Sāmānids did not pay any regular tribute for the provinces of Khurāsān and Māwarā al-Nahr, as the budget drawn up for 'Alī Ibn 'Isā, the wazīr of the Caliph Muqtadir, in that year does not contain any revenues from the above provinces.² Thus the Sāmānids were now in full enjoyment of the three concessions extorted by the Ṣaffārids from the Caliphate, i.e., the sharing of the two insignia of sovereignty, and the appropriation of the whole of the revenues.

The Sāmānids, being staunch Sunnīs, needed the sanction of the Caliphate to govern their territories so that their possessions might be placed on a legal basis, and their civil administration carried on in accordance with the Shari'ah. It was this religious necessity that compelled them to ask for a deed of investiture for the possessions whose *de facto* rulers they had become by right of conquest. The acceptance of a deed from the Caliphate was in form a declaration of their political subordination to the former, to which a sort of sanction was attached by the necessity of its renewal on the demise of the grantor and the grantee. The possession of this right by the Caliphate made it the custodian of the sovereignty *de jure*, and the Sāmānids

¹ Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, Additions, p. 179.

² Kremer, *Ueber das Einnahmebudget des Abbasidenreichs*, (Monograph on 'Alī Ibn 'Isā and his statesmanship.)

were left with the possession of the sovereignty *de facto* alone. On the other hand the Caliph had no hand in the appointment of an Amīr, which was the concern of the Sāmānid government alone. On occasions of successions to the throne, the new ruler applied to the Caliph for the deed of investiture, which was then duly issued by the Caliph. With their political influence waning, the Caliphs began to attach a touch of sacredness to the ceremony by sometimes tying the banner with their own hands.¹ It is very regrettable that there is no copy of such a deed in existence within our knowledge, but from the contents of a copy of an oath of allegiance taken by Mas'ūd to the Caliph, we gather that this document was not a blank cheque given to the governors to rule their kingdoms as they liked; there were certain religious as well as political obligations to be fulfilled by the rulers, who used to bind themselves with formidable oaths to perform them.² Although there was no sanctioning authority to enforce these obligations on the rulers, yet it seems still to have been understood that they were morally bound to abide by them, and there seems to be no hint in any of our sources that orthodox public opinion in Khurāsān was prepared as yet to admit any severing of the link with the Caliphate.

So far as their internal administration was concerned the Sāmānids were quite independent of the central

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 4.

² *Bayhaqī*, pp. 384-89.

government, but the report of every revolt, every new conquest, and all the movements that were going on in their dominions, was sent to the Baghdād government; and the Sāmānīd Amīrs were expected to act in accordance with the instructions received from Baghdād. In addition, they had to render help to the Caliphate by suppressing all religious revolts, waging jihād, arranging for the pilgrimage, etc.

When Ṭāhir b. Muhammad b. Amr the Ṣaffārid entered Fārs and expelled the prefect of the Caliph in 288/901, Ismā'īl wrote to him that the Caliph had given him the province of Sijistān with all its appendages, and therefore he should abstain from capturing it. In consequence of this, Ṭāhir returned, and the Caliph appointed his own client Badr to Fārs.¹ In 296/910 Ahmad b. Ismā'īl sent a despatch to Baghdād announcing the conquest of Sijistān and the capture of Muhammad b. 'Alī b. Layth who was a rebel against the Caliphate.² This was followed by a despatch announcing that he had captured Subkara who had captured Fārs against the wishes of the Baghdād government.³ In accordance with the orders received from the Caliphate, the two prisoners were despatched to Baghdād and the messengers of the Sāmānīds were sent back with robes and scented jewels for the governor of Khurāsān.⁴ In 309/921 an envoy of the ruler of Khurāsān brought to Baghdād the head of

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, VII, p. 352.

² *Misk.* I, p. 19; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 21; *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 46.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Misk.* I, p. 20; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 22.

Layla b. Nu'mān, the Daylamite, who had rebelled against the authority of the Caliphate in Tabaristān;¹ and in 330/941 Makan b. Kaki's head was sent with some presents to the Caliphate.²

The Sāmānids were so loyal to the authority of the Caliphate that they did not oppose it even if their own rights were infringed. They took all such things in good part and were quite content with what they could get out of the Caliph by peaceful means. When Baris Kabīr who was the governor of Rayy, Tabaristān and Jurjān on behalf of the Sāmānids, made his way to Baghdād on the death of Ismā'il in 295/907 with all the revenues he had collected, the Sāmānid government condemned the action of the Caliph Muqtadir who welcomed the traitor and gave him the government of Diyār-Bakr.³ Again in 303/915 Muhammad b. Alī b. Sulūk, a cousin of the governor of Khurāsān who came to Baghdād demanding protection, was welcomed by the Caliph and presented with a robe of honour.⁴

When the people of Sijistān revolted against the authority of the newly appointed Sāmānid ruler, Naṣr II, and paid homage to Muqtadir, the Caliph assigned the province to his own men who imprisoned the officials of the Sāmānid ruler and sent them as prisoners to Baghdād in 301/913.⁵ Even then the

¹ *Misk.* I, p. 76; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 84.

² *Ibid.*, II, p. 23; *Ibid.*, V, p. 24.

³ *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, pp. 5-6; *Mīr Khwānd*, p. 717.

⁴ *Misk.* I, p. 39; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 43.

⁵ *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, pp. 59-60.

Sāmānids did not lift a finger against their legitimate suzerain the Caliph, whom they considered justified in granting a piece of territory which they themselves had governed on payment of tribute to whomsoever he chose.

Whenever an opportunity arose, the Sāmānids waged holy war against the infidels. In 291/903 when the Turks entered Māwarā al-Nahr, Ismā'il persuaded the Muslims to wage war against them, and with the help of the warriors for the Faith, he practically destroyed them. He sent a despatch relating these proceedings to Baghdād.¹

The Sāmānids, being staunch Sunnīs, were naturally opposed to any anti-Sunnī movement during their jurisdiction, as it was also detrimental to their political interest. When Muhammad b. Zayd, governor of Tabaristān, attacked Jurjān in 289/901, Muhammad b. Hārūn, the general sent by Ismā'il, not only expelled the 'Alids from Jurjān, but brought his own country Tabaristān under the jurisdiction of the Sāmānids, and caused the Khutbah to be read in the name of the 'Abbāsīd Caliph.² In 290/902 when Muhammad b. Hārūn, who had been appointed by Ismā'il as governor of Tabaristān, rebelled against him, and threw off the allegiance of the 'Abbāsīds by defying the authority of the Caliphate and occupying Rayy against its will, Ismā'il, under instructions from the central government, proceeded to restore order in Rayy and expel

¹ *Tabari*, III, p. 2249; *Ibn Athīr*, VII, p. 368.

² *Ibid.*, p. 2208; *Ibid.*, p. 357.

the rebel.¹ He occupied Rayy whose government was assigned to him by the Caliphate on the stipulation of a regular payment of tribute.²

The Qarmatian propaganda won several adherents amongst the Sāmānid officials and finally Amīr Naṣr himself became a convert to their teachings.³ The 'Ulamā naturally resented the conversion of the Amīr to heresy and they invoked the help of the Turkish guards who formed a plot to depose the Amīr and offer the throne to the great Sipahsālār. The plot being discovered, the Amīr's son Nūh ordered the leader of the conspirators to be executed, and Naṣr announced his abdication in favour of his son, Nūh, against whom there was no accusation of heresy. Nūh gave orders to imprison his father and put him in chains. Afterwards he ruthlessly persecuted the heretics, and their property, including the treasure of the deposed heretic Amīr, was transferred to the orthodox. Henceforward the Sheites were completely suppressed and continued only as a secret sect.⁴

The Sāmānids were not as ambitious as their

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, VII, p. 365.

² Kremer, *Ueber des Einnahmebudget des Abbasidenreichs*, p. 28. The revenue of Rayy appears in the budget of Baghdād government for 306/918-19; in 314/926 when Ibn Abu'l Saj was given the government of Jibāl and was ordered to fight the Qarmatians the government of Rayy was given to the Sāmānids and a person was sent to settle the kharāj. See *Misk.* I, p. 149; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 166. This clearly shows that Ismā'il had not annexed Rayy as it is mentioned in the article on Ismā'il in the *Encyclopædia of Islām* by Barthold.

³ Nizām-ul-Mulk, *Siyāsatnāmah*, pp. 188-931; Al-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 188; Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 243-44.

⁴ *Ibid.*

predecessors, the Šaffārids ; and were content with what they could get out of the Caliphate by peaceful means, as the strongest Sunnī power in Persia their opinion was invited even in the matter of an election of a Caliph.¹ They had inspired so much confidence through their loyalty that the Calips regarded their dominions as the last place of refuge in case of danger. When the Caliph Muqtadir was hard pressed by the Qarmaṭians, ‘Alī Ibn ‘Isā addressed the Caliph thus: “If another thing come about, then do thou depart to the remotest part of Khurāsān.”²

The Sāmānids were in return duly rewarded for their loyalty by the Caliphate. Without the least remonstrance, the central government granted them the very concessions which were grudged to others. So much was the Caliphate sure of their loyalty that the government of all these parts which were supposed to be on the verge of revolt was invariably assigned to them; while they, on their part, suppressed all such revolts, pacified the country and held it, if the Caliphate so desired, or else made it over to the Caliphate. In short, it can be concluded that perfect mutual harmony existed between the ‘Abbāsīd Caliphate and the Sāmānīd Amīrs in their relations during this period.

¹ *Misk.* I, p. 4; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 4.

At the time of the election of Muqtadir in 295/907, the wazīr ‘Abbās was waiting for the arrival of the chamberlain of Ismā‘īl b. Ahmad, ruler of Khurāsān.

² *Misk.* I, p. 181; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 204.

CHAPTER II

Caliphate under the Buwayhid régime and its Relations with Persian Rulers

WITH the capture of Baghdād by the Buwayhids¹ a new chapter opened in the history of the Caliphate. Almost all the temporal power of the Caliph was already taken over by various Amīrs who had risen to power at Baghdād before the Buwayhids. The most important symbol of sovereignty, *i.e.*, the coinage, had already been shared by them and many of the functions of the wazīr were taken over by the secretary of the Amīr al-Umarā. Even the revenue realized from several parts of the empire was not received directly by the Caliph, who was given an allowance just sufficient to meet his necessary expenses.² In spite of all this the Caliph was still considered the temporal as well as religious head of the Islamic community and orders were issued in his name. He still retained the right

¹ See art. on Buwayhids in the *Encycl. of Islām*. After strengthening his position, Abu'l-Hasan 'Alī applied in 322 A.H. to the Caliph Rādī, to invest him with the porvinces which were already in his possession. The Caliph consented on condition of payment by him of eight million dirhams. 'Alī forcibly took the robe of honour and the standard from the Caliph's messenger and did not pay even a single penny. Cf. *Misk.* I, pp. 299-300. This shows the necessity of securing a deed of investiture from the Caliph; and also the attitude of the Buwayhids to recognize the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate.

² *Misk.* I, p. 352; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 396.

to appoint his own wazīr, whose existence could not be ignored, especially when there were so many competitors for the rank of Amīr al-Umarā.

But with the advent of the Buwayhids to power at Baghdād, still worse was to come. Being Shī'as, they did not acknowledge the Caliphate of the 'Abbāsids whom they considered as usurpers!¹ It was only for political motives that Mu'izz al-Daulah recognized the institution. His position in the beginning was not safe at all. After his peaceful occupation of Baghdād, he had to meet his rivals the Hamdānids, who had already held the post of the Amīr al-Umarā. They nearly turned the scales of victory in their favour and it was only a stroke of fortune that, by a mere stratagem, Mu'izz could retain possession of Baghdād in 334/945.² Besides he had to deal with the Barīdīs and the Qarmatians.

Mu'izz al-Daulah was aware of this opposition and therefore did not think it politic to alienate the sympathies of the majority of the population at Baghdād who were Sunnīs.³ Perhaps he had a mind to replace the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate by an 'Alīd one after completely establishing himself. He expressed his desire to transfer the Caliphate to the family of 'Alī immediately after deposing the Caliph Mustakfī on a mere suspicion of intriguing against his authority. But he was checked in his design by the advice of one of his courtiers who

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 399.

² *Ibid.*, p. 341.

³ *Misk*, II, p. 328 ; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 355.

pronounced it to be unsound policy, remarking, 'If trouble were to arise between yourself and the 'Abbāsīd Caliph, your followers who do not believe him to be the rightful claimant, will not hesitate even if you order them to kill him, but in case of an 'Alid Caliph, they will not hesitate to carry out his commands even if it be to kill you.' These words appealed to Mu'izz who being actuated by personal considerations, dropped the proposal. Political considerations outweighed his religious sentiments and thus the choice fell on an 'Abbāsīd Caliph, Mutī'. Thus the 'Abbāsīd Caliphs obtained recognition at the hands of those who did not believe in their rights.¹

When the Buwayhids took charge of the administration of the Caliphate, a permanent Amirate with hereditary rights was established, and by these Amīrs the Caliph was practically stripped of his remaining sovereign functions and privileges. Formerly the Caliph had a wazīr and the Amīr al-Umarā a secretary, but now it was the other way about. The Caliph had no hand in the actual appointment of the wazīr and even the right of appointing the wazīr and the governors in theory was shared by the Amīrs.² The Caliph Mustakfī was granted a daily allowance of five thousand dirhams,³ but it was further reduced to two thousand

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, pp. 339-40. This conversation is probably to be regarded not as a historically founded fact, but rather as a summing up of Ibn al-Athīr's own reading of the situation. Nevertheless, in the present state of our knowledge, it appears to be a justifiable view.

² *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 399; quoted from Sabī's collections, pp. 222-23.

³ *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 338. Not dīnārs as mentioned in the *History of the Saracens* by Amīr 'Alī, p. 303.

on the appointment of his successor, the Caliph Mutī¹ and that too was at the mercy of these Amīrs. His personal estate, which yielded a yearly income of 200,000 dīnārs, was put in charge of a secretary;² but this revenue, like the personal allowance, depended on the goodwill of the Buwayhid Amīrs who might confiscate it if they so desired.³ Sometimes, when the Amīrs were hard pressed for money, it was not unusual that a demand was made of the Caliphs to advance some money from their personal income towards the common exchequer; and the Caliphs being not in a position to resist such abnormal demands for fear of deposition, had to accede to them.⁴

The provincial governors or rulers who recognized the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate as a religious institution mentioned the Caliph's name in the Khutbah on Fridays and other ceremonial occasions, and this signified (as has been shown in the previous chapter) the religious recognition of the Caliphate by the rulers who were otherwise independent. But the Khutbah at Baghdād was also, before the advent of the Buwayhids, a symbol of their political supremacy. During the régime of the latter, this prerogative of the Caliph also was en-

¹ *Misk.* II, p. 87; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 91.

² *Ibid.*, p. 108; *Ibid.*, p. 111.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 344; *Ibid.*, p. 377.

During the period of Mu'izz al-Daulah much of the personal property of the Caliph was confiscated and given to the soldiers.

⁴ *Misk.* II, p. 308; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 330. In 361/971 Bakhtiyār under the pretext of waging jihād realized 400,000 dirhams from the Caliph Mutī', who, it was given out, had to sell some of his jewels and furniture, to meet this abnormal demand.

croached upon and the custom was started of having the name of the Amīr conjoined with that of the Caliph in the Khutbah at Baghdād. 'Adud al-Daulah was the first to introduce the innovation,¹ and henceforward it became the usual practice for the subsequent Buwayhid Amīrs. Although this prerogative was more under the control of the public than of either the Caliph or the Buwayhid Amīr, yet 'Adud al-Daulah could show his high-handedness when he caused the omission of the name of the Caliph Tai for two whole months from all the pulpits under his control.² Generally, however, a request was made by the Amīr to the Caliph for the inclusion of his name in the Khutbah at Baghdād, and this was usually granted. Since it was the most decisive sign of recognition of an Amīr by the Caliph, great importance was attached even to the order in which the names followed after the name of the Caliph. One of the conditions of peace between Sharaf al-Daulah and his brother Samsām al-Daulah was that the former's name should be mentioned in the Khutbah at Baghdād after the Caliph's and before Samsām al-Daulah's name.³ The exclusion of the name of a certain Amīr from the Khutbah at Baghdād meant *ipso facto* the termination of his sovereignty at Baghdād. A striking illustration of this is furnished by the

¹ *Misk.* II, p. 396; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 435; *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 507.

Ibn Ra'q's name was ordered to be mentioned in the Khutbah in all pulpits, (*Cf. Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 241); but it is quite clear that these did not include the pulpits of Baghdād. It is noteworthy that this came about gradually, as distinct from that in the provincial cities.

² Arnold, *Caliphate*, p. 62.

³ *Misk.* III, p. 124; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, p. 127.

repeated inclusion and exclusion of the name of Jalāl al-Daulah from the Khutbah at Baghdād.¹

In all these provinces which were under the political control of the Buwayhids the Khutbah contained not only the name of the Amīr al-Umarā at Baghdād alongside that of the Caliph, but sometimes those of other members of the Buwayhid family as well.² In those provinces, of course, where the rulers were politically independent of the Buwayhids, the latter were not included in the Khutbah, and only the name of the 'Abbāsīd Caliph was mentioned to signify the religious recognition of the institution.

In regard to the coinage, the Buwayhids not only shared but monopolised this symbol of sovereignty to such an extent that even the epithet 'Amīr al-Mu'minīn' after the name of the Caliph was omitted.³ Only the name of the Caliph, generally on the reverse side, was kept on, whereas not only the name of the Amīr al-Umarā with his titles and kunyā but also the name and title of the head of the Buwayhid family and sometimes that of the heir-apparent were inscribed on the coinage minted at Baghdād.⁴ Since the coinage was directly under the control of the Buwayhids, they

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, IX, pp. 288 and 308-309.

² *Misk*, II, p. 115; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 118. In 337/948 in a treaty with Nāsir al-Daulah, the Hamdānid, Mu'izz al-Daulah agreed at that his name as well as those of 'Imād al-Daulah and Bakhtiyār should be mentioned in the Khutbah recited in the territories.

³ Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, II, pp. 194-220. There is no coin minted during the Buwayhid régime, which bears the epithet, 'Amīr al-Mu'minīn' after the name of the Caliph.

⁴ Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, II, pp. 200-206.

could put on it even those titles which were not granted to them by the Caliph.¹ It is very interesting to note that even the title *shāhinshāh* appears on coins minted at Baghdād, although there is no historical evidence to show that such a title was ever granted to any of the Buwayhid rulers² before Jalāl al-Daulah. The controversy that arose on the request of the latter for the grant of the title 'Malik al-Mulūk,' and which led to the setting up of a tribunal of qādīs to consider the legality of such a grant,³ is an ample proof of the above statement. A study of the coinage shows how the pendulum of sovereignty swung from the Amīr to the Caliph and *vice versa*. During the régime of powerful Amīrs, the name of the Caliph appears generally on the reverse side, whereas during the reign of weak Buwayhids, it appears on the obverse side; and with the decline of the Buwayhid power, the Caliph Qādir succeeded in having even his son's name struck at the coinage minted at Baghdād.⁴

Another prerogative hitherto exclusively reserved to the Caliph, that of having the drums sounded at his gate at the prayer times, was encroached upon by

¹ *British Museum Catalogue*. A coin minted at Baghdād in the year 370 A.H. bears the title 'Shāhinshāh' after the name of 'Adud al-Daulah. The above epithet is very frequent after the name of Bahā al-Daulah. Even the title 'Malik al-Mulūk' appears on a silver coin minted at Hamadān in the year 406 A.H.

² It is wrongly stated that Bahā al-Daulah obtained the title of 'Shāhinshāh' from the Caliph; and that the controversy with regard to Jalāl al-Daulah was concerned with the recital of the above title in the Khutbah. Cf. Minorsky, *La Domination des Dailamites*, p. 18.

³ *Ibn Athīr*, pp. 312-13.

⁴ Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, p. 219.

'Adud al-Daulah who compelled the Caliph to give orders that the drums should be sounded at his gate three times a day, morning, sunset and nightfall.¹ Henceforward it became the usual practice for the Buwayhid Amīrs to have the drums sounded at their gates. Both Sultān al-Daulah and Jalāl al-Daulah in spite of the remonstrances of the Caliph succeeded in having the drums sounded at their gates five times a day.²

The Buwayhids, ambitious as they were to rule, still found it expedient to allow the Caliphate to retain its sovereignty *de jure*. Consequently the functions of issuing the deed of investiture both on the change of a Caliph and an Amīr remained intact and in force. Though it was a purely formal proceeding and the Caliph had no alternative but to issue such a deed to the winning party, yet its importance cannot be minimised as, in order to satisfy the public mind, the proceeding had to be gone through and there is not a single instance in which a deed was not asked for by a Buwayhid Amīr. A formal assembly used to be held to which the high officials, various dignitaries of the court, commanders of the army and religious heads, *i.e.*, Qādis and Faqīhs, were invited. The recipient of the deed of investiture presented himself most humbly and solemnly before the Caliph whose hands he would kiss and then place the robes of honour on his head as a mark of reverence. Then the contents of the

¹ *Misk*. II, p. 396; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 435. *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 507.

² *Ibn Athīr*, IX, pp. 215, 255.

deed of investiture would be read aloud, and both the recipient Amīr and the Caliph would bind themselves with mutual oaths, that of allegiance on the part of the former and of fidelity on the part of the latter.¹ The public attached so much importance to this deed of investiture that at this period, it seems, it was still difficult for any ruler to establish his rights permanently without securing it. In cases of contending parties and usurpers it was considered a chief factor in establishing their claims.² But during the Buwayhid régime everything depended upon the reigning Amīr, without whose consent the Caliph could not issue any such patent of sovereignty. In fact most of the governors and usurpers applied to the Buwayhid Amīrs for such grant rather than to the Caliph, who sometimes used to issue such deeds even if they were against his own wish.³ Not only the Amīr al-Umarā but any powerful Buwyahid ruler could render the

¹ *Misk.* III, pp. 84, 141 and 240; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, pp. 85, 146 and 254, respectively.

The words *خلوص النية و بالوفا* have been misinterpreted as loyalty and fidelity; while the words *صدق الطاعة* have been mistranslated as fidelity. Cf. *Misk.* III, p. 240; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, p. 254.

² *Misk.* II, p. 239; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 254. After the imprisonment of his father by Abu Taghīb, the Hamdānid, in 357/968, his right was contested by his brothers and in order to strengthen his cause, Abū Taghīb offered 1,200,000 dirhams a year to Bakhtiyār for the renewal of the deed. Cf. the story told in *Misk.* III, p. 89; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, p. 91, that Muzaffar b. 'Alī, the Chamberlain of Abu'l Mali, governor of Marshas, bade his clerk write a letter in the name of the Caliph entrusting him with the administration.

³ *Misk.* II, pp. 156-57; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 167. Ibn Muḥtāj secured the deed of investiture through Rukn al-Daulah, for the province of Khurāsān which was in the possession of Sunnī rulers, the Sāmānids.

whole proceeding a mere mockery. When Bakhtiyār wanted to conciliate Fakhr al-Daulah in order to win his support against 'Adud al-Daulah, he had the Caliph Tai issue a deed of investiture to him and his commander, Sahlan b. Musāfir, for the territories in their control as governors appointed by the Caliph and not as deputies of 'Adud al-Daulah as previously arranged. Sahlan was also granted the title of 'Ismat al-Daulah and was called by his kunyā. But both these persons, owing to their fear of 'Adud al-Daulah could not even venture to don the robes of honour neither did Sahlan dare to assume his title.¹

Another prerogative of the Caliphate was to bestow honours and this was the only thing left to them by which they could flatter or please a certain Amīr. Since there was a regular craze amongst the Amīrs to obtain flattering titles from the Caliphs,² the latter were very careful about the grant of them and great ingenuity was exercised in devising a suitable title in each case. Even the use of the kunyā by the Caliph was considered to be an honour and sometimes persons of high rank insisted on receiving this honour.³ In this respect too the Caliphs were prevailed upon by their Buwayhid masters to grant them high-sound-

¹ *Misk.* II, pp. 364-65; *Eclipse*, trans. V, pp. 398-99.

² *Ibid.*, p. 321; *Ibid.*, p. 346.

When peace was made between Bakhtiyār and Abū Taghīb, it was also agreed that the latter should receive a title. Bakhtiyār secured the title of 'Adud al-Daulah from the Caliph.

³ *Misk.* II, p. 346; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 376. When 'Adud al-Daulah wanted to conciliate Bakhtiyār's wazīr, the latter demanded the confirmation of his title and the use of his kunyā by the Caliph.

ing titles beyond all proportion to their merits; whilst, much as they would have liked to do so, they could not grant any title worth mentioning to the Sāmānids, who were more loyal to the Caliphate than any contemporary Persian ruler. Usually a request for the grant of a title was made not to the Caliph direct but to the Buwayhid Amīr at Baghdād who generally secured the title demanded for his favourites. In this respect, too, a new practice was adopted by the Buwayhids; not being content with the titles conferred on them by the Caliphs, some of them assumed titles of their own accord.¹

For political reasons, the Buwayhid Amīrs had various important orders issued in the Caliph's name and bearing his seal of which he was the sole custodian.² His signature was also required on all important correspondence that was carried on with the provincial governors,³ and even on contracts made with the officials effecting the assessment.⁴ But this appears to have been a purely formal proceeding; the Amīr made whatever arrangements suited him and sent the documents to the Caliph for signature.

Being Shi'as, the Buwayhids had no respect for the 'Abbāsid Caliphs and this explains the humiliating treatment accorded to the Caliphs by them. It was during their régime that the Caliphs, on formal

¹ As already stated the Buwayhids assumed the titles of Shāhinshāh and Malik al-Mulūk which were definitely not granted to them.

² *Misk.* II, p. 844; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 373.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 113; *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 129; *Ibid.*, p. 132.

occasions, visited the Amīrs in person.¹ Even the formal ceremony of election was done away with and the Buwayhids nominated whomsoever they would from amongst the family and could depose the Caliphs at will.²

The whole position of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate under the Buwayhid régime can be best described in the words of the Caliph, Mutī' (334-63/946-74) who being asked by Bakhtiyār to contribute to the expenses of the Sacred War out of his personal income, replied: "The Sacred War would be incumbent on me if the world were in my hands, and if I had the management of the money and the troops. As things are, when all I have is a pittance insufficient for my wants, and the world is in your hands and those of the provincial rulers, neither the Sacred War, nor the Pilgrimage, nor any other matter requiring the attention of the Sovereign is a concern of mine. All you

¹ *Misk*. II, p. 396; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 435.

In 368/978 the Caliph Tai went out to meet 'Adud al-Daulah with the whole of the resident army. The Caliph Tai also went to offer condolence to Bahā al-Daulah. Cf. *Misk*. III, p. 152-53; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, p. 158-59.

² *Misk*. II, p. 86; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 90; *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, pp. 338-39. In 334/946 Mu'izz al-Daulah deposed the Caliph Mustakfī on a mere suspicion that he was maintaining a secret correspondence with the Hamdānids against him (Mu'izz). When the Caliph was holding an assembly to receive an envoy from Khurāsān two Daylamites at Mu'izz's instigation entered the assembly, dragged the Caliph from his throne and took him on foot to Mu'izz's palace where he was confined. Mutī', who had sought protection with Mu'izz owing to his enmity with the late Caliph Mustakfī and is said to have excited Mu'izz against him, was raised to the office of the Caliphate.

In 381/991 Bahā al-Daulah actuated by his greed for the supposed wealth of the Caliph Tai, deposed the latter and installed his cousin Qādir in his place. *Misk*. III, p. 201; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, p. 213.

can claim from me is the name which is uttered in the Khutbah from your pulpits as a means of pacifying your subjects; and if you want me to renounce that privilege too, I am prepared to do so and leave everything to you."¹ No doubt these words were written in a state of utter despondency and in order to avoid the unjustifiable payment of money, yet they show the utter subservience of the Caliph to his merciless masters. The position of the Caliphs, however, was not so utterly hopeless as is represented by the above words. The same Caliph who was unwilling to part with some of his wealth to be spent on the Sacred War and the Pilgrimage, could find money to spend on the erection of three palaces which were of such considerable size that in the following century together with the remains of the old palace of the Taj in whose grounds they were created, they are said to have occupied about a third of the total area of East Baghdād.²

In spite of the insignificance to which the Caliphate at Baghdād had fallen, and the utter disregard in which the Caliphs were held by their Shi'a masters, their prestige as the religious head of the Sunnī Muslims was such that even the Buwayhids felt proud to offer their daughters and sisters in marriage to them; and could never get one in return.³ In this capacity, they

¹ *Misk*, II, pp. 307-308; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 330; *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 456.

² *Levy, Baghdad Chronicle*, pp. 162-63.

³ *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 454. In the year 369 A.H., it is mentioned that 'Adud al-Daulah arranged an alliance between himself and the Caliph Tai by marrying the Caliph's eldest daughter. It is obviously a mistake in the translation as it is 'Adud al-Daulah's daughter. The context makes it quite

received deputations from various independent Muslim (Sunnī) rulers to whom they issued deeds of investiture and from whom they received costly presents on various occasions;¹ and they addressed the pilgrims on their way to or from Mecca.² Even the Buwayhid Amīrs, in order to impress on men's minds the majesty and dignity of the Caliph's exalted office, considered it politic to display great pomp and show on ceremonial occasions.³ Besides, the Buwayhid Amīrs considered it one of their duties to maintain the prestige and integrity of the Caliphate in the eyes of the Muslim princes by asking them to pay homage to it by mentioning the name of the Caliph in the Khutbah and coinage in their territories.⁴ Even the Buwayhid rulers in Persia, Shī'as though they were,

clear on p. 14, VI (*Eclipse*) where it is mentioned that in the year 371 A.H., on his return to Baghdād, 'Adud al-Daulah, was told that Tai disliked his daughter.

¹ *Bayhaqī*, p. 361. It was customary with the Sunnī independent rulers to send costly presents to the Caliph.

² *Misk.* III, p. 250; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, pp. 265-66.

³ A vivid description of a grand assembly that was held to receive the Egyptian Ambassador is given by Prof. Arnold in *The Caliphate*, pp. 66-67.

⁴ When in 401/1010 the Uqaylid Amīr Qarwash b. Muqallad mentioned the name of Hākim, the 'Alid Caliph of Egypt, in the Khutbah in all his provinces, Mausil, Anbar, Kufa and Madā'in, etc., the Caliph Qādir protested against it and sent the Qādi Abū Bakr to Bahā al-Daulah asking him to take action. The latter sanctioned one hundred thousand dīnārs towards the expenses of the army and ordered one of his commanders to bring Qarwash to his senses. The latter was compelled to drop the name of the Egyptian Caliph from the Khutbah and re-insert that of the 'Abbāsīd. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 157. Being a Shī'a, Bahā al-Daulah was placed in an awkward situation and to justify his action in having the name of the Egyptian Caliph dropped from the Khutbah, he caused a document (Mahdar) to be drawn up in 402/1011 by the Qādis and the Shī'a 'Ulamā in which the claims of the Egyptian Caliphs were denounced. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 166.

continued to recognize the 'Abbāsid Caliphate by fulfilling the above obligations;¹ and in order to impress on the public mind the legality of their claims received deeds of investiture from the Caliph² and put on the robes of honour sent by the latter with great pomp and show.³

At Baghdād there were certain religious obligations which could only be fulfilled by the Caliphs themselves; and in spite of the efforts of the Buwayhids to usurp those functions, the Caliphs succeeded in retaining them. For instance, the appointment of the Qādis remained a prerogative of the Caliph even during this period of degradation. It was impossible for any Qādi to hold his office unless he was directly appointed by the Caliph. When Mu'izz al-Daulah in 350/961 not only appointed the chief Qādi without the sanction of the Caliph but actually farmed the post for 200,000 dirhams a year,⁴ things did not pass off quite smoothly for him. The Caliph declined to receive his nominee and would not permit him to be presented to him even on reception days; and two years later, when he was removed, his successor set aside all his judgments on the ground that he had bought his

¹ The name of the 'Abbāsid Caliph appears on all the coins minted in the territories administered by the Buwayhids in Persia. Cf. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*.

² *Misk.* II, pp. 364-65; *Eclipse*, trans. V, pp. 398-99.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 119; *Ibid.*, p. 123.

Rukn al-Daulah when he received the robes of honour for the provinces of Khurāsān, donned them in public and read his deed in the public mosque.

⁴ *Misk.* II, p. 189; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 205; *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 399.

office.¹ When Bahā al-Daulah wanted to place the judicial system under the Shī'a chief judge, he could not succeed owing to the refusal of the Caliph to nominate him. Consequently the otherwise all-powerful Buwayhid Amīr had to content himself with a separate office-holder, called Naqīb, to administer justice amongst the Shī'as according to their code of law.²

A transcript of the letter of appointment of the chief Qāḍi in the name of the Caliph in 366/976 in the *Rasā'il as-Sabi*³ is of interest as indicating the substantial independence still enjoyed by the officers of justice. Since most of the Qāḍis received a very meagre allowance, just enough to maintain themselves and their family, or sometimes even no salary at all,⁴ they were little inclined to yield to political pressure and feared neither Caliph nor Amīr.⁵

Besides delivering justice, one of the chief duties of the Qāḍis was to prepare a list of 'Attestors' (public

¹ *Misk*, II, p. 196; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 212; *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 407.

² *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 129.

³ *Mez, Renaissance of Islam*, trans. Khuda Bakhsh, pp. 229-30; quoted from *Rasā'il as-Sabi*, pp. 118-27. The Qāḍi is enjoined to study the Qur'ān constantly and offer prayers punctually. He is to show impartiality in matters of justice between Muslim and non-Muslim. He is authorised to select 'Attestors' discreetly and to employ an experienced legally trained Kātib, an incorruptible court ushar (Ḥājib) and a trustworthy deputy for work if he cannot personally attend to it.

⁴ *Misk*, II, p. 196; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 212.

⁵ *Mez, Renaissance of Islam*, trans. Khuda Bakhsh p. 218. The Baghdād Qāḍi al-Isfarainī (d. 406/1016) could say to the Caliph Qādir that he dare not dismiss him. On the contrary he—the Qāḍi—need only write to Khurāsān to shake the Caliph's throne. Cf. also the well-known instance of Māwardī's decision against Jalāl al-Daulah's receiving the title of Mulūk (*Ibn Athīr*, IX, pp. 312-13).

notaries) who should be of irreproachable character. The Qādis were punctilious in filling up this list; every six months fresh nominations were made and undesirable names were removed.¹ From among these Attestors were chosen a fixed number of persons to constitute a body of assessors to assist the Qādis.² The assessors were appointed personally by the Qādis and had to vacate their posts automatically on the removal or dismissal of the Qādi who had appointed them.³ That in the selection of the Attestors the Qādis were not influenced by the temporal authorities, can be illustrated by the fact that when 'Adud al-Daulah's general asked him to direct the Qādi to include a name in the list of Attestors he gave the following reply, 'You should speak about the promotion of soldiers. The inclusion of names in the list of Attestors is the Qādi's business. Neither you nor I have any voice in the matter.'⁴ The Caliph as the religious head could intervene if in his opinion any person of doubtful character was included in the list of Attestors. Yet sometimes the position of a Qādi was rendered very precarious if pressure was brought to bear upon him by the reigning Amīr; and in such cases usually a compromise was effected.⁵

¹ Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, trans. by Khuda Bakhsh, pp. 227-28.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 15.

⁵ *Misk*, III, pp. 270-80; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, pp. 205-98. Two traders while in Mecca on pilgrimage had employed a person who was not officially recognized as Attestor. When the purchaser invoked the help of the Buwayhid Amīr (Bahā al-Daulah) who issued orders to his representative at Baghdād to see to the ratification, the Qādis were placed in a very awkward

The Imāms of the mosques were directly responsible to the Caliph and generally had to carry out his orders. Of course the Buwayhid Amīrs could, if they so desired, prevent the Caliph's orders from being carried out; nevertheless, they generally did not interfere with them owing to public sentiment. The Imāms were also responsible for seeing that no innovations were introduced in the Khutbah. In 420/1029, when the Shī'as introduced an innovation in the Khutbah at Karkh, the Caliph appointed a khatīb and although he was stoned and prayers were stopped, yet subsequently the Shī'a leaders apologised to the Caliph and asked his permission to read the Khutbah in his name in the usual manner, which was done.¹

That the religious functions were still under the control of the Caliph is borne out by the fact that when the Caliph Qā'im in 426/1034 felt annoyed with Jalāl al-Daulah, he, in order to bring the latter to his senses, issued orders to the Qādis, Faqīhs, Imāms and persons in charge of marriages to suspend their functions.²

situation. One of them who did not carry out the instructions of the Buwayhid Amīr was rebuked by the representative of the Amīr and had to leave his place; while the other three were summoned by the Caliph who severely rebuked and detained them in his palace. The Caliph also issued orders that the names of those Qādis and the Attestors be struck off the list and their discharge be proclaimed from the pulpit. The whole matter was compromised only by bringing to the Caliph's notice that his orders could very well be stopped from being carried out; and that one of the Attestors in question was the only respectable living marginal witness to the deposition of the late Caliph.

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, I, p. 278.

² *Ibid.*, p. 300.

It was during this period of degradation that systematic exposition of the theoretical position of the office of the Caliphate was given by one of the most important jurists of Islām, 'Alī Ibn Muhammad al-Māwardī (381-450/991-1058). The motive of the latter in propounding a theory which stands in such glaring contrast to the actual facts and practice may perhaps be found in the fact that at this time not only the Buwayhids (who being Shī'as had no real respect for the 'Abbāsids) but also the Muslim Sunnī independent rulers, out of political necessity, had begun to ignore the existence of certain Caliphs at Baghdād.¹ In such circumstances there was grave danger of the utter destruction of the institution with the consequent result of the disappearance of that semblance of Islamic unity that existed between the various Sunnī States owing to their common bond of allegiance, however nominal, to their religious head. It is quite possible that Māwardī may have written this treatise on the institution of the Muslim State at the instigation of the Caliph with the object of showing the importance of the Caliphate and bringing the necessity of its existence before the notice of the Buwayhids, the Sunnī public and the Sunnī Muslim independent rulers, notwithstanding the apparent weakness of its actual situation.² But is it not more likely that it was

¹ The Sāmānids, as will be shown later, did not recognize the Caliph Muṭṭ' for about ten years and the Caliph Tai at all.

² The high regard in which Māwardī was held by the Caliph is shown by the fact that he was the first to bear the title 'Aqda'l-Qudāt (Yāqūt, *Irshād*, V, p. 407). Māwardī was several times employed on diplomatic service by the

the very fact of the excessive weakness of the Caliphate that instigated him to write his work as a reminder to the Sunnī Muslim world and its rulers that the Caliphate was not a casual political institution which had outlived its day, but a divinely ordained institution which formed an integral part of the religious structure of Islām. It is absurd to suppose that a man of the intelligence of Māwardī should have composed such a treatise as a mere essay in theoretical idealism. Hence he sets out to show what the Caliphate ought to be, and ignores its actual weak and degraded position in bondage to the Buwayhids; at the same time, like all Sunnī jurists, he is concerned to rebut the argument that the community has been living in sin, and hence finds it necessary to give legal sanction to a variety of practices which to a certain extent are in conflict with the religious ideal. Thus, in consideration of the practice of his time, he devises a category of temporal governors whom he calls 'Amīrs by force' within which the Buwayhids and other independent princes of his time such as the Ghaznavids can be placed, but endeavours to mitigate this concession and brings it within the principles of the Islamic Law by laying down certain conditions to be fulfilled by them for the validity of their claims.

An Amīr by force, according to Māwardī, is a person who, without the knowledge or consent of the Caliph, takes possession of certain territories by force

of arms; and the Caliph, being powerless to prevent his seizure of temporal power, entrusts him with the entire administration of those possessions.¹ In this case, says Māwardī, "The Amīr would be a permanent ruler but the Imām or Caliph, by the nature of his position as religious head, would be considered the source of all orders relating to religion so that an illegal and unconstitutional Amirate may be validated as legal and constitutional." For the installation of such a usurper, seven conditions are then laid down which he must needs fulfil.

1. He should preserve and respect the dignity of the Caliph as the supreme religious head of the entire Muslim community.

2. He should make open religious submission to the Caliph so that there may not be any suspicion of opposition to him.

3. He should remain on good terms with the Caliph, and render him assistance in all common matters of Islām in order to maintain the prestige of Islām in the eyes of strangers.

4. He should maintain religious rights and should see that orders and decisions relating thereto are not set aside.²

5. He should collect revenue in accordance with the laws prescribed by the Shari'ah, and should exercise

¹ Māwardī, *Ahkām al-Sultānīyah*, p. 32.

² This clause is rendered in *Orient under the Caliphs*, trans. by Khuda Bakhsh, p. 277, as 'To respect the Caliph's nomination to religious offices, e.g., Qadis and Imāms.' This is a gross misinterpretation of the fourth condition given on page 33 of *Ahkām al-Sultānīyah*.

justice and equity therein.

6. He should watch that criminal justice is administered with fairness.

7. He should protect the faith and encourage it, and should abstain from all forbidden things. If he finds people obedient to the religious laws, then he should give them their religious rights, if on the other hand, he finds them indifferent, he should extend to them the invitation of Islām.¹

It has already been shown that the Buwayhids, being Shī'as, had no belief in, and consequently no regard for, the religious claims of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate; therefore they could not sincerely comply with those obligations which were of a purely religious character. They did show outward respect to the office of the Caliphate and tried to maintain its prestige in the public eye; but that was mainly to serve their own political ends. On the other hand, they did certain things which further degraded the position of the Caliph; and gave much offence to the Sunnīs at Baghdād.

As soon as Mu'izz al-Daulah thoroughly established himself at Baghdād, he tried to bring the Shī'a element, which constituted only a small portion of the population,² into prominence at the expense of the Sunnī majority. The State encouragement given to the Shī'as emboldened them to the extent of writing the following words in bold letters on the mosques and

¹ Māwardī, *Ahkām al-Sultāniyah*, pp. 32-33.

² *Misk.* II, p. 328; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 355.

houses of the Sunnīs in 351/962, 'May God curse Mu'awīyah Ibn Abī Sufyān who usurped the Caliphate; those who confiscated Fadak from Fātimah, those who prevented Hasan from being buried by the side of his maternal grandfather, those who banished Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī and those who turned out Ibn 'Abbās from the Council.' When it was found effaced during the night, Mu'izz al-Daulah was advised to replace them with 'May God curse the doers of wrong against the family of the Prophet of Allah,' not mentioning the name of anybody except Mu'awīyah.¹

In the following year (352/963) Mu'izz al-Daulah introduced the ceremony of the tenth of Muharram. All the shops and market were ordered to be closed on that day and people were made to put on clothes made of hair cloth to lament the event of the martyrdom of Husayn. The women were made to come out with dishevelled hair and blackened faces, and go round the city and its suburbs beating their faces in mourning.² The other chief festival of the Shī'as, namely *'Īd al-Ghadīr*, was celebrated with great rejoicings. The official quarters were illuminated and shops were kept open all night.³ With Mu'izz al-Daulah at the helm of State affairs, the Caliph was unable to stop these innovations which were hurting the sentiments of the Sunnīs, and in spite of the resentment of the latter they were carried on by the Shī'as.

Even the two most important religious functions

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 403.

² *Ibid.*, p. 407.

³ *Ibid.*

of the Caliph, *i.e.*, waging of Jihād and supervision of the Pilgrimage were neglected during the Buwayhid régime. The Caliph shirked the responsibility for fulfilling the above obligations by saying that these duties belonged to those who had undertaken the administration of the Empire, whilst the Buwayhids, being Shi'as, did not care to discharge them as they involved expenditure without any definite personal advantage to them.¹

During this period of irresponsibility especially when the Hamdānids' attention was divided between fighting with the Byzantines² on the one hand and the Buwayhids on the other, the former were able to raid the Muslim territories and cause incalculable damage to Muslims' lives and property. The horrors committed by them touched the heart of every Muslim save those of the Caliph and the Buwayhid Amīr.³ In the year 361/972, when the

¹ The sacred cities at this time being in the hands of the Fātimids.

² In 351/962, the Byzantines entered 'Ain Zarba and massacred about 660,000 Muslims; the Domesticus remained on Islamic territory for twenty-one days, took fifty-four forts and massacred 400,000 citizens of the town of Tarsus. Cf. *Misk.* II, pp. 190-91. In 354/965 about 200,000 men, women and Muslim children were dragged to the Byzantine country, the public mosque of Tarsus was turned into a stable and many Muslims were forcibly converted to Christianity. Cf. *Misk.* II, p. 211, *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 225.

³ *Misk.* II, p. 202; *Eclipse*, trans. V, pp. 216-17. In 355/966 about 20,000 Khurāsānīs including various jurists and Shaykhs, proclaiming themselves bent on the Sacred War, asked the permission of Rukn al-Daulah to cross the frontier. Such permission being given to them, they demanded a huge sum of money, saying, "We require the entire land tax of the province which is in your hands, for you may only collect it for the Treasury of the Muslims, to be used in case of emergency; and there can be no greater emergency than the ambition of the Byzantines and Armenians to conquer us and gain possession of our frontiers, and the inability of the Muslims to

Byzantines raided Nisibīn, took possession of the place and burnt it down, killing men and taking children captive, a number of people from Diyār Rabi'a and Diyār Bakr came to Baghdād summoning the Muslims to arms in the public mosques and in the streets. It was only then that a number of people of Baghdād joined them and they all went to the palace of the Caliph Mutī' and succeeded in gaining admission to him by breaking through the windows. They employed insolent language to him, telling him that he was incompetent to discharge the duties which God had enjoined upon the Imāms. The leading men of Baghdād came to remonstrate with Bakhtiyār who though ostensibly visiting the martyrrium was really on a hunting expedition. They addressed him in the following words, "You are neglecting the interests of the Muslims and, instead of devoting your energies to an attack on the Byzantines, you are wasting them on a fight with Imrān who is one of the people of the Qiblah." Bakhtiyār promised to return, make peace with Imrān and come back to the frontiers. On his return to Wāsiṭ, he sent orders to Abu Taghlib, governor of Mausil, asking him to prepare sufficient provisions and fodder for himself and his army since he intended to make a raid on the Byzantines. He

resist them." They also demanded that an army should be sent out to join them, but when their demands were not met, they proceeded to quarrel with the Daylamites whom they cursed as unbelievers. Their quarrel with the Daylamites led to a conflict with Rukn al-Daulah who, through a stratagem, defeated them. Thus they all were dispersed and went back to Rayy whence they had come. Cf. *Misk.* II, pp. 222-27; *Eclipse*, trans. V, pp. 234-41; *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, pp. 421-22.

also sent an order to Sabuktakin, the Chamberlain who was in Baghdād, to join in the Sacred War with him. Although the latter found an unexpected response from the public to his hypocritical call, yet, being undesirous of leading them, he kept them as a sort of reserve for himself, in consequence of which they became a serious source of trouble. Being inactive they began to quarrel with each other, killing each other, plundering each other's goods and violating each other's women-folk. The matter assumed grave proportions and instead of using their energies in the Sacred War for which they were assembled they devoted them to the devastation of Baghdād itself.¹ It was not without irony that Bakhtiyār under the pretext of waging Sacred War extracted 400,000 dirhams from the Caliph Mutī' on this occasion.²

It is no wonder that during this period the route of the pilgrim caravans was not safe.³ Such was the neglect of both the Caliph and the Buwayhid Amīrs in this wise that Badr b. Hasanwayh, a Kurdish chief, transmitted five thousand dīnārs with the caravan from Khurāsān to be spent in guarding the road. Later on he increased the sum to nine thousand, finally raising his contribution to the sum of 20,000

¹ *Misk*. II, pp. 303-305; *Eclipse*, trans. V, pp. 326-27.

² *Ibid.*, p. 308; *Ibid.*, p. 330.

³ In 353/964 the Kurds made a united attack on the pilgrim caravan that was returning to Khurāsān, and seized and plundered it near Hulwān whither the pilgrims returned. Cf. *Misk*. II, p. 203; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 217. Again in 355/966 a vast caravan consisting of pilgrims, merchants and refugees from Syria to 'Irāq who were migrating for fear of the Byzantines, was robbed by the Banu Sulaym. Some of the people returned to Egypt but most of them perished. Cf. *Misk*. II, p. 215; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 228.

dīnārs annually. When he died in 405/1014, this stoppage seriously affected the beneficiaries; whereupon the pilgrimage came to a standstill.¹

The utter subservience of the Caliphs to the Buwayhids, who had taken over all the powers without any corresponding duties or responsibility, was also to affect the relations of the Caliphate with those Sunnī independent rulers who were the political rivals of the Buwayhids. In this category fall the Sāmānids whose relations shall now be traced.

With the establishment of the Buwayhid power at Baghdād, the relations between the Caliphate and the Sāmānids could not have been the same as they were before. The Sāmānids were well aware of the fact that, as the political rivals of the Buwayhids in Persia, they would be required continuously to wage war against them over the possession of Rayy, Jibal, Tabaristān, and even Khurāsān; and that the Caliph, being a puppet in the hands of the Buwayhids, was a mere instrument to serve their ends. Therefore any orders of the Caliph affecting the political position of the Sāmānids in Persia could not very well be obeyed. To send any tribute or even presents to the Caliphate² under such circumstances was to fill the coffers of the Buwayhids, and it would be used against the Sāmānids

¹ *Misk* III, p. 287; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, p. 306. In addition to this he transmitted a sufficient amount of money to be expended in repairing the road or to be given to the descendants of the Refugees and Helpers in the two sanctuaries, or to the nobles, ascetics, Qur'ān readers and members of distinguished families in Baghdād; thus raising his contribution to the sum of 20,000 dīnārs annually.

² *Misk* II, pp. 307-308; *Eclipse*, trans. V, pp. 330; *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 466.

themselves.¹ Even realizing all these factors, the Sāmānids did not hesitate to recognize the Caliph Mutī' who was set up by the Buwayhids after their most insulting deposition of the Caliph Mustakfī on the occasion of a grand assembly which was held in honour of the reception given to the Khurāsānī ambassador.² This humiliating treatment meted out to the Caliph coupled with the insult done to their own ambassador should have been a sufficient cause for the Sāmānids to break off all relations with the Caliphate by not recognizing the Caliph Mutī', who by means of an intrigue against the late Caliph Mustakfī and currying favour with the Buwayhids, was raised to the Caliphate.³ But the Sāmānids waited till their own political interests were in jeopardy. For about two years they continued to recognize the Caliph Mutī' ⁴ but afterwards they ceased to pay homage to him. There is no definite historical evidence to show the real cause that led the Sāmānids to take this abrupt step. Most probably it was the outcome of the rebellion of Abū 'Alī Ibn Muhtāj, the commander

¹ *Misk.* II, pp. 143-44; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 151. In 341/952 on the occasion of the invasion of Rayy by the Khurāsānīs, Rukn al-Daulah received a million dirhams on demand from Mu'izz al-Daulah in addition to other help given in the shape of forces.

² *Misk.* II, p. 86; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 90.

³ Cf. p. 60 above.

⁴ *Misk.* II, pp. 156-57; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 167; *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 381. Both the above historians state that the Caliph Mutī' was not recognized by the Sāmānids from the time of his accession to the Caliphate, and Ibn Muhtāj was the first to introduce his name in the Khutbah in 343/954 in Khurāsān. But in view of the fact that there exists a coin No. 359 minted at Bukhārā in the year 355 A.H. bearing the name of the Caliph Mutī', it becomes difficult to accept their statement. Cf. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, p. 98.

of the Khurāsānī forces, instigated by the Buwayhids¹ in alliance with Ibrāhīm, the Hamdānids at Mausil. In 334/945, Abū 'Alī invited Ibrāhīm b. Ahmad to Khurāsān informing him that he (Abū 'Alī) had appointed him sovereign and obtained allegiance for him from his followers. Ibrāhīm was also supported by Nāsir al-Daulah who sent him robes of honour and tied a banner for him in the name of the Caliph Mutrī'.² Rayy was evacuated by Abū 'Alī Ibn Muhtāj for Rukn al-Daulah who also occupied Jibal in the year 335/946. The same year Nūḥ was routed by the combined forces of the opposition, and Abū 'Alī and Ibrāhīm entered Bukhāra where they captured the stores and treasures that were there, and had homage paid to Ibrāhīm. On this occasion Abū 'Alī, communicating the joyful intelligence to 'Imād al-Daulah, asked the latter to secure a deed of investiture with the government of Khurāsān for Ibrāhīm.³ It was perhaps to nullify the importance of such deeds that Nūḥ decided on this action, and continued not to recognize the Caliph Mutrī' for full nine years.⁴

The position in which the Sāmānids, who were

¹ *Misk.* II, pp. 100-101; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 106.

One of the conditions of peace between Rukn al-Daulah and Nūḥ was that 'Imād al-Daulah would help the former against Abū 'Alī. 'Imād al-Daulah at the same time instigated Abū 'Alī by sending him a missive that he ('Imād al-Daulah) remained constant in his attachment and alliance with him and warned him against the treachery of Nūḥ.

² *Misk.* II, pp. 101-102; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 107; *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 344.

³ *Ibid.*, *Eclipse*, trans. V, pp. 107-108.

⁴ Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, pp. 99-102. All the coins minted from 336 to 344 A.H. in the territories of the Sāmānids bear the name of the Caliph Mustakfi who was deposed and blinded by the Buwayhids in 334/945.

staunch Sunnīs, now found themselves was most embarrassing. As a religious institution of the Sunnī community the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate had to be recognized by mentioning the name of the Caliph in the Khutbah on Fridays and other ceremonial occasions, and by having the name of the Caliph inscribed on the coinage current in their dominion; and they had in return to secure the renewal of the deed of investiture on the demise of every Amīr in order to legalise their administration. Since Nūḥ b. Naṣr held the deed from the late Caliph Mustakfī, he could very well afford not to recognize the Caliph Mutī' set up by the Buwayhids. In order to fulfil the other obligations, i.e., the offering of the prayers in the name of the 'Abbāsīd Caliph and inscribing his name on the coinage, the Amīr hit on the ingenious device of continuing to mention the name of the late Caliph in the Khutbah and inscribing it on the coinage as well. But the position became ridiculous when the deposed and blinded Caliph died in 338/949,¹ and the Sāmānids continued to put his name on the coinage till 344/955. This was the first occasion when political necessity compelled the rulers to devise such an expedient by which they could ignore the orders of the Caliphs but at the same time could satisfy the public sentiment by putting the name of the dead Caliph in the Khutbah and on the coinage;² thus recognizing the necessity of

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, p. 338.

² *Ibid.*, p. 341. As a temporary expedient Nāṣir al-Daulah also adopted the same line of action. While at war with Mu'izz al-Daulah in 334/945 he prohibited any transaction with the coins bearing the name of the Caliph

the institution and yet disregarding the sacrilegious moves of wire-pullers. It was this example, first set by the Sāmānids, that was followed later on, though in modified form, by the Mongols who, when converted to Islām, needed such an expedient.¹

The period between 336/947 and 344/955 when the Sāmānids did not recognize the Caliph Mutī' was full of political rivalry between them and Rukn al-Daulah who, actuated by the disturbed political condition, was bent upon carving out as big an independent State as possible. Ever since the death of Mardawij in 323/934, and later on of Makan in 329/940, there had been a scramble for power between various claimants amongst whom the Sāmānids and Rukn al-Daulah played an important part by encouraging and welcoming each other's rivals to gain their own political ends. It was therefore natural for the Sāmānids to discontinue their recognition of Mutī' who was made to issue various orders against the Sāmānids during this period. Rukn al-Daulah went so far as to ask his brother Mu'izz al-Daulah to obtain a deed of investiture for him for the government of Khurāsān in 337/948 which was actually done by the latter.²

Mutī', and had the new coins struck with the die bearing the name of the Caliph Muttaqī.

¹ For political reasons, the Mongols, when converted to Islām, did not want to recognize the Egyptian Caliphate but at the same time they wanted to satisfy their own consciences as well as those of the public by mentioning the name of some Caliph in the Khutbah and coinage. Consequently they hit on another novel device by giving this honour to the first four Caliphs or, if Shī'as, to the twelve Imāms whom they considered the only lawful Caliphs. Cf. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, pp. 47-48. (*Coins of the Mongols*, vol. VI) *Tārīkh-i-Wassaf*, p. 506.

² *Misk*. II, p. 118; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 122.

Rukn al-Daulah donned his robes of honour and appeared in public to convince them of his rightful claims; and recited his deed of investiture with the government of Khurāsān in the presence of the judges, military commanders and notables.¹ Again in 343/954 Abū 'Alī Ibn Muhtāj when dismissed by the Sāmānid ruler Nūḥ b. Naṣr, raised the standard of revolt against the Khurāsānī government, sought the help of Rukn al-Daulah and asked him to secure a deed from the Caliph. Mu'izz al-Daulah received the envoy of Abū 'Alī with great honour and introduced him to the 'Caliph Mutī', who issued a deed of investiture to Abū 'Alī in place of Nūḥ b. Naṣr. Mu'izz al-Daulah also despatched Abū Mansūr Lashkarwaz to reinforce Abū 'Alī. The latter omitted the name of the ruler of Khurāsān from the Khutbah at Nīshāpur in the year 343/954 and inserted that of the Caliph Mutī'.² But such actions had no effect on the minds of the public who knew very well the abject position of the Caliph, and that he was a mere tool in the hands of the Buwayhids; and were persuaded also of the validity of the claims of the Sāmānids, who had ceased to recognize that Caliph. Nor did the Sāmānids, under the circumstances, have any scruples in disobeying these orders. The new Amīr 'Abd al-Malik who succeeded Nūḥ in 343/954 marched against Nīshāpur and, after expelling Abū 'Alī, took possession of it. Abū 'Alī fled to Rukn al-Daulah but soon after died with

¹ *Misk.* II, p. 119; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 123.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 156-57; *Ibid.*, p. 167.

his son. In the following year, the Khurāsānī army marched towards Rayy and took possession of Isfahān. The Sāmānid general grew so bold after this victory that he pursued the son of Rukn al-Daulah and plundered his belongings; only the skill and courage of Ibnu'l-Amīd, Rukn al-Daulah's wazīr, saved him from complete annihilation.¹

But the new ruler of Khurāsān, 'Abd al-Malik although recognized as *de facto* Amīr, did not hold any legal title to his territories from any of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphs. He was, in consequence, anxious to come to terms with Rukn al-Daulah in order to obtain a deed of investiture from the Caliph, without which the appointment of Qādis and other religious officials was not considered valid. Besides being a religious obligation, it was also a political necessity. How much importance the rulers attached to the securing of a deed from the Caliph even during this period can well be seen from the reply of Nāsir al-Daulah, the Hamdānid to his employee, Ibrāhīm b. Ahmad, the uncle of Nūḥ. When the latter, on an invitation of Abū 'Alī in 334/945 to dethrone Nūḥ, the Sāmānid, asked the permission of his master, Nāsir al-Daulah, the latter replied in the following words, "We are just about to start for Baghdād, so wait till we enter it, when the Caliph will invest, give you a robe of honour from his place, and tie a banner for you; this will add to your glory and strengthen your cause."²

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, VIII, pp. 383-84.

² *Misk.* II, p. 101; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 107. Nāsir al-Daulah actually sent

After making peace in 344/955 with Rukn al-Daulah, on condition that the latter should have Rayy and Jibal on payment of a certain sum of money to the ruler of Khurāsān,¹ 'Abd al-Malik sent his sister's son along with a representative of Rukn al-Daulah to the Caliph Mutī', requesting the latter to grant him ('Abd al-Malik) the deed of investiture for the government of Khurāsān.² The Caliph delivered the robes of honour to the envoy for 'Abd al-Malik and tied the banner for him. He added to the robes of a governor those of a messmate; and presented him with a horse.³

Another and final breach was brought about in their relations with the Buwayhids which led the Sāmānids not to recognize at all the Caliph Qādir set up by them. This was over the deposition of the Caliph Tai in 381/991 by Bahā al-Daulah who, actuated by his greed for the supposed wealth of the Caliph, deposed him without any fault of his.⁴ Again as in the previous case, the Sāmānids continued to offer prayers for the deposed Caliph Tai and, as their coinage shows, to inscribe his name on the coins,⁵ refusing to recognize the new Caliph Qādir in spite of the efforts which he made through the pilgrims whom he addressed on this subject in 383/993. The Khurāsānīs under-

him the robes of honour and tied a banner for him in the name of the Caliph Mutī'.

¹ *Misk.* II, p. 161; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 172.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Misk.* II, p. 161; *Eclipse*, trans. V, p. 173.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, p. 201; *Ibid.*, VI, p. 213; *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 55.

⁵ Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, p. 114.

took to bear a message and letters to the Sāmānid ruler, but nothing came of it.¹

These two incidents show very well the attitude of the Sāmānids towards the recognition of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate. In fact, their ties with the institution were loosening day by day. The last two Sāmānid rulers Mansūr (387-89/997-99) and 'Abd al-Malik, who ruled for a few months, carried on the government without obtaining any legal title, but the putting of the names of the deposed Caliphs of the 'Abbāsīd house in the Khutbah and coinage gives proof of their loyalty to the cause of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate. That the Sāmānids were genuinely devoted to the institution can be known also by the fact that they not only recognized it throughout their régime, but also considered it as one of their duties to get it recognized by the Buwayhids. In 373/983 after the death of Mu'ayyad al-Daulah and the establishment of Fakhr al-Daulah in his place, Ibn Sa'dan, his wazīr, tried to bring about a reconciliation between him and Samsām al-Daulah. Amongst other things, he wrote to the former about the arrival of an envoy from Khurāsān conveying the terms of peace, of which the first condition was to be the submission to the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate (a religious obligation and a qualification for worldly success).²

The Sāmānids had a great regard for the institution

¹ *Misk.* III, p. 250; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, pp. 265-66. *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 103. As late as the year 388 A.H. the name of the Caliph Tai appears on a coin minted at Herāt. Cf. Art. 297 of 1929, *Indian Numismatic Supplement*, published from the Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

² *Misk.* III, p. 98; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, p. 101.

of the Caliphate and it was chiefly due to this that, in spite of the fact that their rivals, the Buwayhids, were arrogating to themselves high-sounding and flattering titles irrespective of whether they were bestowed upon them or not, they on their part never assumed any such titles, and were content with 'Wālī of the commander of the Faithful'—a title which was granted to them by the Caliphate itself.¹ No doubt they granted high-sounding titles to their subordinates, but such titles were not considered so respectable as those granted by the Caliphate. How much importance was attached to the latter can be seen from the fact that one of the conditions of peace of Abū 'Alī Simjuri with the Sāmānid Amīr was that the former should be granted the same title which they (the Sāmānids) themselves had from the Caliphate;² although he had already received from Nūḥ, the Sāmānid, a much more high-sounding title, i.e., 'Divinely aided Amīr of Amīrs.'³

In compliance with the conditions laid down in the deed of investiture, the Sāmānids, like other Sunnī governors, were expected to rule their territories in accordance with the laws of the Sharī'ah; and this explains the organization of their government on the same model as that of the Caliphate itself. The Caliphs had no hand from the very beginning of their rule in the appointment of the Sāmānid Amīrs beyond

¹ *Narshakhy*, p. 160. The epithet 'Malik' often appears on the coinage of the Sāmānids. Cf. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*.

² *Narshakhy*, p. 160.

³ Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 253.

sanctioning it by issuing a deed after their accession to the throne. Hereditary succession was the general rule. Like most of the Caliphs, the Sāmānids used to nominate their successors and some of them designated two or three successors in succession.¹ In the absence of such nomination, the notables and religious heads chose the successor from amongst the members of the family.² As in the case of the Caliph, so in the case of the Sāmānids, an oath of allegiance was taken by the electors and 'bā'yat' was done by all the people afterwards. Practically the same system was in vogue as in the case of election of a Caliph with one exception that in the case of Amīrs, even minors might succeed without any difficulty.³

Though the Sāmānids were aristocrats by origin, they never figured as autocrats in their rule. They bound themselves by the laws of Shari'ah and thus did not hold themselves above the law. Most of them were pious Muslims, easy of access to the public and noted for their justice, equity and moderation. For the administration of justice there was a Qāḍī of Qāḍīs with various subordinates under him.⁴ Like most of the Caliphs, some of the Amīrs or a member of a royal family held the court of *Mazālim* to investigate legal disputes especially complaints of oppression on the part of officials.⁵ The learned and

¹ Gardizī, p. 39.

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³ *Ibid.* Amīr Naṣr was only eight year sold when he succeeded to the throne.

⁴ Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 232.

⁵ *Siyāsat-nāma*, p. 17.

the theologians enjoyed great honour in the Sāmānid dominions. Once, in order to show respect to a learned and pious man, Ismā'il moved seven steps backwards.¹ The most learned and worthy man was selected from amongst the Faqīhs of the Hanafī School at Bukhāra and important matters were decided according to his instructions.² There was also in existence an office corresponding to the office of a Muftī or Shaykh al-Islām of later times; the holder of which bore the title of Ustād.³ There was also the post of the Muhtasib which was entrusted to an influential person who treated cases without any partiality or fear. His duty was the same as under the Caliphate, i.e., to punish all those who openly violated the Sacred Law, attempted to cheat a customer or failed to pay the established taxes.⁴ In matters of weights and measures such strictness was observed that when Ismā'il heard that certain measures with which the corn for *kharāj* used to be weighed were heavier than they ought to have been, he sent for them to Bukhāra, and cut the additional weight; and made it a punishable offence.⁵

The model of government being the same, it is not surprising to find that the Sāmānids were in the long run to meet the same fate at the hands of their governors as the Caliphate met at their own hands. In

¹ *Mīr Khwānd*, p. 715.

² Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 232; quoted from *Bib. Geog. Arab*, III, p. 339.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

⁵ *Mīr Khwānd*, p. 716; *Ibn Khaldūn*, III, pp. 334-35.

both cases, with the decline of the central authority, the provincial governors assumed independence and only kept up a semblance of unity by putting the name of their overlords in the Khutbah and on the coinage. In the absence of any national movement in mediæval times, the Sāmānids, in spite of their good government, could not rally any national support to their cause against either the Qarākhānids or Maḥmūd of Ghazna who divided their territories between themselves and put an end to the first independent Persian dynasty. When the Sāmānid possessions were threatened in 390/1000 by the Qarākhānids, the Sāmānid preachers in Bukhāra ascended the mosque pulpits calling on the people to enlist, and saying in the name of the Sāmānids:¹ "You are aware how well we have conducted ourselves and how cordial have been the relations between us. This enemy now menaces us, and it is your manifest duty to help us and fight on our behalf. So ask God's grace in succouring our cause." When the common people heard this, instead of listening to the appeals of the Sāmānid agents and helping them in their hour of need, they consulted the Muslim jurists on the subject of fighting. The latter dissuaded them, saying: "If the Khāns' followers were at variance with you on religion, it would be a duty to fight them. But where the object of dispute is temporal, no Muslim has a right to risk his life and expose himself to bloodshed.

¹ *Misk.* III, p. 373; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, p. 400. The above historian holds that most of the people of Bukhāra as also of Transoxiana were bearers of arms.

These persons (*i.e.*, the enemy) are well-conducted, and orthodox; it is better to keep away from the fray.”¹ “This,” says the historian, “was one of the chief causes of the victory of the Khānites, of the rout of the Sāmānids, and the extinction of their empire.”²

In Persia proper, the Sāmānid possessions were conquered by Amīr Maḥmūd of Ghazna, whose relations with the ‘Abbāsīd Caliphate it now falls to us to trace.

CALIPHATE AND THE GHAZNAVIDS

With the disappearance of the Sāmānids as rulers, the legal title by which they were authorized to rule the country also ended and it reverted to its grantor, *i.e.*, the Central government which was the sovereign *de jure*. Likewise the authority delegated to the Sāmānids by the Caliphate to appoint Qādīs and other religious officials lapsed, and the mandates of the Qādīs were in theory annulled until the new ruler was lawfully established. Maḥmūd of Ghazna, after his victory over the Sāmānids, required a legal title to hold the country which he had already conquered; and must have the delegated authority from the Caliphate to carry on the administration of justice in accordance with the Shari‘ah.³ Hence it follows

¹ *Misk.* III, p. 373; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, p. 400.

² *Ibid.*

³ It would be a mistake to think that the Caliphate only as a religious institution was considered to bestow any part of the Islamic empire on anybody it chose. Most of the writers have completely ignored the other aspect of the question, *i.e.*, that the Caliphate was the custodian of the sovereignty *de jure* which it never parted with, and went on renewing both on the change of the Caliph and the ruler. Of course it was chiefly due to its

that Maḥmūd in his relations with the Caliphate was guided by political as well as religious motives.

The very fact that he recognized the Caliph Qādir instead of the deposed Caliph Tai who was still recognized by the Sāmānids and whom Maḥmūd himself had recognized while serving them,¹ at once shows his motive. It was not because he considered the Caliph Qādir as the rightly elected Caliph that he recognized him in preference to the deposed Caliph Tai, but because otherwise he could have obtained neither the legal title to rule the country nor the delegated authority to administer justice in accordance with the laws of the Sharī'ah.

The first thing which Maḥmūd, after his victory over the Sāmānids in 389/999, did was to draft a petition² to the Caliph Qādir in the most humble terms, calling himself and his brother slaves of the Commander of the Faithful, and heaping prayers on him, ascribing every possible virtue to him. He states in this petition that the sole cause of his fighting against the Sāmānids was that, in spite of every exhortation on his part, they would not recognize the Caliph. "I appealed to Mansūr b. Nūḥ, and urged him with my utmost strength thereunto, only he would not listen to dutiful admonition, nor attend

being a religious institution that the Muslim rulers respected that right.

¹ Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, II, p. 131. On a gold coin minted at Nishāpur in 385 A.H. appear the names of the Caliph Tai and Nūḥ b. Mansūr on the reverse side, and that of Maḥmūd on the obverse side.

² The petition of Maḥmūd to the Caliph Qādir is printed and translated in *Misk.* III, pp. 341-45, and *Eclipse*, trans. VI, pp. 366-70, respectively.

to enlightening exhortation.”¹ He then describes the course of the war in detail and speaks of his victory and the steps subsequently taken by him in the following words: “And now when I write this letter, God has opened to the Commander of the Faithful all the territory of Khurāsān, and caused its pulpits to rival one another in mention of his name; in him the cause of right triumphs, and desires vie in embracing his side. Further I have taken no steps so as to bind or loose, ratify or annul, till I should obtain from him some exalted order which should serve as a basis for my building, as a call for me to follow, by God’s grace and favour.”² After describing his victory as the victory of the Commander of the Faithful Maḥmūd makes out his case for the Amīrate of Khurāsān and outlying provinces already conquered by him in the following words, “And if our lord and master the Commander of the Faithful think meet to deign to peruse this letter and employ his slave on his orders and prohibitions, let him do so if God will.”³

On receiving the petition of Maḥmūd, the Caliph Qādir granted him a patent of sovereignty and a crown, and confirmed him in all the possessions which he had already acquired. The Caliph also bestowed upon him the title of Yamīn al-Daulah wa Amīn al-Millah.⁴ As shown by the above petition Maḥmūd

¹ *Misk.* III, p. 342; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, p. 367.

² *Ibid.*, p. 344; *Ibid.*, p. 369.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Utbī*, p. 234.

had already ordered the Caliph's name to be mentioned in the Khutbah all over his territories; but on the Caliph's asking him to recognize the right of his son, Ghālib, by conjoining his surname with that of the Caliph in the Khutbah, he made it a matter of obligation, and on all days of festivals and congregations caused the Khutbah to be read with these two surnames.¹ The name of Ghālib was also put on the coinage minted at Nīshāpur.²

Besides serving his own political ends Mahmūd, by recognizing the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate, helped its cause a great deal, raised its prestige in the eyes of the Muslim world and revived its authority in Persia. The acceptance of a deed of investiture by Mahmūd in 389/999 and another diploma in 417/1026 confirming him in possessions newly conquered³ re-established not only the religious but also the political supremacy of the Caliphate, which had broken down at the end of the Sāmānīd period. Mahmūd's successor, Mas'ūd (421-32/1030-40) also asked for and received deeds of investiture both on his accession to the throne,⁴ and on the death of the Caliph Qādir in 422/1031.⁵ The renewal of the deed of investiture to the Ghaznavids bound them with formidable oaths to

¹ *Ubbi*, p. 234.

² Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, p. 133. It is only the coins minted at Nīshāpur which bear the name of Ghālib, son of the Caliph Qādir.

³ *Gardizi*, pp. 87-88.

⁴ *Bayhaqī*, pp. 45-46.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

abide by the conditions laid down therein,¹ and necessitated the despatch of large sums of money and numerous gifts to the Caliph and his officials on such occasions.²

According to Māwardī's classification of Amīrs, the Ghaznavids also fall within the third category, i.e., 'Amīrs by force.' And it will be interesting to see how far the seven conditions³ laid down by Māwardī for such Amīrs, were complied with in actual practice by Maḥmūd and his successor, Mas'ūd, in their relations with the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate.

I

Both Maḥmūd and his son Mas'ūd maintained a respectful attitude towards the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate, and always considered the Caliph as their supreme religious head. In 391/1001, Wāthiqī, a descendant of the Caliph Wāthiq, after conspiring with the jurist Abu'l Faḍl Tamīmī, forged a letter in the name of the Caliph Qādir appointing Wāthiqī to the succession. Hārūn b. Ilak Bughra Khaqan, being convinced of his claims, warmly supported him and ordered that prayers

¹ *Bayhaqī* pp. 384-89. There is a copy of an oath of allegiance taken by Mas'ūd to the Caliph. The chief obligations are that he should rule his territory strictly in accordance with the laws of the Sharī'ah, and render unconditional obedience to the Caliph.

² *Bayhaqī*, p. 46: On the occasion of the renewal of the deed, a grand reception was given to the Caliph's ambassador; and everything was put into good order so that favourable reports should be communicated to the Caliph. Presents in kind and coins were despatched to the Caliph and his officials. Cf. *Bayhaqī*, p. 361.

³ Whether this category was not explicitly designed to cover the position of Maḥmūd?

should be offered for him throughout his dominions after the name of the Caliph. This action of Bughra Khaqan created great uneasiness at the Caliph's court and led the Caliph Qādir to repudiate Wāthiqī's claims and to appoint his own son, Abu'l Faḍl (Ghālīb) his successor. On this occasion, Maḥmūd not only recognized the claims of Ghālīb by putting his name in the Khutbah and on the coinage, but when Wāthiqī came to Khurāsān to invoke Maḥmūd's help, the latter had him arrested and sent him as a prisoner to a fortress where he remained till his death.¹ But the greatest service that was rendered by the Ghaznavids to the 'Abbāsīd cause was in counteracting the active propaganda of the rival Fāṭimid Caliphate;² and it was only through Maḥmūd's whole-hearted support of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate that the Fāṭimids, in spite of all their efforts, could not secure a footing in Persia. When in 403/1012-13 Hākim, the Fāṭimid Caliph sent a letter to Maḥmūd, perhaps to procure his allegiance the latter sent the letter to Baghdād to be publicly burnt.³ A little later in the same year Maḥmūd, on hearing of the arrival of an emissary Tahartī who was supposed to have been despatched by the Fāṭimid Caliph to him with the same object in view, had him arrested; and set up a court of eminent Theologians to investigate into his conduct and deliver their judgment

¹ *Misk.* III, p. 393; *Eclipse*, trans. VI, p. 424.

² *Uṭbī*, p. 296; *Reynolds*, trans. pp. 439-40. Maḥmūd commissioned spies to make investigations into the conduct of those who professed to adhere to the cause of the Fāṭimid Caliphate. He uprooted and annihilated all of them. Most of them were impaled or stoned.

³ *Nāzim, Sulṭān Maḥmūd*, p. 164.

on him. In compliance with their decision, Maḥmūd ordered Tahartī to be put to death.¹

II

As regards open religious submission to the Caliph, Maḥmūd tried his utmost to maintain a compromising attitude. Although in some cases where personal interests were involved it was difficult to obey the orders of the Commander of the Faithful, yet Maḥmūd overcame this difficulty by adopting a conciliatory attitude. The case of Abū 'Alī Ḥasan commonly known as Ḥasnak is a good example of Maḥmūd's attitude of mind in such intricate cases. In 414/1023 Ḥasnak, while on his way back from his pilgrimage to Mecca, received a Khil'at from the Fāṭimid Caliph Az-Zāhir. This greatly annoyed the 'Abbāsīd Caliph Qādir, who naturally suspecting that it was done with the knowledge and consent of Maḥmūd, addressed a strongly worded letter to the latter in which he charged Ḥasnak with Qarmatian beliefs and demanded his execution. Much correspondence passed about the matter, and Maḥmūd, being greatly annoyed and vexed, said one day, "Write to this doting old Caliph, that out of regard to the 'Abbāsīds, I have meddled with all the world; I am hunting for the Qarmatians, and whenever one is found who is proved to be one he is impaled. If it were established that Ḥasnak is a Qarmatian, the Commander of the Faithful would soon learn what had happened to him. But I have

¹ 'Utbī, pp. 296-99; Gardizī, p. 71.

brought him up and he stands on an equality with my sons and brothers. If he is a Qarmatian so am I also." After much consideration it was decided that the robe of honour which Ḥasnak had received, and the presents which the Egyptian Caliph had sent to Maḥmūd should be sent with a messenger to Baghdād to be publicly burnt.¹ If, on the other hand, under the guise of the orders of the Commander of the Faithful, some ulterior motive of the ruler could be served, much outward importance was attached to it. The same Ḥasnak was stoned to death by the order of Mas'ūd, who bore a grudge to him on account of his arrogant behaviour and opposition to Mas'ūd's succession to the throne.² In order to remove him, the old charge of heresy was brought up against him once again on behalf of the Caliph; and to make the people believe in its truth, two men were dressed up as messengers coming from Baghdād, bearing a letter from the Caliph to the effect that Ḥasnak being a Qarmatian should be executed and stoned to death, so that no one else in defiance of the Caliph, might dare to accept the *khil'at* of the Egyptian Caliph. When Ḥasnak was being executed, the following message from Mas'ūd was delivered to him, "This is your own wish, for you desired me to bring you to the scaffold whenever I became king. I wished to have mercy on you, but the Commander of the Faithful has written

¹ *Bayhaqī*, pp. 212-13; trans. *Elliot & Dowson*, Vol. II, p. 93.

² *Bayhaqī*, pp. 208, 210. So great was Ḥasnak's power during the time of Maḥmūd that he occasionally offended and sometimes insulted Mas'ūd with impunity.

that you have become a Qarmatian and by his order you are led to the scaffold."¹

III

As long as their own personal interests were not affected both Maḥmūd and his son Mas'ūd remained on good terms with the Caliph, and always tried to render him assistance in all common matters of Islām. Both of them obliged the Caliph to grant them the deeds of investiture of countries which had not yet been conquered by them;² and both of them entered into a treaty with the Caliph by which the latter bound himself not to enter into direct relations with the Qarākhānids.³ Any title or robe of honour granted to the latter was to be bestowed through the agency of the Ghaznavids. So emphatic was Maḥmūd in this matter that Abu'l 'Abbas Māmūn, the Khwārazmshāh,

¹ *Bayhaqī*, pp. 217-18, trans. *Elliot and Dowson*, Vol. II, pp. 97-98.

² Haig, art. on Maḥmūd in *Encycl. of Islam*. Ḥabīb, *Sultan Mahmud of Ghaznin*, p. 33. In 403/1012-13, Maḥmūd compelled the Caliph Qādir, to hand over to him the districts of Khurāsān which were still in his hands; Muḥammad Ḥabīb relates that the Caliph stoutly refused Maḥmūd's further demand that Samarkand should also be given to him. "I will do no such thing," he replied, "and if you take possession of Samarkand without my permission, I will disgrace you before the whole world." Maḥmūd was furious, "Do you wish me to come to the capital of the Caliphate with a thousand elephants," he threatened the Caliph's ambassador, "in order to lay it waste and bring its earth on the backs of my elephants to Ghaznin?" But in the words of Muḥammad Ḥabīb, "The policy of plundering the centres of Muslim and Hindu civilization simultaneously was too bold even for Maḥmūd, and he had to apologize humbly to the power which, even in its hour of weakness, could have shattered the moral foundation of the Ghaznavid kingdom."

Mas'ūd also insisted on the inclusion of certain provinces in the deed of investiture before he accepted it. Cf. *Bayhaqī*, p. 359.

³ *Bayhaqī*, p. 359.

out of regard for the sentiments of Maḥmūd, did not openly accept the robes of honour sent by the Caliph nor did he assume the title granted to him.¹ To serve their own purposes sometimes the help of the Caliph was also invoked. When Maḥmūd, displeased with Mas'ūd, wished to nominate another son, Muḥammad, in preference to Mas'ūd, he asked the Caliph to give precedence to his name over that of Mas'ūd in official correspondence.² When Mas'ūd heard of the order of the Caliph giving preference to Muḥammad over him, he declared, "The sword is a truer authority than any writing."³

But as soon as he heard the news of his father's death in 421/1030 he most courteously replied to the Caliph's letter interceding for the ruler of Isfahān, 'Alā al-Daulah b. Kakawayh, which had till then lain unanswered; and pleaded his cause for the bestowal of a deed of investiture,⁴ which was, as a matter of course, granted to him.

As regards helping the Caliph in all common matters of Islām, since both the Ghaznavids and the Caliph belonged to the Sunnī sect, their religious interests coincided and therefore no difficulty was encountered in this respect. The persecution of the

¹ *Bayhaqī*, pp. 838-39.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 258-59.

³ Jurjānī, *Tabaqāt-i-Nāsiri*, trans. Raverty, p. 92.

⁴ *Bayhaqī*, pp. 14-17; *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 279. When Mas'ūd after his conquest of Rayy proceeded to complete the conquest of Hamadān and Isfahān, he put 'Alā al-Daulah to flight and occupied both places. Thereupon the latter prevailed on the Caliph, through his kinsman, Jalāl al-Daulah to ask Mas'ūd to let him remain his deputy at Isfahān.

Qarmatians, Bāṭinīs and Mu'tazilīs, which was in accordance with the wish of the Caliph, also served the political motives of the Amīrs in rooting out all these elements which were endangering the peace and safety of the country. Maḥmūd was particularly ruthless in his persecution of the Bāṭinīs. Thousands of them were gibbeted, stoned to death, or carried in chains to Ghazna. A hundred camel-loads of books dealing with their heretical beliefs were cast into the flames.¹ The imperialistic policy pursued by Maḥmūd likewise served his double purpose. In the eyes of the Caliph and the Muslim public he figured as a champion of the Islamic faith, when he waged wars against the infidels of Hindustān. In fact the wars to which he had given this religious colour were the outcome of his insatiable greed for money, and the necessity of providing the funds required to maintain the magnificence of his court. The policy of Maḥmūd in this respect has been well described by Professor Muḥammad Ḥabīb in the following words: 'His persecution of the heretics, apart from the pressing demand of the orthodox may have been due to his conviction that their immoral doctrines would shake the foundations on which Muslim society was based, and a greed for money and power, not an enlightened desire for the spread of Islām, was the motive of his Indian campaigns.'² However, he gratified the Caliph by notifying³ his victories over the infidels, but here too

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 262.

² Ḥabīb, *Sultān Maḥmūd of Ghaznī*, p. 19.

³ Victories of Maḥmūd were officially notified to the Caliph. *Of. Sibṭ*.

he achieved his other object, the enhancement of his prestige in the eyes of the Buwayhids, his political rivals at Baghdād. On the other hand, the prestige of the Caliphate was raised also and they now began to feel more secure than before under the bonds of the Buwayhids. About the close of his reign, Maḥmūd seems to have resolved to rid the Caliphate of the Buwayhids. Mas'ūd, when left at Rayy in 420/1029, was instructed to conquer Isfahān and then to release the Caliph from the bondage of the Buwayhids, but before Maḥmūd's plans could materialise, he died.¹ Both Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd provided facilities for the pilgrims. Maḥmūd offered large sums to the Beduins to let the caravans pass unmolested,² and Mas'ūd likewise held himself responsible for the safety of the pilgrims' caravans. In 423/1032 he drew the attention of the Caliph's messenger who had been sent for the renewal of the deed on the death of the Caliph Qādir, to the point that he should convey a warning to the Buwayhids to provide similar facilities.³

In order to maintain religious rights, Qādīs chosen from among Muftīs and Faqīhs of established reputation for learning and character were appointed

Ibnul Jawzī, f. 204-b ; *Gardizī*, pp. 87-88. When the news of the Somnath victory reached the Caliphate, the Caliph heaped titles and honours on Maḥmūd, his sons and his brother ; Maḥmūd received the title of Kahf al-Daulah wa'l-Islām.

¹ *Bayhaqī*, pp. 83, 359.

² *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 229.

³ *Bayhaqī*, p. 360. The Caliph sent Mas'ūd a satisfactory answer saying that he had drawn the attention of the Buwayhids, and arrangements were being made to render the route of the pilgrims safe. Cf. *Bayhaqī*, p. 441.

all over the kingdom.¹ There was a Qādī for every town and a Qādī al-Qudāt or Chief Qādī for every province.²

The Qādīs received handsome salaries and, according to Nizām al-Mulk, were removed only for grave misconduct in the discharge of their duties.³ Besides the administration of justice the Qādīs had various other duties to perform.⁴ The Qādī's position was very important and he was said to have 'power over the life and property of the Muslims.' His orders were executed with the help of the local governors, and defaulters were severely punished.⁵

V

Little is known in detail of the financial system of the Ghaznavids, but it was doubtless the case that the main sources of revenue were the same as those of the Caliphs; the chief permanent sources being the land-revenue, the Zakāt (*i.e.*, two and a half per cent. tax on the accumulated property of the Muslims at the end of the year), tribute and presents from the dependent princes, the produce of gold and silver mines,⁶ and the duties levied on articles of import and export that passed through the frontiers of the Ghazna kingdom. Whether any of the other illegal taxes called by the

¹ Nāzim, *Sultān Maḥmūd*, p. 148.

² *Bayhaqī*, p. 246; Nāzim, p. 147.

³ *Nizām al-Mulk*, pp. 38, 77.

⁴ *Sulūk al-Mulūk*, f. 42-a. The various duties of a Qādī are given.

⁵ *Nizām al-Mulk*, p. 40.

⁶ Nāzim, p. 133.

jurists *Mukus* were levied in the Ghaznavid kingdom seems not to be known. In any case this income was supplemented by the huge amount of booty that was captured during Maḥmūd's successful wars in India. But his continuous raids, though they brought rich booty for himself and his guards and soldiers, proved ruinous to his subjects. He devoted most of the money he brought from India to magnificent buildings in order to give an impress of dignity to his court, and consequently he was in constant need of money to carry on his Indian campaigns. Before one of his campaigns Maḥmūd ordered the indispensable sum to be collected within two days, which was actually achieved from the officials, who, in the words of the court historian, 'Utbi, were "fleeced like sheep."¹ It goes without saying that those officials must have realized from the poor more than they paid to the Amīr. In consequence of heavy taxation "the agricultural districts were to a great degree deserted, and the irrigation works in some places had fallen into decay, in others had ceased altogether."² During the reign of Mas'ūd, the people had to suffer all the more. Even the peace that prevailed during the previous reign disappeared with the removal of the powerful personality of Maḥmūd. Abu'l Faḍl Sūrī, the civil governor of Khurāsān, from whom the Amīr received large presents, shared the spoils of the robbers who quietly continued their activities and robbed the people to their fill. The population

¹ Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 293.

² *Ibid.*

was reduced to despair and the aristocracy began to invoke the help of the 'Leaders of the Turks' in Transoxiana.¹ Hence the second part of Māwardī's fifth stipulation was certainly not scrupulously observed. However, genuine complaints of the people were sometimes listened to by the Amīrs and in times of unforeseen calamity their sufferings were, to a certain extent, alleviated. When, for the upkeep of his magnificent garden, Maḥmūd imposed an extra tax, the people remonstrated and stopped him in one of the streets of Balkh, and Maḥmūd had to yield to their complaints and remit the heavy obligation.² In 401/1011, when crops failed owing to early frosts, the wazīr remitted the land-revenue, and issued loans to cultivators to enable them to buy seed and cattle.³

VI

For the administration of criminal law, the court of Mazālim was held by the Amīrs daily, and impartial criminal justice was dealt out to high and low alike. Besides, all the princes, wazīrs, commanders of provincial armies and other high officials held their courts and decided such cases as did not involve intricate questions requiring expert knowledge of the law, or were connected with their own departments.⁴ Amīr Maḥmūd had a strong sense of justice and in

¹ Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 293.

² *Hāfiz Abrū*, f. 184; *Awfī*, f. 173.

³ *Utbī*, p. 247.

⁴ *Bayhaqī*, pp. 40, 181.

order to keep himself informed of the doings of the State officials and provincial governors, he employed spies and newswriters throughout the whole empire. Nobody could plead rank or birth as an excuse for leniency or special treatment before Maḥmūd,¹ who enforced respect for law by all the means at his disposal. However, the cases that were tried by the Amīrs were few, and no general effort was made to suppress the robber chiefs whose castles blocked all intercommunication between the various parts of the empire.²

VII

Amīr Maḥmūd and his successor Mas'ūd did not tolerate any deviation from belief in the orthodox Sunnī scet; and they protected the faith by rooting out all the heretical elements from their territories. A censorship of the religious beliefs of the Muslim subjects was instituted, and there was an officer appointed to punish heretics, Qarmatians, Bāṭinīs and Mu'tazalīs,³ and all their literature dealing with heresy was ordered to be destroyed wherever found.⁴ This policy must have encouraged the faith to which they as well as the Caliph belonged. Though the Amīrs were

¹ *Nizām al-Mulk*, p. 208. Even Prince Mas'ūd had to pay his debts when sued by a merchant of Ghazna. *Ibid.* p. 42. 'Alī Nushtigin, a high military officer, was stopped and lashed in public for open defiance of the Muslim law. The 'Amīl of Nīshāpur, on the complaint of a woman whose property was seized by him, was flogged and dismissed. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 66.

² *Habīb*, p. 69.

³ *Nāzim*, p. 160.

⁴ *Ibn Athīr*, I, p. 262.

not missionaries, and conversion was not their chief object, yet they were not devoid of missionary spirit altogether. We often find preachers in the wake of Maḥmūd's army extending the invitation of Islām to non-Muslims.¹ Maḥmūd also appointed teachers to instruct the converts in the 'rudiments of their new faith'² and ordered mosques to be built all over the country. Very little is known about their private lives but it can be said that they lived more or less in accordance with the Muslim code of morality.³ They were quite punctilious in the performance of their religious obligations; offered the usual prayers regularly and read the Qur'ān; and also used to give Zakāt.⁴ In addition to this they devoted large sums of money to giving alms to the poor, and settled handsome allowances on scholars and disabled persons.⁵ However, they indulged in wine-drinking, but their bouts were limited to a select circle and their companions had to walk out sober for fear of being punished by the Muḥtasibs.⁶

In conclusion one is forced to admit that both Maḥmūd and Mas'ūd generally complied with Māwardī's conditions to a much greater degree than the Buwayhids. They revived the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate and raised its prestige in the eyes of the

¹ *Nāzim*, p. 162.

² *Gardizī*, p. 72.

³ *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 262. Amīr Maḥmūd did not exceed the prescribed limit with regard to number of wives.

⁴ *Nāzim*, p. 159.

⁵ *Bayhaqī*, p. 330.

⁶ *Nizām al-Mulk*, pp. 41-42.

Muslim world.¹ Like the Sāmānids, they felt it their duty to see that the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate should be respected and recognized by the Buwayhids.² But, as compared with the first Sāmānids, the Ghaznavids were generally more overbearing in their dealings with the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate though always ready to compromise in the end. They had acquired a sort of legal authority from the Caliph to conquer any lands they liked, and set up a sort of central agency through which the Caliphate was required to deal with other powers. Both of them assumed the title of Sultān, though out of religious regard for the Caliphate they did not put it on their coinage as it was not officially granted to them by the Caliphate³—a privilege which was first accorded to their political successors, the Saljūqs, whose relations with the Caliphate shall form the theme of the next chapter.

¹ The victories of Maḥmūd announced from the pulpits of the Caliphate must have raised the latter's prestige.

² *Bayhaqī*, pp. 359-60. In his letter to the Caliph Qā'im in 423/1032, Mas'ūd wrote that the Buwayhids should make it a point to keep up the prestige of the Caliphate.

³ Kremer, art. on Sultān, in *Encyclopædia of Islam*, says that according to *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 92, the title Sultān was granted to Maḥmūd by the Caliphate but the actual words

وكان ابيه محمود اول من لقب بالسلطان ولم يلقب به من قبل
do not show that it was granted by the Caliphate.

CALIPHATE AND SULTANATE

AT the time of the appearance of the Saljūqs¹ as a political force in Persia, the temporal power of the Caliphate had been reduced to its lowest ebb both in Baghdād and the neighbouring provinces by the Buwayhids, and in Persia by the Ghaznavids. It is true that, with the decline of the Buwayhid's power at Baghdād, the Caliphs were making some tentative efforts to assert their importance either by figuring as champions of good government against the misrule of the later Buwayhids, or by interposing themselves as arbitrators between the Sunnīs and Shī'as in their religious quarrels.² But, in fact, during the later period of the Buwayhids neither the Caliphs nor the Amīrs were in a position to assert their authority against the turbulent Turks who always needed a strong hand to control them. The Turks themselves were neither able to produce any capable leader to manage the affairs of the State, nor would they allow any capable Buwayhid Amīr to control the machinery

¹ See art. on Saljūqs in *Encyclopædia of Islam*.

² *Ibn Athīr*, IX, pp. 235-36. The religious innovations introduced by the Buwayhids at Baghdād resulted in a series of bitter quarrels between the Sunnīs and Shī'as, and offered an opportunity to the Caliph to assert his authority. In 415/1024 in a quarrel between the 'Abbāsids and the 'Alids at Kūfa, the former lodged a complaint with the Caliph who compromised the matter temporarily. The 'Abbāsids, being dissatisfied, came to Baghdād, did not allow the Khutbah to be read on Friday, and insisted on the removal of the prefect at Kūfa; and appointed the one whom they wanted. When the Caliph complied with their request, the wazīr Abū'l-Qāsim, owing to his relationship with the deposed prefect, began to take hostile action against the Caliph. Thereupon the latter issued an order for the expulsion of the wazīr from Samarrā, which was duly carried out.

of the Government. In 418/1027 they approached the Caliph to appoint some commander over them to take charge of affairs; but when Jalāl al-Daulah was called by the Caliph they several times revolted against his authority, besieged his house, maltreated his family and subjected him to various indignities; and obliged the Caliph on several occasions to drop his name from the Khutbah.¹ Both the Amirate and the Caliphate during this period of inactivity had become politically ineffective, and in the absence of a strong hand to curb the activities of evil-doers, misrule, anarchy and licentiousness reigned supreme.²

Though the Buwayhids had usurped all the temporal power of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate in actual practice, yet in theory they found it necessary that certain functions, for political reasons, should be fulfilled under the signature of the Caliph. As already shown, the latter was still required to issue orders under his name affecting certain temporal affairs and even the partial right of appointing the wazīr and the governors was allowed to be retained by him. The ceremony of issuing the deeds of investiture to individual rulers enabled the Caliph to enter into direct political relations with them. Besides, the Buwayhids, being unable to fulfil the obligations of the Caliph were not granted the title of Sultān. Thus

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, IX, pp. 288, 308-309.

² A robber named Al-Burjūmī terrified the citizens in 425-26/1034 so much that they had to call him 'The chief Abū 'Alī.' He had fixed tribute paid to him by the citizens, caravans, and several professionals; and even the Sultān had to surrender some of his revenues. Cf. Levy, *Baghdād Chronicle*, pp. 173-74.

the Sultanate set up by them, though an accomplished fact, had not yet reached the stage of full emancipation, and was never complete in the eye of the law.¹ Likewise, though the Ghaznavids had actually assumed the title of Sultān, they too, owing to the exclusion of their political authority from Baghdād, could not obtain official recognition of the title. The Sultanate in fact existed, but as an usurped authority, lacking any legal sanction, and unrecognized in official correspondence and coinage. Nothing short of the combination of the functions of the Ghaznavids and the Buwayhids by a Sunnī ruler would form the basis of a legally constituted Sultanate. Such was the situation and the position of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate at Baghdād and in Persia when the Saljūqs burst like a storm on the scene and displaced both the Ghaznavids and the Buwayhids.

It is an established fact that the Saljūqs, being recent converts to Islām, were orthodox Muslims, and as such they considered it their duty to recognize the institution of the Caliphate. In a petition which they sent to the governor of Khurāsān requesting him to ask Mas'ūd to allot them the districts of Nasa and Farawa, they called themselves protégés of the Commander of the Faithful.² The Caliph, on the other hand, never hesitated to assert

¹ No Buwayhid Amīr was ever granted the title of Sultān; and none of them even assumed it as their coinage shows. It is wrongly stated by Amīr 'Alī that Mu'izz al-Daulah received the title of Sultān, *vide A History of the Saracens*, p. 503.

² *Bayhaqī*, p. 583.

his authority and claim obedience from them, whenever an opportunity was offered. In 429/1038 when Tughril was declared king at Merw and Nishāpur, and his name was mentioned in the Khutbah in all the places which fell to him, his brother Dā'ūd carried on such ravages in these provinces that rumours of his malpractices reached the ears of the Caliph Qā'im who, realizing his responsibility for the welfare of the people, despatched an ambassador to Tughril forbidding him to tyrannise over the people. The mission of the Caliph had the desired effect, since Tughril, after paying due respect and honour to the ambassador, stopped the malpractices complained of.¹

It was, however, after the defeat of Mas'ūd at the hands of the Saljūqs at Dandanqan in 431/1040 that, for the first time, the latter came into direct relationship with the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate. The Saljūqs, after their victory over Mas'ūd, held a consultation among themselves and wrote a letter to the Caliph Qā'im saying that they were a people always obedient and well-wishing to the Caliph as well as to the Prophet and that they had always carried on jihād and performed pilgrimage to the Ka'bah. They complained against Maḥmūd for imprisoning their uncle Isrā'īl, without any provocation on their part, and emphasized the negligence exhibited by Mas'ūd in the affairs of his government and his indulgence in wine-drinking, luxuries and enjoyments. They also pointed out that

¹ *Bundarī*, p. 7; *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 312.

the nobles and great men of Khurāsān requested them to stand by them in overthrowing the power of the Ghaznavids. Then they mentioned their victory over Mas'ūd which was attained through divine aid and, in order to thank God the Almighty, they were administering the country with justice, and equity and were refraining from exercising any sort of tyranny. At the end there was a request to the Caliph to bestow on them the sovereignty of the already conquered lands in order that they should be able to rule the country according to the Shari'ah and the command of the Commander of the Faithful.¹ The contents of the above letter show very well the motives of the Saljūqs, which obliged them to approach the Caliph for authorization to rule the country. In making this request, they fulfilled a religious obligation. It was still believed that, without such sanction from the Caliphate, the religious institutions, i.e., the appointment of Qādīs, etc., would not be considered valid from the point of view of the Sharī'ah. However, it seems that it was done more to satisfy their own conscience than the public mind, which had already accepted them as their rulers by mentioning their names in the Khutbah and by calling Tughril Sultān al-Mu'azzam.² That the sanction from the Caliphate

¹ *Rawandī*, p. 1031 ; *Bundarī*, p. 8.

Browne and Sykes wrongly put the despatch of this letter after the defeat of Mas'ūd at the hands of the Saljūqs, i.e., three years later. Cf. *Literary History of Persia*, II, p. 172 ; Sykes, *History of Persia*, II, p. 30.

² Although Tughril was addressed by the people and even mentioned in the Khutbah in different places that had fallen into his possession, as Sultān al-Mu'azzam in 428/1036 (Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 328 ; *Zubdat al-Tawārikh*, p. 6)

was necessitated purely from the religious point of view is evident by the very fact that, immediately after they despatched the messenger, they proceeded to divide up the vast territories which had so quietly passed under their control.¹ When the letter reached the Caliph he sent one of his trusted officers to Tughril with kind messages and charged him to ask Tughril to come to Baghdād.²

Tughril could not find time to pay attention to the affairs at Baghdād till 447/1055 when, with the permission of the Caliph, he paid his first visit to the metropolis of Islām, where he was received with great honour, and orders were given to mention his name in the Khutbah and on the coinage in preference to that of Malik al-Raḥīm; and he was granted the title of Rukn al-Daulah.³ In spite of this, relations between the Caliph and Tughril Beg were not very cordial owing to the turbulence of both the Ghuzz troops and the citizens. The population suffered very severely

yet this title does not seem to appear on his coinage till the year 439/1047. Such coins in addition to the above title also bear the title of Shāhinshāh—a title whose bestowal to one of the Buwayhid rulers had been a subject of controversy and had led the celebrated Qādī al-Quḍāt, Al-Māwardī to vote against its award. How the times were so changed that such important and even objectionable titles were assumed by the Sunnī rulers without any commotion. There is no historical evidence to show whether and when such titles were granted to Tughril. According to *Ibn Athīr*, IX, pp. 312-17 the Caliph, in his letter of 429 A.H. mentioned above, addressed them by "exalted titles." Raverty holds on his own authority that in 432 A.H. Tughril obtained the Caliph's consent to his assuming sovereignty, and the title of Sultān. Cf. Jurjānī, *Tabaqāt*, trans. Raverty, p. 132.

¹ *Rawandī*, p. 104; *Bundarī*, p. 8.

² *Ibid.*, p. 105; *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

and Malik al-Raḥīm, in spite of the protests of the Caliph was sent to the fort of Sirwan to be interned there.¹

In 449/1057 Tughril, in reward for his signal services in defeating Dubays b. Mazayd and Bassasiri, a Shī'ite Turkish general who had revolted at Mausil against the authority of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate and had recognized that of the Egyptian Caliphate, was received with the most elaborate ceremony at Baghdād,² and was entrusted with the affairs of the State in the following words: "The Commander of the Faithful," proclaimed Rā'īs al-Ruasa, "thanks you for your efforts and appreciates your services. He delegates to you authority over all the countries whose government has been bestowed on him by God, and transfers to

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 421. The ceremony was marred by an unfortunate incident which led to a fight between the citizens headed by Malik al-Raḥīm and the army of Tughril Beg. The Ghuzz troops committed all sorts of atrocities. Even the tombs of the Caliphs were spoiled and the envoy of the Caliph, who was sent to effect a compromise between Tughril and Malik al-Raḥīm, was robbed. In consequence of this, Tughril, during the thirteen months of his stay, did not once meet the Caliph personally. Owing to the presence of a huge Turkish army at Baghdād, the people experienced great sufferings. The Caliph sent word to Tughril to remove his army from the city. The latter, expressing his apologies for the misbehaviour of the troops, insisted on maintaining them in the city. Only a censure by the Prophet in a dream obliged him to comply with the order of the Caliph. Cf. *Ibn Athīr* IX, p. 431.

² The Rā'īs al-Ruasa was sent by the Caliph to receive Tughril. On the latter's request for admittance into the presence of the Caliph, a grand assembly of court dignitaries and other high officials was called. One of the Caliph's horses was given to Tughril to ride. The latter, amid a great procession, presented himself before the Caliph who was seated on the royal throne dressed in the Prophet's mantle and holding his staff. On Tughril's approach, the curtain behind which the Caliph was seated was lifted and the latter was disclosed. Tughril Beg kissed the ground before the Caliph who asked him to sit down. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, IX, pp. 235-36; *Bundarī*, pp. 13-14.

you the care of God's people. It is incumbent upon you to be God-fearing in what he has entrusted to you. Acknowledge the favours of God, strive to exercise justice abroad, to prevent wrong-doing and to benefit the subjects." The Caliph then invested him with a "robe of honour, a collar and bracelets, and also with a scented gold embroidered turban symbolizing the combination of the Arab and non-Arab crowns. He was also presented with two swords by the Caliph and addressed as 'King of East and West.' Tughril in token of servitude kissed the Caliph's hand and laid it upon his eyes."¹ This memorable document was the first of its kind of which we have any knowledge in the history of the Caliphate. Not one before Tughril had been given jurisdiction over "all the countries whose government had been delegated to the Caliph by God." The Sultanate now at last received legal sanction from the Caliphate itself.

The prestige of the Sultanate was further raised when Tughril paid his third visit to Baghdād in 451/1059, and reinstated the Caliph Qā'im who, during the former's absence from Baghdād, was imprisoned by Bassasiri who had proclaimed the recognition of the Egyptian Caliphate at Baghdād.² The Caliph, on

¹ *Bundārī*, p. 14; *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 436; Levy, *Baghdād Chronicle*, p. 188.

² In 450/1058 Bassasiri, a Shī'ite Turkish general who had not been on good terms with the Caliph, came to Baghdād, defeated his forces, arrested him and sent him to Ana. He caused the Khutbah to be read for the Egyptian Caliph, Mustansir at Baghdād and had dīnārs struck in his name. The Sunnī formulæ in the Adhān was replaced by that of the Shī'a, and the black standard of the 'Abbāsīd was changed to the white. Cf. *Rawandī* p. 108; *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 441; *Ibn Qalanisi*, pp. 88-89; *Zubdat al-Tawārikh*,

this occasion,¹ presented to the Sultān the only sword which was left with him ; and substituted the title of Rukn al-Dīn for Rukn al-Daulah.²

Tughril had not even conceived the idea of taking over the administration of Baghdād, but, in fact, had thought of leaving it with the Caliphate. It was only due to the lack of aspiration on the part of the Caliph and the wit of Tughril's wazīr in detecting it, that Baghdād was thrown into the direct possession of Tughril.³ Thus, so far as the temporal power of the

f. 13. As soon as Tughril heard of this, he rushed back to Baghdād, defeated Bassasiri and re-established the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate. Cf. *Ibn Qalanisi*, p. 90; *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 448; *Zubdat al-Tawārikh*, f. 13.

¹ It was a strange and unprecedented scene when the Caliph and the Sultān met on this historic occasion in an unceremonious manner, the Caliph presenting to the Sultān his sword, the latter giving proof of the utmost humility by leading the horse of the Caliph by the bridle to the palace; Cf. *Rawandī*, p. 110; *Bundari*, p. 18; *Zubdat al-Tawārikh*, f. 13; *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 446.

² *Rawandī*, p. 110.

³ A few days after the re-establishment of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate Tughril asked his wazīr 'Amid al-Mulk to approach the Caliph for the allotment of a certain portion of territory in the neighbourhood of Baghdād to meet the expenses of his army as he would be required to come so often to Baghdād in connection with administrative affairs. The quick-witted wazīr asked Tughril to wait as he expected a move by the Caliph himself to provide him with a fixed grant for his own upkeep. Actually, as it happened, 'Amid al-Mulk, on his way to the Caliph, saw the latter's wazīr coming to the Sultān. Guessing the mission of the Caliph's wazīr, 'Amid al-Mulk hurriedly retraced his steps and informed the Sultān about the approach of the Caliph's wazīr, advising him at the same time that if the Caliph's message was to the same purpose as he had anticipated, the Sultān should welcome it saying that he was already concerned about it. By chance it so happened that the Caliph's message was to the same purpose as was anticipated by 'Amid al-Mulk, and naturally the Sultān sent the same reply to the Caliph as was suggested to him by his wazīr. Shortly afterwards the Sultān sent for the record-book from the Dīwān and noted down therein the personal allowance of the Caliph. Cf. *Rawandī*, pp. 110-11; *Tārikh-i-Guzida*, p. 435.

Caliphate was concerned, it was now left in as sad a plight as it was during the Buwayhid régime. Be that as it may, the Sultanate created by Tughril was of a higher status than that enjoyed by any before or after him.¹

With the establishment of a Sunnī Sultanate at Baghdād a new era was inaugurated in the history of the institution of the Caliphate. The Saljūqs, by conquering Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Asia Minor, once more re-united the scattered provinces of Islām, belonging to different dynasties hostile to each other, under one sovereign. In the words of Lane-Poole, "They put a new life into the expiring zeal of the Muslims, drove back the re-encroaching Byzantines, and bred up a generation of fanatical Muhammadan warriors to whom, more than to anything else, the Crusaders owed their repeated failure."² The rise of the Saljūqs also meant the victory of the Sunnī creed, as far as their power extended, over the Shī'a tendencies which had been gaining more and more ground under the Buwayhids and the Fatimids. Since the Saljūqs regarded the 'Abbāsid Caliphate as the head of orthodox Islām, they 'constituted themselves the champions of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate and were naturally the declared enemies of the Fatimid Caliphate.'³ They took energetic steps against the dangerous activities of the Ismailians and furthered the interests

¹ A gold coin minted at Baghdād in 455/1063 bears the following inscription on the reverse side: Al-Sultan al-Mu'azzam Shāhin-Shāh Tughril Beg. The word Sultān does not appear on the Baghdād coinage after Tughril. Cf. *British Museum Catalogue*.

² Lane-Poole, *Muhammadan Dynasties*, p. 150.

³ *The Damascus Chronicle*, trans. H. A. R. Gibb, pp. 19-20.

of Sunni theologians.¹

With the rapid conquests of the Saljūqs, the religious authority of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate was established in all lands that fell under their political control. Besides, the prestige of their power prompted many an independent prince to reject the religious authority of the Fatimids and recognize that of the 'Abbāsids instead.² It was during this period that the name of the 'Abbāsid Caliph was inserted in the Khutbah in the sacred cities of Mecca and Madinah whose inclusion within the sphere of the 'Abbāsids control must have raised the prestige of the Caliphate.

As regards the institution of the Caliphate itself, the Saljūqs, considering it a religious institution, left it to run its normal course. In the election of the Caliph a formal sort of consultation took place between the wazīr, qāḍīs and other high officials and usually a son of the deceased Caliph was raised to the Caliphate. Since most of the Caliphs nominated their successors in their own life-time, there was little choice. It,

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 24. When Alp Arsalān was engaged in the war with Qutulmish, Nizām al-Mulk said to the former, 'I have brought soldiers from Khurāsān who will assist and not desert you, and who will shoot arrows that never miss, viz., the 'Ulama and the ascetics, whom by my favour I have made your best auxiliaries.'

² In 462/1070 an envoy from the Amīr of Mecca came to Alp Arsalān informing him that he had established the Khutbah for the 'Abbāsids and discontinued it for the Egyptian Caliph Mustansir, whereupon the Sultān bestowed upon him thirty thousand dīnārs and an annual salary of fifty thousand dīnārs to the Amīr of Madinah if the latter followed the same example. Cf. *Bundarī*, p. 36; *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 41. In 463/1070 the Khutbah was read for the Caliph Qā'im and Sultān Alp Arsalān at Halab when the people there beheld the supremacy of the Saljūqs' authority, and the decline of the sway of the Egyptian Caliph. Cf. *Bundarī*, p. 37; *Ibn Qalanisi*, p. 98; *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 42.

therefore, became practically a matter of hereditary succession based on nomination by the late Caliph.¹ Paradoxical as it may appear, the election of the Caliph was not influenced by the Saljūq Sultāns.² Henceforward the Caliphs were not deposed arbitrarily³ by the Sultāns as was the case during the time of the Buwayhids. They were now left in the peaceful enjoyment of their allowance and the income of their personal estate without the fear of any demand being made or of their estate being confiscated.⁴ Besides the Sultāns despatched huge sums of money and costly presents to the Caliphs on different occasions.⁵

The Caliph was also allowed to appoint his own wazīr. But since the *de facto* position of the Caliph had not improved, the functions of the wazīr remained practically the same as those of the Secretary in the past régime ; and the change effected therefore merely meant a change of title. However, such prestige was attached to this office that persons were desirous of

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 65. The Caliph Qā'im nominated Muqtadī during his own life-time.

The Caliph Mustadhir nominated Mustarshid during his own life-time. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 376. The Caliph Rashīd was also nominated. Cf. *Ibn Qalanisi*, p. 251 ; *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 17.

² In spite of all his efforts, Sultān Mas'ūd could not set aside the election of Rashīd whom he did not want to succeed owing to his enmity with his father. Cf. *Ibn Qalanisi*, p. 251.

³ The committal of the Caliph Rashīd in a document that if he waged war against the Sultān he should be considered as deposed, gave an opportunity to Sultān Mas'ūd to secure a Fatwa from the 'Ulama to this effect after the Caliph had fled from Baghdād. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 26.

⁴ *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 209. Barkyaruq being hard pressed for money asked and secured from the Caliph Qā'im fifty thousand dīnārs.

⁵ *Ibn Athīr*, IX, p. 397. In 443/1050 Tughril sent 10,000 dīnārs to the Caliph, 5,000 dīnārs to his officials and 2,000 to Rā'is al-Ruasa ; and some

occupying it even without any remuneration.¹ Nor were the Sultāns unmindful of its importance, because smooth relations between the Caliph and them largely depended upon the wazīr; consequently they tried as tactfully as they could to interfere in the appointment of the wazīr. Most of the wazīrs were appointed and dismissed under instructions from the Sultān.²

With regard to the Caliph's prerogatives, the latter was more independent in exercising them during this period than under the Buwayhids. At Baghdād the coinage not only bears the name of the Caliph on the obverse side but also with the epithet Amīr al-Mu'minīn which had disappeared during the Buwayhid régime; and no coins minted at Baghdād after Tughril bear the title Sultān. This shows that the temporal authority of the Saljūqs was not legally recognized at Baghdād. In other parts of the Saljūqid empire the Caliph's name with the same title appears on the obverse or reverse side indiscriminately.³

In the case of the Khutbah, the Saljūqid Sultāns were punctilious in mentioning the Caliph's name in the Khutbah all over their empire. Though several

precious jewels and other valuable presents to the Caliph.

Malik Shāh despatched precious presents to the Caliph on his first visit to Baghdād in 479/1086. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 103.

¹In 433/1061 Abu'l Fattāh Mansūr Ahmad was appointed Wazīr on condition that not only would he not accept an Iqta but that he would pay something to the Caliph. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 9.

²*Ibn Athīr*, X, pp. 74-75. In 471/1078 wazīr Fakhr al-Daulah Abu Nasr Ibn Jahir was dismissed on the Sultān's request. The next appointment was made on the recommendation of the Sultān, and the person who, in the meanwhile, had already been appointed, had to vacate the position for the nominee of the Sultān.

³Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, III, pp. 30-37.

times the Sultān's name was dropped from the Khutbah at Baghdād,¹ the Sultāns could never retaliate by omitting his name.

Even in granting titles² the Caliph was more free than before, though he was obliged to grant high-sounding titles even to minor Sultāns.³

The Caliph was now shown more reverence by the Sultāns not merely out of political consideration, but as being their religious head. With the curtailment of his temporal power, the Caliph began to attach more sacredness to his office and person;⁴ and not only laymen but the Sultāns themselves believed in his spiritual powers, and sometimes attributed mere accidents to his supernatural powers.⁵ Owing to his eminent position it was considered a great honour if the daughters and sisters of the Sultāns were accepted in marriage by the Caliphs.

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 23. Sultān Mas'ūd's name was dropped from the Khutbah at Baghdād.

Sultān Sanjar's name was also omitted from the Khutbah in the whole of 'Irāq in 526/1131. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 476.

² *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 57; Arnold, *Caliphate*, p. 83. When in 479/1086 the prince of Ceuta and Morocco, Yūsuf b. Tashifin recognized the 'Abbasid Caliphate, the Caliph Muqtadir on the prince's insistence, granted him the title of Amīr al-Muslimīn—a much more flattering title than any granted to a Saljūqid Sultān.

³ *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 145. Muḥammad whose age was only four years was granted the title of Nāsir al-Daulah wa'l-Dīn.

In 498/1104, Barkyaruq, a 'four-year old son, was granted the same title which was given to his grandfather, Malik Shāh. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 260.

⁴ *Bundarī*, p. 81; *Ibn Athīr*, X, pp. 103-104. In 479/1086 Malik Shāh was not allowed to kiss the Caliph's hand. His request to kiss the Caliph's ring only was granted.

⁵ *Bundarī*, p. 70; *Suyūṭī*, trans. Jerrett, p. 446.

Malik Shāh's death in 485/1092, was taken to have been caused by the prayers of the Caliph.

In 521/1127, Sultān Maḥmūd attributed his illness to his war against the Caliph. Cf. *Bundarī*, p. 152.

The existence of a Sunnī Sultanate was not wholly without a disadvantage to the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate. Since the institution, as already shown in the first chapter, had become a mere figure-head, it could not be left alone by the stronger and more capable rulers. But its existence was tolerated on the one hand because of the reverence attached to the 'Abbāsīd family and its claim to the office based on supposed traditions, and on the other hand the absence of any line of demarcation between the religious and temporal duties of the Caliphate had made the whole politico-legal structure so complicated that there was no way but to maintain the institution. The above argument can very well be supported by the remarks of one of the greatest philosophers of Islām, Imām Ghazzālī who lived during the early Saljūqid period. The learned Imām says: "There are those who hold that the Imāmate is dead, lacking as it does the required qualifications, but no substitute can be found for it. What then? Are we to give up obeying the law? Shall we dismiss the Qādīs, declare all authority to be valueless, cease marrying and pronounce the acts of those in high places to be invalid at all points, leaving the populace to live in sinfulness? Or shall we continue as we are, recognizing that the Imāmate really exists and that all acts of the administration are valid, given the circumstances of the case and the necessities of the actual moment."¹ If there had been a real election, the fittest and most

¹ Levy, *Sociology of Islam*, Vol. I, p. 306.

competent person might have been definitely designated to the office of the Caliphate; but in its absence, the natural force came into play and the man who possessed most strength asserted his authority and claimed the power. In fact the Sultanate was the necessary consequence of the kind of institution which the Caliphate had become. In such circumstances, the Caliphate had to be maintained, but at the same time the Sultanate had to be accommodated. To get out of this awkward position, a *via media* was sought. The Sultanate was legalized by means of a legal fiction, i.e., by the issue of a deed of investiture to the Sultān by the Caliph himself—a mere formality created in order to give a show of legitimacy to the Sultanate, which was in fact based on force.

Now, for the first time in the history of the institution, there stood by the side of the Caliph a legally constituted Sultān whose power depended on the sword and could not very well be set aside by any means other than the sword itself. A Sunnī Sultān was not only required to fulfil certain obligations as prescribed by the Muslim jurists to an 'Amīr by Force' but he was expected to take over and fulfil entirely the duties set forth for the Caliph himself. As long as the Sultān fulfilled these obligations, administered the country according to the laws of Shari'ah and thus gave peace and security to people, there was none to lift a finger against him.

During the Saljūq period, the word Sultān¹

¹ See art. by Kremer, on "Sultān," in the *Encycl. of Islam*.

assumed a new significance. There is an attempt to confine its meaning to the sole possessor of the temporal power of the Caliphate.¹ In theory there should now be only one Sultān and down to the reign of Muḥammad b. Malik Shāh the other ruling princes of the dynasty in Persia contented themselves with other titles of less importance—e.g., Malik, etc.² It was perhaps for the justification of the above interpretation that Nizām al-Mulk, in order to place the Sultanate on a legal basis, made an effort to formulate the theory of the Sultanate in his celebrated *Siyāsat-nāmah*.

Nizām al-Mulk, according to the well-known story, had been asked, amongst others, to write a book dealing with administrative problems so that the principles enunciated therein might serve as a model in governing a Muslim State. Though primarily a book which deals with administrative problems and conduct and the deportment of kings from a strictly practical point of view, yet the author devotes a few pages to the origin of kingship and to the duties and responsibilities of kings. He does not even acknowledge the Caliph as the ultimate source of the temporal authority of the Sultān ; but instead he substitutes a sort of divinely-ordained kingship when he says that in every age God the Almighty selects one from amongst his creatures, and adorns him with kingly attributes ; and

¹ Barthold, *Caliph and Sultan*.

² The Saljūqids of Kirmān called themselves Malik, while the Saljūqids of Rūm styled themselves Sultān al-Mu'azzam. Cf. Lane-Poole, *Coins of the Saljuqs*, Vol. III, p. 48.

entrusts him with the peace and welfare of His subjects. His fear and grandeur is created in the hearts of the people, so that the latter may live peacefully under the banner of his justice."¹ As regards the duties of kings, he requires that they should deal with their subjects with justice and equity and tempts them with the double reward of perpetuating the sovereignty in their own family and of enjoying the fruits of their justice in the next world.² Though not expressly, yet by giving interesting and instructive anecdotes, he holds the Sultāns responsible for the slightest injustice, injury or even negligence shown not only by themselves but even by their officials.³ He in no way holds the rulers responsible to their subjects, and by a mystic argument seeks to prove that as long as the people obey the laws of the Shari'ah, God will continue to grant them a good ruler. "If the people show any sign of disobedience or contempt towards the Ordinances of the Shari'ah or if they fail in their duties towards God, then His displeasure manifests itself in the disappearance of the just king from amongst them. Consequently disorder prevails, blood is shed and whosoever is powerful snatches the power into his own hands, and rules over the subjects despotically and does as he pleases. In consequence of this, the sinners are destroyed and with them the pious people as well. Ultimately one of the people through God's grace, gets the power and

¹ *Siyāsat-nāmah*, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

control, and God grants him sufficient wisdom and intelligence to carry on the affairs of the State.”¹

To a superficial observer, the theory of kingship as propounded by Nizām al-Mulk gives the impression of a sort of Divine right of Kings, and misleads one into thinking that it bears a close resemblance to the theory of pre-Islamic kingship in Persia, more especially as he frequently quotes anecdotes of the Sāsāni kings as examples; but a critical study dispels any such misunderstanding. For example, while the pre-Islamic kings in Persia called themselves gods² and as such considered themselves above the law, our author ties the Sultān hand and foot to the observance of the Sharī'ah.³ Any opposition to the orders of a pre-Islamic Persian king was inconceivable and punishable with death.⁴ But our author, in dealing with the administration of justice, gives some instructive anecdotes suggesting that in this respect rulers stand on the same footing as ordinary men.⁵ On the other hand, his theory is in complete contrast to that of Māwardī, who also wrote

¹ *Siyāsat-nāmah*, p. 6.

² *Christensen*, p. 88. Khusru II called himself an immortal man among gods and a very illustrious god among men.

³ *Siyāsat-nāmah*, p. 54.

⁴ *Christensen*, p. 98; *Huart*, pp. 147-48. When Khusru I reformed the system of taxation and established new principles of collection he assembled his council and invited their opinion. A man asked respectfully whether the king meant to establish a certain tax for perpetuity which, in his opinion, as time went on, would lead to injustice. “Accursed and rash man,” cried the monarch, “to what class do you belong?” The man replied that he was one of the secretaries. The king ordered him to be beaten to death with a writing-case. This was done and the beholders exclaimed, “O king, we find all the taxes which you have imposed on us are just.”

⁵ *Siyāsat-nāmah*, p. 39.

at a time when the Caliphate had scarcely a vestige of temporal power. While Māwardī suggests that a Caliph should be elected and should be responsible to the people, who had the right to depose him in case of the non-fulfilment of his duties, Nizām al-Mulk entertains no such ideas and develops an argument by which he tries to prove that it is entirely through the faults of the people themselves if they do not have good rulers, whom he makes responsible only to God. His departure from the established Islamic theory can be explained by the fact that the very nature of the situation he was in made it impossible for him to follow the lines of Māwardī; and if he had done so it would have defeated his own object. The chief aim of Nizām al-Mulk was to establish a justification for the Sultanate in its own right without any external agency being responsible for it; while recognizing at the same time the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate as a religious institution. Since in theory the Sultān derived his power to rule from the Caliph, his office could neither be made elective, nor could he be made responsible to the people. That Nizām al-Mulk was prepared to acknowledge the Caliphate as a religious institution only is easily proved by the fact that while in the case of temporal power he ignores the Caliph as the source of the Sultān's authority and attributes it to God, he acknowledges the Caliph as the ultimate source of religious authority to the Sultān, when he says, "The Qādīs are the Nā'ibs (representatives) of the Caliphs and, as such, possess their ways, and they

are appointees and deputies of the Sultān, and as such perform his duties.”¹ In other words he commits himself to the fact that the Sultān has been delegated authority to appoint such officials from the Caliph. Again, on the chapter of ‘Titles,’ he acknowledges the legality of the titles that were bestowed by the Caliphs on the Saljūqid Sultāns.² In fact his was an effort to find a *via media* that the Caliph was the religious head and yet the Sultān too held divinely ordained authority.

It may seem even more extraordinary that much the same views are expressed by Imām Ghazzālī: ‘Know that God hath chosen from among the sons of men two groups, (1) The Prophets to make clear for His servants the way to His service and illuminate for them the way to knoweldge of Him, and (2) He hath chosen kings to protect His servants from injuring one another, and hath given them possession of the reins of binding and unloosing, (اهرام ونقض) and hath bound upon them the well-being of His creatures in their lives by His wisdom, and established them in the most honourable place by His power; as it is to be heard in the Traditions (السلطان ظل الله في الارض) wherefore it is fitting that it should be known that he to whom God hath given the degree of kingship and hath made His shadow upon earth, the love of him is

¹ *Siyāsat-nāmah*, pp. 41-42.

² *Ibid.*, p. 136. How is it possible for Nizām al-Mulk to talk about the titles of the successors of Malik Shāh when he himself died during the former’s life-time. Cf. *Siyāsat-nāmah*, p. 137. It shows that this chapter was not written by Nizām al-Mulk himself.

incumbent upon all men, and they are bound to follow him and obey him, nor is it lawful for them to disobey him or oppose him, and it is fitting that every man to whom God hath given the Faith should love the kings and Sultāns and obey them in what they command."¹

In his later work² he returns to this subject and attempts to define the relationship between Caliphate and Sultanate. "An evil-doing and barbarous Sultān, so long as he is supported by military force, so that he can only with difficulty be deposed and that the attempt to depose him would cause unendurable civil strife, must of necessity be left in possession and obedience must be rendered to him, exactly as obedience must be rendered to Amīrs. For in the Hadīths³ regarding the duty of obedience to the Amīrs (اسمعوا و اطيعوا استعمل عليكم عنده حبشى) and the prohibition of withdrawing one's hand from assisting them there are expressed definite commands and restraints. We consider that the office of the Caliphate is contractually assumed by that person of the Banu 'Abbās who is charged with the responsibility of it and that the function of government in the various lands is carried out by means of Sultāns, who owe allegiance to the Caliph. . . For if we were to decide that all governments are now null and void, all institutions of public welfare would also be

¹ Ghazzālī, *At-Tibr al-Masbūk*, pp. 40-41.

² Ghazzālī, *Ihyā al-'Ulūm*, Vol. II, p. 124.

³ Remarkable that the author transfers to the temporal princes the Hadīths which were invoked by early writers to claim obedience to the Caliphs.

absolutely null and void ; thus the capital would be lost in straining after the profit. Nay, but government in these days is a result solely of military power, and whosoever he may be to whom the holder of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the Caliph. And whosoever exercises independent authority, so long as he shows allegiance to the Caliph in the matter of his prerogatives of the Khutbah and the Sikkah, the same is a Sultān, whose orders and judgments are valid in the several parts of the earth."

Nothing could have been more fatal, however, to the smooth working of this dual system than the arrangement suggested by 'Amid al-Mulk to Sultān Tughril, *i.e.*, the occupation of Baghdād by him. Outside Baghdād the conflict of authorities might be avoided ; within the city any harmonious solution was an utter impossibility. In the presence of the Caliph at Baghdād, no Sultān could exercise unquestioned authority in the city, especially through a subordinate. The absence of any clear line of demarcation between the religious and temporal powers in Islām gave an opportunity to any energetic Caliph to play at Baghdād the rôle of the temporal as well as the religious head of Islām : and it was natural that his interference was more effective than that of a Sultān who was always absent from the place. Again, as during the Buwayhid occupation, there were certain things connected with the personal office of the Caliph, which could be performed by no other. Such obligations could be transferred to any lieutenant of the

Caliph in a far off territory, but the delegation of such powers at the residence of the Caliph had no justification. For instance, the appointment of Qāḍīs, Khaṭībīs, Imāms and all other religious functionaries had to be made by him personally at Baghdād. Whether the Qāḍīs drew their salaries from the Caliph's or the Sultān's exchequer, they were not subject to any outside influence in the exercise of their duties. Some of them were so independent and fearless in the discharge of their duties that they did not spare even the Sultāns from fulfilling certain obligations.¹ Even the Mudarris of the Nizāmīyah Madrasah could not hold the office without the permission of the Caliph. For not having obtained such permission the Mudarris Yūsuf al-Dimishqī was excluded from the mosque on Friday, and even the substitute sent by Sultān Mas'ūd was not allowed to undertake his duties until the Sultān himself had interceded with the Caliph.²

The Caliph was also held responsible for the moral and sanitary conditions of the city. In the year 466/1073 before the inundations, petitions had been sent by prominent citizens to the Caliph Qā'im complaining of the excess of wine-drinking and vice in the city and requesting him to abolish the places of

¹ In a particular case the chief Qāḍī Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Muzaffar al-Shāmī, refused to accept the testimony of a witness on the ground that he was dressed in silk. When the complainant protested that on similar grounds the evidence of the Sultān and of his minister, Nizām al-Mulk should be disallowed, the Qāḍī agreed with him and said that he would not accept their testimony either. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 173.

² *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 100.

ill-resort. The Caliph Muqtadī enacted several laws in order to safeguard the morals of the people. Singing women and prostitutes were banished from the city and their houses were sold, people were forbidden to enter the public baths without wearing a cloth, and the removal of various structures of reed and high towers used ostensibly for bird houses, but in reality for the unlawful purpose of spying on the private quarters of the people was ordered. Lastly the Caliph issued an order forbidding the ferrymen to carry men and women across together in their boats.¹ In the religious quarrels which broke out sometimes between the Shi'ites and Sunnites and other times between the Hanbalites and the Asharites, the Caliph's help was invoked, and his authority was regarded as supreme.² In all other matters connected with religion, his was the chief authority that could not be easily gainsaid.³

That the Caliph did not divest himself of his temporal power at Baghdād is evident from a study of the coinage. After Tughril, no Suljuqid Sultān was allowed to add the title Sultān after his name on the coins minted at the metropolis of Islām.⁴ The fact that the Caliphs were still able to levy tax on the people at Baghdād also goes to prove this statement.⁵ On the

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 156 ; Levy, *Baghdad Chronicle*, p. 203.

² Levy, *Baghdad Chronicle*, p. 202.

³ *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 123. Over the Jew Abu Sa'd ibn Simha's highhandedness with a huckster, the Caliph issued an order that all Dhimmīs must mark themselves with the special tokens and wear the garments prescribed for them by the Caliph 'Umar.

⁴ Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, Vol. III, pp. 30-37.

⁵ *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 435. The Caliph Mustarshid, in order to meet the

other hand the Sultāns farmed the revenue of Baghdād and held themselves responsible for the government of the city. For this purpose they appointed a prefect (*Shihna*) at Baghdād who was charged with the duty of maintaining peace and the security of the citizens. The position of this prefect was most precarious. On the one hand he was the representative of the Sultān and must therefore carry out his duties in accordance with his orders; on the other hand he had to deal with a still higher authority than that of the Sultān, i.e., the Caliph, who still considered himself the supreme authority in all matters at Baghdād at least. In cases of negligence or malpractices started by the prefect, the people, instead of complaining to the Sultān, approached the Caliph who was at Baghdād and thus easily accessible.¹ Thus a sort of dual government was established at Baghdād, and sooner or later it was to bring about a serious conflict between the two authorities.

No serious rupture in the relations of these two authorities took place, however, during the Nizām al-Mulk period. This was due partly to the occupation of the Sultāns in their wars with non-Muslims and partly to the wise administration and good counsel of Nizām al-Mulk, whose chief aim was the unity of the Islamic world under the guidance of

expenses of construction of a wall, levied a tax on all exports leaving the city through its gates.

¹ Several times the Caliph, by sending the Qādīs, stopped the malpractices started by the Shihnas. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, X, pp. 163, 231.

the Caliph.¹ During this period, the occasional interference of the Caliph in temporal affairs at Baghdād was met with a compromising attitude adopted by Nizām al-Mulk.² The Caliph, on the other hand, adopted a similar attitude; and did not like to create trouble over petty things. Even the assumption of the royal prerogatives, e.g., the sounding of drums, by the Shihna as representative of the Sultān at Baghdād, was tolerated by the Caliph.³ But it required the greatest political prudence to maintain concord between the two authorities, and the ability of Nizām al-Mulk to achieve this is illustrated by the fact that for so many years no serious quarrel arose. Even the rupture between the Caliph and Malik Shāh was not caused by any political incident, but was the cutcome of the unhappy marriage of Sultān Malik

¹ Houtsma, art. *Indian Journal*, September, 1924.

² An illustration of this can be found in the following case. Aytakin al-Sulaymānī, the prefect at Baghdād, who was appointed by Alp Arsalān had left his son to officiate for him during his absence. He maltreated the people and killed one of the servants of the Caliph Muqtadī. The people of the Caliph's Dīwān complained against him to the Sultān asking him to remove the prefect from his post. Since his father was in great favour with Nizām al-Mulk, the request of the Dīwān was not favourably considered. Nizām al-Mulk sent the prefect Aytakin to Baghdād in 464/1071 and requested the Caliph to forgive him. When the Caliph rejected the request of Nizām al-Mulk, the latter sent him to Takrit and granted him an Iqta there. On hearing this, the Caliph sent orders to the governor of Takrit not to allow him admittance into his country. This affair opened the eyes of Nizām al-Mulk and the Sultān and they had to remove Aytakin and send Sa'd al-Daulah in his place to Baghdād. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 47.

³ In 471/1078 Sa'd al-Daulah had drums beaten at his gates at prayer times (five). This was the first innovation introduced by a prefect. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 72.

Muayyid al-Mulk b. Nizām al-Mulk did the same thing in 475/1082. Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 83.

Shāh's daughter with the Caliph Muqtadī.¹

The death of Nizām al-Mulk, shortly followed by that of Sultān Malik Shāh, in 485/1092, gave the signal for a long struggle for the succession to the Sultanate between the sons of the Sultān. These wars offered an unexpected opportunity to the Caliph to assert his independence; but it seems that his temporal power during the Nizām period was so weakened that he was incapable of taking advantage of these long and bloody wars. The Caliph's position can be realized from the fact that he had to delegate the temporal power even to minors.² A strange and ridiculous position had arisen in Muslim politics. A minor could not be elected as Caliph, though the Caliph, during this period, was not the actual ruler of the Islamic State; while the Sultāns, who were supposed to have delegated powers from the

¹ The unhappy relations between the Caliph and his wife, the Sultān's daughter, brought about their separation, and ultimately the premature and tragic end of the princess caused Malik Shāh to conceive hatred against the Caliph, whom he looked upon as the author of his misfortune. He completely ignored the Caliph's presence during his visit to Baghdād in 484/1091 and showed his public displeasure by not even seeing him. This was bad enough; but worse was to follow, for the Sultān ordered the construction of various buildings for the use of himself and his officials, indicating thereby that he intended to make Baghdād his winter resort for the future. (Cf. *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 135.) Any serious step against the Caliph at this juncture was avoided by the wise counsels of Nizām al-Mulk, but, after the latter's death, the way was open to the Sultān to give vent to his feelings. He sent instructions to the Caliph to retire from his residence to Basra or, if he desired, to the Holy Cities in Arabia; and to nominate the little Ja'far as his successor, without even realizing the consequences of such an unwise step as to declare a child as Caliph.

² *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 145. The Caliph Muqtadī, under the pressure of Turkan Khātūn, had to grant the deed of investiture to her child of four years of age. In 498/1104, after the death of Barkyaruq, his *shihna* Amīr al-Ghāzi, had the Caliph mention Barkyaruq's five-year-old son's name in the *Khutbah* at Baghdād and also on the coinage (*Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 262).

Caliphate to manage temporal affairs, might be little more than babes.¹ As a matter of fact both Barkyaruq and Muḥammad, who succeeded Maḥmūd on account of his sudden and premature death, were minors though not of very tender age, but there was no way of preventing their succession to the Sultanate as their power mainly depended on the right of the sword. Whosoever came out successful of the war of succession had his name mentioned in the Khuṭbah at Baghdād and also on the coinage, with, of course, the permission of the Caliph, which was quite formal and nominal.² The prayers for the Sultān at Baghdād had become almost as necessary as for the Caliph. People used to offer prayers for them automatically as soon as they heard the result of the war, and in case of doubt they mentioned the word *sultān* in the Khuṭbah without mentioning any particular name.³ The Caliph, realizing his incapacity, adopted a passive attitude and calmly watched the progress of the war between the two brothers, Barkyaruq and Muḥammad. The latter

¹ This state of affairs was neither in keeping with the doctrines of the Islamic jurists nor with the views of Nizām al-Mulk. Imām Ghazālī objected to the Caliph's granting the deed of investiture to the four-year-old son of Sultān Malik Shāh (*Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 145).

² *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 155. In 487/1094, after his victory, Barkyaruq came to Baghdād and asked the Caliph for the inclusion of his name in the Khuṭbah, which was done. And the Khuṭbah was read for Muḥammad at his request, when the latter defeated Barkyaruq (*Ibn Athīr*, X, pp. 195-96).

³ *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 265. In 498/1104 Muḥammad reached Baghdād and encamped on the west side where his name was mentioned in the Khuṭbah, whereas in the east the Khuṭbah was read in the name of Malik Shāh. In the mosque of Manṣūr, the *khaṭīb* contented himself with naming the Caliph and offered prayers in the name of "the Sultān of the World" without mentioning any personal name.

went on fighting, settling terms and even dividing countries with rights of mentioning their names in the *Khutbah*, and informed the Caliph afterwards.¹

Both the Caliph and the Sultān tolerated each other in spite of their personal recriminations and animosities; the former owing to his inability to adopt any other course and the latter, out of religious regard, did not think it worth while to involve himself in any quarrel with the Caliph.² If any Sultān did not behave with respect to the Caliph or oppressed the people, he ran the risk of alienating the sympathies of the public.³

In the absence of any stable Government at Baghdād during this period, owing to the continuous wars of succession, the *shihna* instead of maintaining peace and security began to govern more despotically and to oppress the people. The Caliph felt his responsibility for stopping these malpractices, but, unable to assert his will except by sending Qādīs⁴ to intercede with the oppressors, took the fatal step of inviting Sayf al-Daulah Ṣadaqah, an Arab Shi'a chief of Ḥillah, to

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, X, pp. 254-55.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 209-10. In spite of Barkyaruq's misbehaviour with the Caliph, the latter had to grant him the deed. In the same way, in spite of his denunciation by the Caliph, Barkyaruq had to put up with the same Caliph.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 209. When Barkyaruq oppressed the people and confiscated the property of the Qādī Salīm, the people sided with Muḥammad.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 163. In 487/1094 Aytakin the *shihna* at Baghdād set fire to the entire Bāb al-Baḡrah because his *hājib* Muḥammad was stoned to bleeding. The Caliph, through the intercession of the Qādī, stopped him from further injuries to the citizens. The men of al-Ghāzī showed their high-handedness by murdering a boatman because he was slow in bringing a boat for their use (*Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 231).

intervene. The latter seized the opportunity to plunder the people and sometimes even imposed conditions on the Caliph before he would stop pillaging the city.¹ The rapid changes of temporal authority at Baghdād had also rendered the position of the shiḥna insecure. Since the change of Sultanate from one candidate to another also meant a change of the shiḥna at Baghdād, it sometimes led to a war between the two rival claimants. This further worsened the lot of the citizens who were always the victims in such struggles. In such wars the help of the Caliph was sometimes sought and was given to one who happened to be at Baghdād.²

On the whole, however, the Caliph, realizing his incapacity to assert his position, left matters in *status quo* and contented himself with the affairs of Baghdād, the enjoyment of his personal income free from all responsibilities, and his own private affairs. Neither the Caliph nor the Sultān stirred a finger at a time when the Crusaders were gaining victory after victory in Muslim lands. Appeal after appeal was made to the Caliph who neither cared to send help himself, as head of the Muslim community, nor could he force the Sultān to fulfil the obligation of waging *jihād* or at least of protecting the lives and property of the Muslims.³ Only in 504 A.H. the Caliph and the Sultān

¹ *Ibn Athir*, X, pp. 245-46. Sayf al-Daulah stopped plundering on condition that the shiḥna sent by Barkyaruq should be turned out and Muḥammad's name should be mentioned in the Khutbah.

² *Ibn Athir*, X, p. 374. In 512/1118, Aqsunqur with the help of the Caliph turned out the new shiḥna sent by Maḥmūd.

³ Even the population of Baghdād, beyond shedding tears, were not moved by the news of the advance of the Crusaders on Jerusalem in 492/1092. The

were obliged to comply with the request of a mission which was headed by a good many of the learned scholars of the Metropolis who were anxious to uphold the prestige of Islam.¹

A new step was taken in the development of the Sultanate when, after the defeat of Sultān Maḥmūd at the hands of Sanjar, the latter was acknowledged as suzerain at Baghdād in 513/1119.² Henceforward Sanjar became the official Sultān and his name was mentioned in the Khutbah as well as on the coinage not only at Baghdād³ but also in all those countries which were

city did not take any practical step even when a delegation came to secure help after the fall of Jerusalem (*Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 192). In 501/1108 a delegation arrived at Baghdād, headed by the ruling chief of Tripoli himself. The latter was received with great honour and consideration by both the Caliph and the Sultān, and was promised troops; but not a single man went out of 'Irāq to give battle to the enemy (*Ibn Qalānisi*, p. 161; *Ibn Athīr*, X, pp. 305-306).

¹ The men of Aleppo and their supporters, on the Friday after their demonstration, went to the mosque in the Caliph's palace with a view to enforcing their appeal. They were joined by many citizens. When their entry was prevented by the guardian of the gate, they, pushing aside the guard, forcibly entered the building, tore down the grille surrounding the part of the mosque attached for the Caliph's private use, broke the pulpit and caused the abandonment of the public service. The Caliph was thus obliged to refer the matter to the Sultān in strong words with the result that the Sultān sent orders to Mausil and to other cities within his sphere of influence, commanding the governors of those places to prepare themselves to partake in the Holy War against the Franks (*Ibn Qalānisi*, p. 173; *The Damascus Chronicle*, p. 111; *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 339; *Levy, Baghdad Chronicle*, p. 211). This occasion coincided with the arrival of the Sultān's daughter, the Caliph's wife, who entered the city with great pomp and magnificence; but as the ceremony was marred by the disturbances the Caliph instituted an enquiry to find out the real authors of the trouble so that condign punishment should be meted out to them, and was only prevented from doing so by the timely intervention of the Sultān. (*The Damascus Chronicle*, pp. 111-12).

² *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 388.

³ It should be noted, however, that at Baghdād, Sanjar's name appears on the coinage without the epithet Sultān.

under Suljūqid control in Persia.¹ This was the first occasion in the history of the Caliphate that a ruler was allowed this honour without having possession of Baghdād, and set an important precedent, which was subsequently invoked by powerful rulers, who demanded as a right that their names should be mentioned in the Khuṭbah at Baghdād. The position was further complicated by the fact that the rulers who were in possession of Baghdād also called themselves Sultāns, as their coinage shows.² It consequently became necessary that their names should be mentioned in the Khuṭbah also and inscribed on the coinage at Baghdād by virtue of their being *de facto* sovereigns. The only difference between the two categories of Sultāns was that, while Sultān Sanjar's name was mentioned in the Khuṭbah and inscribed on the coinage in the territories administered by the Sultāns of 'Irāq, the latter did not enjoy the same privilege in Sultān Sanjar's dominions.³

As soon as Sultān Sanjar made peace with his nephew Maḥmūd he appointed him his heir-apparent and ordered the inclusion of his name in the Khuṭbah all over the Islamic Empire, and afterwards informed the Caliph to this effect.⁴ This was the limit of encroach-

¹ Lane-Poole, *Coins of the Saljuqs* III. No coins of Sanjar's period are known from Kirmān, but even in earlier times the Saljūqid *maliks* of Kirmān did not strike the Sultān's name on their coins.

² Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, III, pp. 43-44.

³ *Ibid.* Sultān Sanjar's name appears on all coins minted in 'Irāq; while no other Sultān's name appears on the coinage minted in the dominions of Sultān Sanjar.

⁴ *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 389.

ment upon the prerogatives of the Caliph by the Sultān. It was now Sultān Sanjar who gave the government of 'Irāq to whomsoever he liked; but, since the government of Baghdād was also involved, the prince concerned had to take an oath of allegiance to the Caliph and to receive a deed of investiture from him in return. The situation had become extremely complicated and was made worse by the wars of succession that were to follow the death of Maḥmūd. The help of both Sultān Sanjar as *de facto* suzerain of 'Irāq and of the Caliph as the holder of *de jure* sovereignty was invoked by the conflicting parties. The unity of the Saljūq dynasty broke down on the death of Sultān Muḥammad in 511/1117 and the accession of his son Maḥmūd, whose authority at Baghdād was intermittent, being challenged first by his uncle Sanjar and then by his own brother, Mas'ūd, who ruled at Mauṣil. This fraternal conflict was due to the intrigues of Dubays, son of the famous Sadaqa, and gave an opportunity to the Caliphs to assert their temporal power by trying conclusions with the Saljūqid Sultāns.

Thus, it was the activities of Dubays which gave a chance to the Caliph Mustarshid (512-29/1118-35) to organize the forces which later on proved useful to him and to his successors against the Saljūqid Sultāns. Dubays was a mere plunderer and was most unscrupulous in his actions. He would neither listen to the Caliph nor to the Sultān and, if it suited his purpose, he would tender his apologies to both of them.¹ Since he

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, X, pp. 397-98.

had been continually raiding Baghdād and harrying the surrounding districts, the Caliph had to assume the rôle of a defender. In order to meet this common enemy, Caliph and Sultān had to set in concert, and Sultān Maḥmūd rendered all necessary help to the Caliph against Dubays. When, however, in 516/1122, the latter made peace with the Sultān by giving his brother Mansūr as a hostage for his good conduct, the Caliph did not approve of the peace and wrote to Sultān Maḥmūd that under no circumstances should peace be made with him as he was intending to come to Baghdād to avenge his father's death.¹ The Caliph also asked the Sultān to recall Aqsunqur Bursuqī from Mauṣil in order to assume charge of Baghdād and 'Irāq as prefect.² A desultory war went on for some time between the joint forces of the Caliph and Bursuqī and those of Dubays; but the Caliph finally defeated him by leading a huge army personally against him in 517/1123, and returned to Baghdād in triumph. This victory had a great moral effect on the public mind and re-established the prestige of the Caliph.³ After getting rid of Dubays, it was the turn of the prefect, Aqsunqur, with whom the Caliph got displeased and so had him retransferred from his post.⁴ Another prefect, Yarqutash, was sent to Baghdād, but now the growing powers of the Caliph Mustarshid would not allow him to tolerate

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 422.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 428-30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 431.

any prefect of the Sultān at Baghdād. Mustarshid was an able and energetic Caliph who generally commanded the respect of the Sultān and others, and he was the first Caliph who seriously thought of translating his family's theoretical rights into actual practice. His ideas can be judged from the following speech which he delivered after the Friday sermon just before giving battle to Sultān Maḥmūd in 520/1226: "We entrusted our affairs to the house of Saljūq, but they rebelled against us, and time lengthened over them and their hearts were hardened, and many of them were sinners."¹ The continuance of a dual government at Baghdād under such an imperious Caliph was out of question. The struggle that had long been brewing broke out openly in 520/1126 when the Caliph was involved in a quarrel between his wazīr and the prefect of the Sultān at Baghdād. The latter, on a threat from the Caliph, left Baghdād and fled to the Sultān, before whom he laid his complaint, warning him that the Caliph's power was on the increase and, unless he took proper steps immediately, the Metropolis would be lost to the Saljūqs. Acting on this advice, the Sultān mobilised his forces and proceeded towards 'Irāq. The Caliph remonstrated and requested him to turn back, on the ground that the country and its inhabitants were impoverished as a result of the ravages of Dubays and not in a position to supply the needs of the Sultān's army. In asking him to put off his visit until the city had been

¹ Nizāmī Arūḍī, *Chahār Maqālah*, trans. Browne, Anecdote VIII, pp. 23-24.

restored at least to some of its former prosperity, the Caliph promised that no opposition would then be made to his coming. In return for this consideration, he offered the Sultān some money, which so strengthened the suspicions of the latter that he insisted on coming to Baghdād. This led to the actual rupture between the two.¹ In the ensuing struggle the people, exasperated by the plunder of the Caliph's crown and private dwelling by the Sultān's army, enthusiastically took the part of the Caliph who was enabled to raise a huge army of about thirty thousand. But the desertion of a Kurdish chief to the Sultān and the intervention of Zangī, then governor of Wāsīt, turned the scale in his favour.² The Caliph, seeing the prospects of war against him, made overtures for peace, which were accepted by the Sultān, who contented himself with a present of money and other gifts from the Caliph and retired from Baghdād in 521/1127 after a bout of illness.³

On the death of Sultān Maḥmūd in 525/1131, the Caliph Mustarshid took advantage of the quarrel between Dā'ūd, the son of Sultān Maḥmūd who was recognized as Sultān in Jibāl and Ādharbaijān, and his uncle Mas'ūd, who revolted against his authority. Both of them applied to the Caliph for the inclusion of their names in the Khuṭbah at Baghdād, but he refused their requests with the remarkable words

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 448.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 449-50.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 450; *Bundarī*, p. 152. It is noteworthy that Ibn Athīr's sympathies are rather with the Sultān, Bundarī's against him.

(if Ibn Athīr is to be trusted): "The decision regarding the Khuṭbah rests with Sultān Sanjar; whomsoever he wants, the Khuṭbah will be read in his name."¹ At the same time he wrote to Sultān Sanjar not to recommend anybody's name.² During the troubled years which followed, when various princes of the Saljūqid dynasty tried to gain the mastery of 'Irāq, the Caliph Mustarshid played off the claimants against one another, welcoming the defeated party and often helping it with men and money. This attitude at once involved him in a conflict with Sultān Sanjar, and relations between Caliph and Sultān became so straitened that the former dropped the Sultān's name from the Khuṭbah in 526/1131.³ Upon this, Sanjar gave Ḥillah to Dubays and invited him to advance towards Baghdād. The joint advance of 'Imād al-Din Zangī and Dubays on Baghdād compelled the Caliph, who was heading an army with Malik Saljūq Shāh and Mas'ūd against Sultān Sanjar, to retrace his steps. Sultān Sanjar, after defeating the combined forces of Malik Saljūq Shāh and Mas'ūd, reinstated Malik Tughril in 'Irāq; the Caliph, on the other hand, having defeated the force of Zangī and Dubays,⁴ again helped the refugees, *i.e.*, Malik Dā'ūd and Mas'ūd, with men and money, inserted their names in the Khuṭbah and sent them twice to fight against Malik Tughril. He was unable, however, to

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, X, p. 474.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 478.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 476-78.

instal his nominee in 'Irāq against the nominee of the Sultān, and only Tughril's death in 629/1134 allowed Sultān Mas'ūd to succeed him.¹ But no sooner was Mas'ūd installed than Mustarshid's determination to get rid of Saljūqid control led him to a decisive struggle with the new Sultān of 'Irāq, which caused his defeat and capture and cost him his life. When Sultān Mas'ūd occupied Hamadān, several of the leaders of the Saljūqids turned against him. The Caliph not only welcomed the rebels as usual but, to make matters worse, dropped the name of Sultān Mas'ūd from the Khuṭbah at Baghdād.² In the ensuing campaign of 529/1134, the Caliph was refused help from the governor of Baṣrah³ and many of his leaders deserted to Sultān Mas'ūd, with the result that his forces were defeated and he was personally captured with all his remaining officers. The Sultān appointed as prefect at Baghdād Beg Abah al-Maḥmūdī who confiscated all the personal property of the Caliph and also plundered his palace. Upon this the people at Baghdād were deeply grieved and gave expression to their feelings not only by breaking the *minbar* of the mosque and preventing the *khaṭīb* from reading the Khuṭbah but also by fighting against the prefect.⁴ In the meanwhile news arrived of the revolt of Malik Dā'ūd and, in consequence of this, the Sultān hastened in that direction, with the imprisoned Caliph in

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, p. 14 ; *Ibn Qalānisi*, p. 248.

³ *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 15.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

his wake.¹ Peace was made between the Caliph and Sultān Mas'ūd on the following terms:

That the Caliph shall pay a sum of money to the Sultān ; that he shall not again assemble armed forces ; and that he shall not leave his place.² These terms show very clearly that the Sultān was determined to prevent the Caliphate from assuming the functions of temporal rulership. As the Caliph was making arrangements for his return to Baghdād, however, he was murdered by some Bāṭinīs in his tent, though it was naturally suspected at Baghdād that the murder had been instigated by the Sultān.³

In spite of the humiliation which attended Mustarshid's efforts to free himself from the control of the Sultāns, the spirit of independence which he had displayed fired his successors, and after one more attempt the Caliphs at last succeeded in realizing their ambition when the Saljūqids were quarrelling over the fragments of their empire. The struggle was renewed immediately on the succession of Mustarshid's son, Rashīd, who refused to adhere to the terms of the treaty, and would not pay the sum demanded. On a mere suspicion, he expelled the prefect from Baghdād, and dropped the name of Sultān Mas'ūd from the Khuṭbah.⁴ This was sufficient for the reopening of war between the Caliph and the Sultān.

¹ *Ibn Qalānisi*, p. 249 ; *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 16.

² *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 16.

³ *Bundari*, p. 178. It was also rumoured that it was at the instigation of Sultān Sanjar.

⁴ *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 23.

The former mobilised his forces and allied himself with Malik Dā'ūd b. Sultān Maḥmūd, who came to Baghdād with all his forces from Ādharbajān in 530/1135; and for whom the Khuṭbah was read at Baghdād.¹ Relying upon the strength of his combined forces, and with the advice of his counsellors, the Caliph rejected the peace overtures of the Sultān who had offered obedience and submission to him.² Sultān Mas'ūd consequently proceeded to Baghdād, and besieged it for about fifty days. When he was on the verge of raising the siege, he received some boats from the governor of Wāsiṭ, with which he succeeded in crossing the Tigris. The Caliph fled with all his allies to Mausiḷ and the Sultān triumphantly entered Baghdād in 530/1136.³ His first business on entering was to summon an assembly of the Qāḍīs, Faqīhs, public notaries and other high officials and lay before them the document of the Caliph in which he had declared himself deposed if ever he went out to fight against Sultān Mas'ūd. Thus the Sultān secured *Fatwas* from the Qāḍīs and Faqīhs for the deposition of Rashīd, and issued an order intimating the deposition of the Caliph and the exclusion of his name from the Khuṭbah.⁴ Afterwards he consulted the late Caliph's wazīr and agreed with him to the election of Muqtafi (530-55/1136-60) as the new Commander of the Faithful, a man who was to deal a hard blow to

¹ *Bundari*, p. 179.

² *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 24.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

Saljūq power. Ibn Athīr relates that when the Sultān sent a messenger to the new Caliph with regard to an estate belonging to the privy purse, he received the following reply: "Eighty mules are used for bringing water from the Tigris. Let the Sultān see that those who drink this water have their needs supplied." This unexpected reply led the Sultān to realize that he had elected too strong a man for the Caliphate.¹

The Caliph Muqtafī, although a creation of the Sultān, assumed a more independent attitude than many of his predecessors. He entered into a plot to murder the Sultān while at Baghdād, but it did not materialize owing to the incessant rain that fell that day and prevented the Sultān from coming out of his house for prayers.² It was well for the Caliphate that Sultān Mas'ūd died in 547/1152. With his death the temporal power of the Saljūqs disappeared from Baghdād and the surrounding territories for ever; the libertine Mas'ūd al-Bilālī, the prefect at Baghdād, fled,³ and the Caliph proceeded to ransack the houses of the Saljūq officials who were quartered in the city.⁴ In accordance with the oath taken by the Caliph at his accession, he banished from the city those Turks and Persians who had any connection with the Saljūq régime,⁵ and appointed Greek and Armenian mamlūks

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 28.

² *Rāwandī*, p. 238.

³ *Zubdat at-Tawārikh*, p. 72.

⁴ *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 106.

⁵ *Zubdat at-Tawārikh*, p. 72; *Levy, Baghdad Chronicle*, p. 222.

to be Amīrs in their places. All the estates formerly held by the Sultān's minister were now given to his own wazīr. In the same year, the Caliph occupied 'Irāq as far as Takrīt, Ḥulwān, Ḥillah, Kūfah and Wāsiṭ. Some forces sent by Malik Shāh were defeated by the Caliph's army and the latter two places came under the direct control of the Caliphate.¹

After establishing his temporal power in Baghdād and the surrounding provinces, the Caliph considered it a stigma and a mark of subordination to continue to insert the Sultāns' names in the Khuṭbah at Baghdād. Since prayers had been offered for them at Baghdād only by virtue of their *de facto* occupation of the city, with the disappearance of their sovereignty their names could no longer be included in the Khuṭbah. But the Sultāns were not to accept this view without challenge. It appears from historical evidence that the Caliph was still willing to mention the name of the official Sultān in the Khuṭbah, and as long as Sultān Sanjar continued to exercise effective rule, his name was mentioned in the Khuṭbah and inscribed on the coinage at Baghdād.² The Caliph paid the same honour to Sulaymān Shāh b. Muḥammad who had been made heir-apparent to Sanjar, when the former after his defeat by the Ghuzz came to Baghdād in 551/1156;³ on the other hand, he refused the request of Muḥammad, who had succeeded in Persian 'Irāq, for the inclusion of his name in the Khuṭbah at

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 106.

² *Ibid.*, p. 147.

³ *Bundarī*, p. 240; *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 136.

Baghdād.¹ This furnished a pretext to Sultān Muḥammad to start siege operations against the Metropolis, but the shrewd Caliph was quite prepared to withstand an attack. The Sultān unnecessarily delayed the siege operations in spite of the fact that he was supplied with continual reinforcements of ships. For certain reasons, he continued to send messages to the Caliph assuring him of his loyalty if only his own claims were acknowledged. It must remain uncertain whether this was due to the fact that his only aim in fighting with the Caliph was to establish his right to incursion of his name in the Khuṭbah at Baghdād, or to the fact that some of the besiegers had scruples about warring against the Caliph and the "Heart of Islam". In the meanwhile, the Caliph's wazīr was secretly trying to win the Sultān's officers by sending them secret gifts of money accompanied by warnings that it was "contrary to the teachings of Islām to rebel against the Caliph, or to attack Baghdād, which was his abode."² To some extent the wazīr's propaganda proved effective, but the real help came from the other direction. By the time the Sultān was ready to attack in earnest, the diplomatic efforts of the Caliph and his wazīr bore fruit in persuading Malik Shāh and other claimants of the Saljūqid throne to move hostile troops against the Sultān's base at Hamadān. Afraid of more serious trouble at home, he had to raise the siege; the city was saved, and

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 140.

² *Zubdat at-Tawārīkh*, p. 75; Levy, *Baghdad Chronicle*, p. 225.

never again did any Saljūqid Sultān forcibly attempt to claim Baghdād as his own.¹

On the death of Sultān Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad b. Malik Shāh in 554/1159, Sulaymān Shāh b. Muḥammad was reinstated as Sultān, and, since the latter had already been accepted by the Caliphate as the successor of Sanjar and his name had been mentioned as such in the Khuṭbah, no trouble arose. But when Malik Shāh, gathering some followers at Isfahān, sent to the Caliph demanding the inclusion of his name in the Khuṭbah at Baghdād and threatening at the same time that in case of non-compliance he would attack Baghdād, the Caliph's wazīr sent a slave-girl to poison him in 555/1160.² After the murder of Sulaymān Shāh, who had given himself up to pleasure and luxury, by his own wazīr Sharaf al-Dīn, the Saljūqid Sultanate at Baghdād came to an end.³ When his successor Aarsalān Shāh b. Tughril (556-73/1161-77) sent a request for the incursion of his name in the Khuṭbah at Baghdād, the messenger was disgracefully turned out.⁴ The efforts of the last of the Saljūqid Sultān, Tughril, to revive the claims of the Sultanate at Baghdād, i.e., to deprive the Caliphate of its temporal power, led him into a sharp collision with one of the most energetic of the Caliphs, Nāṣir, who had the satisfaction of seeing Tughril's head hung at the gates of his palace in 590/1194 in Baghdād.⁵

¹ *Ibn At-ṭir*, XI, pp. 140-42; *Bundarī*, p. 246.

² *Ibn Athīr* XI, p. 174.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 177-78.

⁵ *Zubdat at-Tawārikh*, p. 110; *Juwaynī*, II, p. 32; *Ibn Athīr*, XII, p. 70.

From its long drawn out struggle for temporal power with the Saljūqs, the 'Abbāsid Caliphate thus emerged successful up to a point. The Caliphs were able to create a small independent State for themselves, in which they enjoyed not only religious authority, but also held the temporal sovereignty. This small State was by no means created through the right of their religious authority, but at the point of the sword. No doubt, the Caliphs still commanded the sympathies of the public more than the Sultān.¹ Some of whom with their commanders hesitated to oppose an army personally led by the Caliph.² But these factors were not so important as to enable incapable Caliphs to assert their temporal authority. Their success was mainly due to the continual wars of succession between the Saljūqid claimants, coincident with the emergence of a line of energetic and ambitious Caliphs.

On the other hand, during the Saljūqid period the Caliph's temporal power in Persia vanished entirely. Since the Caliph had vested absolute temporal power in the Sultān, who could bestow any part of the Islamic Empire in his possession on whomsoever he

¹ *Rāwandī*, p. 346. The Caliph was held in such esteem in the public eye that when the last Saljūqid Sultān, Tughril, defeated the forces of the Caliphate and much booty fell to him, people did not purchase an Arab horse even for a *dinār* out of their regard for the Caliphate.

² *Rāwandī*, p. 284. Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd was told that, if the Caliph led the army personally, the Amīrs would not have courage to oppose him. Sultān Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd considered the war against the Caliph inauspicious (*cf. Bundarī*, p. 236). Some of the besiegers apparently had scruples about warring against the Caliph and the "Heart of Islam." *Cf. Levy*, p. 225.

chose, the Caliphate was completely cut off from relations with other Persian rulers. It has already been noted that Tughril and his brothers immediately after writing their letter to the Caliph in 432/1040, divided up the possessions which had fallen to them by conquest. To Qavurd b. Chagrī Beg's share fell the government of Kirmān. When Tughril was recognized as Sultān, the Saljūqs of Kirmān set themselves up as independent rulers and they gave little heed either to the Caliphate or to the Great Saljūqs, with whom they were often at war. When Qavurd in 465/1072 contested the succession to the Sultanate of Malik Shāh, he was defeated, captured and poisoned by order of Malik Shāh; but afterwards his son Sultān Shāh, who also had fallen into the hands of the Sultān (Malik Shāh), managed to effect his escape to Kirmān, where he installed himself as Malik in 467/1074 without taking the trouble to approach either the Caliph or the Sultān for a deed of investiture.¹ In 472/1079 Malik Shāh marched towards Kirmān but on the submission of his nephew Sultān Shāh who welcomed him and gave valuable presents, he returned to his own country and invested him with the possession of all the territories that were ruled by him.² Since these Maliks were never granted any deed of investiture directly from the Caliphate, they had no political connection with the institution whatsoever. During

¹ Muḥammad Ibrāhīm, *History of the Saljūqids of Kirmān*, ed. Houtsma, p. 17.

² *Ibn Athīr*, X, pp. 74-75.

their intermittent wars of succession they never approached the Caliph, even in order to strengthen their position against one another, and seem to have ruled their country solely by right of conquest.

Khurāsān likewise was politically cut off from the Caliphate since the ceremony of the renewal of the deed of investiture fell into disuse. After Sanjar received his deed from the Caliphate, it was never renewed even on the death of a Caliph. It seems that the renewal of this deed, both on the change of the Caliph and of the ruler, was required only in those cases where the Sultān happened to be in possession of Baghdād itself. That Khurāsān was still in touch with the Caliphate can be explained by the fact that its ruler had become the official Sultān and, as such, had to deal with the central government. However, the paucity of correspondence regarding important matters between the governors and the Caliphate shows the extent of their independence. The successors of Sultān Sanjar, Malik Sulaymān Shāh and Maḥmūd Khān b. Muḥammad b. Bughra Khān, who were in turn raised to the Sultanate during the captivity of the Sultān in 549/1154, did not approach the Caliph for the renewal of the deed of investiture.¹ Even after Sanjar's death in 551/1155, Maḥmūd Khān, who finally succeeded Sanjar in accordance with the will of the latter, did not trouble to approach the Caliph for renewal of the deed. He seems to have succeeded and ruled only by right of testament.²

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, XI, pp. 119 and 121 respectively.

² *Ibid.*, p. 147.

Since various governors in Persia held their appointments directly from the Saljūqid Sultāns they either maintained a semblance of allegiance to them or freed themselves from their yoke whenever it became possible for them to do so.¹ No doubt all these rulers kept on mentioning the Caliph's name in the Khuṭbah and inscribing it on the coinage current in their territories; but this recognition was now an automatic traditional usage—it was not coupled with any formal profession of allegiance and receipt in return of a deed or other insignia of temporal sovereignty. It was purely to the force of religious tradition that these practices owed their survival. Hence it can safely be said that, at this time, an implicit distinction was made between the religious and temporal recognition of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate by the rulers in Persia.

To sum up, the Saljūq period, so far as the 'Abbāsid Caliphate is concerned, is characterised by two significant features:

I. It was during this period that the renewal of the deed of investiture to individual rulers fell into disuse; and its necessity was felt only on the change of the dynasty instead of the ruler in the same family. Thus the Caliphate was politically cut off from Persia

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 121. Al-Muwayyad, one of the slaves of Sanjar, occupied Nishāpūr, Tūs, Nasā, etc., without possessing any legal title. With great hesitation he acknowledged Sultān Maḥmūd as his overlord. In 558/1163, when he became the master of the greater part of Khurāsān, he acknowledged Arsalān as his overlord and mentioned his name in the Khuṭbah (cf. *Ibn Athīr*, XI, pp. 192-93).

altogether and even that semblance of political control that existed during the preceding régime came to an end.

II. The other and the most important political significance of the Saljūq period, as far as the Caliphate is concerned, is the complete severance of the temporal and religious functions of the institution. For the first time in its history, the Caliphate had delegated the temporal functions of its own free will to a Sultān who was henceforward considered as the head of the temporal affairs of the Caliphate. The following ideas expressed by the Atabeg of the last of the Saljūqid Sultāns were the outcome of the delegation of the temporal affairs of the Caliphate to the Sultāns: "The Caliph, in the capacity of an Imām, should occupy himself with the performance of *namāz* (prayers) and religious leadership, as it is the foundation of the faith and the best of deeds. As regards temporal affairs, they should be delegated to Sultāns."¹ These ideas are not based on exaggeration, but only describe the position that had actually arisen. On the other hand, as soon as a strong and capable person occupied the Caliphate, it was natural on his part not to admit the Sultanate, but to revert to the earlier position, as actually happened in the case of the last three successive holders of that position during the Saljūqid period. But one thing which cannot be denied is that an innovation had taken place with all legality of a practical sort behind it, which the Cali-

¹ *Rāwandī*, p. 334.

phate could not refuse to a strong Sultān if only he was capable of claiming it, and which he could hold, once he had obtained it, with all show of legality and the authority of a precedent. It was on the strength of this precedent that the Khwārazm Shāhs claimed the privileges previously enjoyed by the Saljūqs, and carried on a continual struggle with the Caliphate that was brought to an end only on the destruction of both dynasties. The next chapter shall be devoted to this development.

CHAPTER IV

The last phase in the struggle between Caliphate and Sultanate

WITH the advent of the Khwārazm Shāhs¹ to power in Persia, the final step was taken in the development of the institution of the Sultanate. They were the first sovereign rulers in Persia to dispense with the traditional policy of approaching the Caliphate for the confirmation of their temporal rights, when the intermediate power from which they had derived their authority had ceased to exist. Al-Arsalān (551-68/1156-72), the son and successor of Atsiz, had secured a deed of investiture from Sultān Sanjar after the latter's escape from his captivity at the hands of the Ghuzz in 551/1156.² But after Sanjar's death in 552/1157, he neither approached the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate, as he ought to have done in the absence of any intermediate authority, for the legitimation of his rights, nor did he take any steps in this direction in his dealings with Maḥmūd who had succeeded in 'Irāq as the head of the Saljūqid dynasty.³ Al-Arsalān may perhaps be taken

¹ See art. on Khwārazm Shāhs in *Encycl. of Islam*.

² *Ibn Athīr*, XI, p. 138.

³ Although Al-Arsalān welcomed Maḥmūd Khān as the successor of Sultān Sanjar in Khurāsān and informed him that he had ordered the observance of three days' mourning in his territories on the death of the

as a legally constituted ruler since he had secured the deed to rule his country from Sultān Sanjar ; but after his death in 568/1172, his two sons, Takash and Sultān Shāh, who had been struggling for the succession, did not entertain the idea of appealing to the Caliph even to strengthen their claims. Instead of approaching the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate for its moral and material support, both brothers in turn invoked the assistance of the infidel Qara Khitays.¹ By this time, in fact, a deed of investiture from the Caliphate had lost even its moral value ; and for the determination of such rights only military strength was of any consequence.

In the same way, the Ghūrīds, though they were political rivals of the Khwārazm Shāhs in Persia and noted for their amicable relations with the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate, in accordance with the spirit of the time, limited the recognition of the Caliphate simply to the mention of the Caliph's name in the Khuṭbah and its

Sultān, he placed him on the same official footing as other minor rulers of Khurāsān when he called himself " sincere friend " (*mukhlis*). It should be noted here that Atsiz in his letters to Sultān Sanjar used to call himself " slave " (*bandah*). On the other hand, in his correspondence with the person who was to represent the Khwārazm Shāhs at the court of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd, the ruler of 'Irāq, and the head of the Saljūqīd dynasty, he addressed the latter as " Sovereign of the World, supreme Sultān, Commander of all the Earth " (*cf.* Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 332-33). This appears to convey a formal acknowledgment of his subordination to the Saljūqīd Sultān, but in actual practice he tried to play the rôle of mediator between the Sultān and the Caliph Muqtafi. In the Khwārazm Shāh's letter to the wazīr of the Caliph, it is stated that " only Sultān Muḥammad could rid Khurāsān of highway robbers and Transoxiana of the yoke of the infidels, that the inhabitants of these provinces await his arrival with impatience and that at such a time the Caliph's government must forget its enmity to the Sultān, for which indeed it had no serious cause, and afford him support (*cf.* Barthold, p. 332).

¹ *Juwaynī*, II, pp. 17 and 20.

inscription on their coinage.¹ There is no historical evidence to show that they ever approached the Caliphate for a deed of investiture; and notwithstanding the fact that they were never granted the title of Sultān, the epithet was duly assumed by them, as is shown by their coinage.² There was, no doubt, an exchange of embassies between the Caliphate and the Ghūrīds, who received robes of honour from the Caliphs on several occasions.³ But they were favoured by the Caliph only because they were quite content with their position and did not make a demand, like the Khwārazm Shāhs, for the inclusion of their names in the Khuṭbah at Baghdād and the grant of the Sultanate. Thus it can safely be concluded that by this time no ruler in Persia held a direct authority to rule his territories from the Caliphate. Even the outward form of a deed of investiture from the Caliph to validate their personal position or to legalise the working of the religious institutions had disappeared with the lapse of time. No question seems to have arisen as to the legality of the appointment of Qāḍīs and other religious functionaries by Sultāns who possessed no delegated authority from the Caliphs to this effect,⁴ as had been disputed by the legists of the

¹ Lane-Poole, *Add.* IX, pp. 5, 8 and 9.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Juzjānī*, trans. Raverty, p. 383. On the arrival of the robe of honour from the Caliph Nāṣir, the Sultān assumed the prerogative of having drums sounded at his gates five times a day.

⁴ The Saljūqīds of Kirmān, no doubt, had set an example in this respect, but their case was quite different either from the Khwārazm Shāhs or the Ghūrīds. They had inherited their territories from their ancestors who had secured a deed from the Caliphate.

time of Imām Ghazālī. We still find the Caliphs trying to retain their hold on these rulers by sending them "Sultanian robes", but the Sultāns set no store by them and even refuse to accept them if they cannot have their own way. On the other hand, they might accept them with all outward show of joy and satisfaction in order to show the public that they had received some sort of recognition from the Caliphate. In fact the Sultanate was established now in its own right, and it had not only taken over the temporal authority of the Caliphate but also its religious functions in their territories. Nay, not content even with this state of things, the Sultāns would try to assert their right over the Caliphate itself at Baghdād. By this time, however, the Caliphs, having retrieved their old position to some extent, were not only unwilling to accede to their demands but were persistent in extending their political authority over as wide an area as possible. This situation created a bone of contention between Caliph and Sultān.

As soon as the Caliph Nāṣir had got rid of the last Saljūqid Sultān with the help of Takash, he found in the latter a far more formidable opponent than the crumbling house of the Saljūqids, and realized that his ambition to occupy Persian 'Irāq would be seriously challenged. Having defeated Tughril, Takash proceeded to occupy Hamadān; the Caliph, being informed, sent his wazīr with "Sultanian robes" and rich presents to Takash, with instructions to settle terms with him. There might have been some compromise

between the Caliph and the Sultān, but the demands of the wazīr were phrased in so haughty a manner that they were not acceptable to the Sultān. The wazīr announced that since the Sultān owed his throne to the Supreme Dīwān, *i.e.*, the Baghdād government, he should be the first to come forward to meet him and should dismount from his horse.¹ Since these pretensions were taken to be a ruse, they were firmly rejected; and only the wazīr's hasty retreat avoided a collision on this occasion. Takash, after disposing of the government of the various newly conquered provinces, retired to Khorezmia.² But the uncompromising attitude of the wazīr soon involved the Caliphate in a war against the Sultān. In 591/1195, the wazīr, who had all along been extending the territory of the Caliphate, attacked Hamadān and captured it.³ The messenger sent by Takash to settle the terms of peace was summarily dismissed by the wazīr who would not agree to anything less than the occupation of the whole of Persian 'Irāq. The Sultān was thus obliged to take arms against the Caliph's forces, and utterly routed them and reoccupied Hamadān. The body of the hated wazīr (who had died in the meanwhile) was exhumed and his head hacked off and sent to Khorezmia in 592/1196.⁴ While the Sultān was at Hamadān, the Caliph sent Mujīr al-Dīn Abu'l-Qasim

¹ *Juwaynī*, II, p. 33. According to Ibn Athīr, the wazīr demanded that the Sultān should present himself in his tent to receive personally the robe of honour ordered for him (*cf.* XII, p. 70).

² *Juwaynī*, II, p. 34.

³ *Ibn Athīr*, XII, p. 73.

⁴ *Rāwandī*, p. 383; *Juwaynī*, II, p. 38; *Ibn Athīr*, XII, p. 73.

Maḥmūd b. al-Mubārak al-Baghdādī, Faqīh of the Shāfi'ites at Baghdād, to him, warning him to be content with the territories which were held by his father and grandfather and to retire from the newly conquered places; or else steps would be taken to turn him out. The Sultān, instead of listening to the demand of the Caliph, in his turn, demanded the province of Khūzistān as well.¹ Thus the messenger returned disappointed and for the time being the *status quo* was maintained. In 594/1198, Takash made a definite request to the Caliph that he should be granted the Sultanate, and that his name should be included in the Khuṭbah at Baghdād.² Though apparently this demand in itself did not mean the temporal power over the Caliphate at Baghdād,³ it was surely a prelude to it. The Caliph, after the unhappy experience of his predecessors, was reluctant to revive the grant of this privilege, and, in order to remove the menace of a fresh occupation of Baghdād, incited the Ghūrids⁴ to fight against the Khwārazm Shāh and occupy his possession.⁵ It was only the serious defeat of the Qara Khitays, the allies of Takash, by the Ghūrids, that obliged the Khwārazm Shāh to come to

¹ *Rāwandī*, p. 385.

² *Ibn Athīr*, XII, p. 88.

³ Cf. Barthold, *Turkistan*, p. 373.

⁴ To the Ghūrids, the commands of the Commander of the Faithful would be doubly welcome. On the one hand, they did not wish the Khwārazm Shāh to assume a position of pre-eminence among the Muslim princes; and on the other, they would enlist the sympathies of the public against the Khwārazm Shāh. This, to a certain extent, accounts for their close alliance with the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate.

⁵ *Ibn Athīr*, XII, pp. 88-89.

terms with the Caliphate,¹ and, as the result of this intervention, peace was made between them. In 595/1199, "Sultanian robes" were sent to Sultān Takash and his son, Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad, by the Caliph.² Thus the Caliphate succeeded for the time being, with the assistance of the Ghūrīds, in evading the demand of Takash, which was, however, to be renewed by his son Muḥammad in still stronger terms.

As soon as Muḥammad, the son of Takash, had rid himself of his rivals³ and stood pre-eminent among the eastern Muslim rulers, he openly aspired to the restoration in his favour of the universal Sultanate. He assumed the title of "Second Alexander" and allowed himself to be called by the name of Sultān Sanjar,⁴ and already at this time had the words "Shadow of God on Earth" engraved on his seal.⁵ He then turned his attention towards the Caliphate in order to assert his right as Sultān over Baghdād itself. Though the Khwārazm Shāh had many grievances against the Caliphate, there can be little doubt that

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, XII, p. 90.

² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

³ Muḥammad continued his struggle against the Ghūrīds whom he expelled from all their possessions by the year 604/1207. Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maḥmūd, the Ghūrīd ruler, remained only in possession of Ghūr, and here too he was compelled to acknowledge himself the vassal of the Khwārazm Shāh by reading the Khuṭbah and coining money in Muḥammad's name (*cf. Juwaynī*, II, p. 65). The next step on his part was to shake off the yoke of the Qara Khitays with whose assistance he had been able to overthrow the power of the Ghūrīds (*cf. Barthold*, p. 363).

⁴ *Barthold*, p. 87. The adoption of Sultān Sanjar's name by the Khwārazm Shāh might have been in order to gain the same popularity and respect among the Muslim community; or perhaps he desired to attain the same position in his relation to the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate.

⁵ *Barthold*, *Turkestan*, p. 364.

the main object of his hostilities against the Baghdād government was his desire to attain the same status at Baghdād that the Saljūqids had enjoyed before him. Since the Khwārazm Shāh considered himself superior in power to the Buwayhids and at least equal to the Saljūqids, he naturally desired to exercise the same rights in his relations with the Caliphate as the two previous dynasties had done.¹ At first, however, Muḥammad sought to achieve his object by diplomatic means, and sent Qādī Mujīr al-Dīn b. 'Umar b. Sa'd to the Caliph with a request that the Khwārazm Shāh's name should be mentioned in the Khuṭbah at Baghdād.² To a certain extent, Muḥammad was justified in demanding this privilege as there was a precedent set by Sultān Sanjar ; but he knew very well that his demand was sure to be rejected by the Caliph, just as his father's had been. As expected, the Caliph would not listen to the arguments of the Qādī, and explained to him the situation which had obliged the Caliphate to grant this privilege to the Saljūqid Sultān Tughril Beg.³ The Caliph also despatched Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn to the Khwārazm Shāh to dissuade him from pressing his claims. The envoy of the Caliph was paid due honour and the Sultān went on his knees to listen to a *ḥadīth*, which was to the effect that the Prophet warned the Faithful against causing harm to the family of 'Abbās. The Sultān answered: "Although I am a Turk and possess very little knowledge of the Arabic language, yet I have understood the sense of the *ḥadīth*

¹ *Juwaynī*, II, p. 121.² *Nasavī*, p. 12.³ *Ibid.*

recited by thee ; I have not harmed a single descendant of 'Abbās ; nor have I endeavoured to do them evil. On the other hand, I have heard that a good many of them are always to be found in the prison of the Commander of the Faithful, and even multiply and increase there ; if the Shaykh were to recite the same *ḥadīth* in the presence of the Commander of the Faithful, it would be more to the point and would serve a better end.”¹ The Shaykh tried to justify the action of the Caliph in imprisoning individuals in the interests of the Muslim community, as a whole, but the embassy failed to achieve its ends, and the hostility between the Caliph and the Sultān increased. According to Juwaynī,² the Sultān did not want “to be spoken of as having for the sake of his ambitious objects made an attack on the Imām—the fealty to whom constitutes one of the fundamentals of Islām—and thrown his faith to the winds” ; and was obliged to contrive a more plausible pretext for war than the question of the Khuṭbah. In the unscrupulous proceedings of the Caliph Nāṣir against him, he saw an opportunity for the realization of his long-cherished aim. Owing to the rebellious nature of the dynasty, the Caliph had always looked upon them as rivals, had incited the Ghūrīds against the Khwārazm Shāh and even suggested the alliance of the Qara Khitays against him. Unfortunately for the Caliphate, all this correspondence was found by the Khwārazm Shāh when he triumphantly

¹ *Nasavī*, p. 13.

² *Juwaynī*, II, p. 121.

entered Hirāt in 612/1215.¹ These documents Muḥammad now published, and at the same time disclosed the treacherous action of the Caliph in instigating the murder of Aghlamish, viceroy of Muḥammad in 'Irāq, and also of the then Amīr of Mecca.² In this way he succeeded in obtaining a *fatwā* from the 'Ulamā' of his kingdom to the effect that "an Imām who committed such undesirable and unbecoming acts, was unworthy of his office, and that a Sultān who proved himself a supporter of Islām and devoted much of his time to war for the Faith, pursued by the intrigues of the Imām, was justified in deposing such an Imām and appointing another; finally that the 'Abbāsids had forcibly seized the Caliphate which, by right, belonged to the descendants of 'Alī."³ On the basis of the above *fatwā*, he rashly declared the Caliph Nāṣir deposed, omitted the mention of his name in the Khutbah, and on the coinage,⁴ and proclaimed as Caliph the Sayyid 'Alā' al-Mulk al-Tirmidhī.⁵ Thus prepared for drastic action, the Khwārazm Shāh marched on Baghdād in 614/1217. Unfortunately for the Sultān, a division led by him from Hamadān to Baghdād was overtaken by snowstorms in the mountains of Kurdistān and sustained heavy losses; its remnants were almost exterminated by the Kurds, and only a small

¹ *Juwaynī*, II, p. 121. Another cause of his resentment against the Caliph, Muḥammad found in an insult done to him by the preference given to Jalāl al-Dīn Ḥasan, the Chief of the Ismā'īlites, in leading the pilgrims on the occasion of the *hajj* (cf. *Juwaynī*, II, pp. 120-21).

² *Juwaynī*, II, p. 121.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 121-22.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 98; *Ibn Athīr*, XII, p. 207.

portion returned to Khwārazm. Thus a serious blow was dealt to the prestige of Muḥammad, the more so because the people regarded this defeat as a punishment from above for his sacrilegious campaign. According to Nasavī,¹ Muḥammad after his misfortune expressed his repentance and tried to make peace with the Baghdād government; but, according to Ibn Athīr, he did not cease his feud with the Caliphate and on his way back to Khwārazm to meet a projected invasion, he gave out that the Caliph was dead and caused his name to be omitted from the Khuṭbah in various places.²

The action of Muḥammad shows the climax of the claim of the Sultanate to assert its supreme rights and dictate its terms to the Caliphate. That the Khwārazm Shāh failed in his attempt is due to a number of circumstances. The most fatal and foolish mistake he committed in this respect was to declare a Shī'a as an Imām thus antagonizing not only the 'Abbāsīd House but the whole of the Sunnī community. It was little wonder, under such circumstances, that he did not succeed in having the Caliph's name excluded from the Khuṭbah in various places.³ Were Baghdād in his possession, he would easily dictate terms to the Caliphate; failing that, the second best alternative for

¹ *Nasavī*, pp. 20-21.

² *Ibn Athīr*, XII, p. 207. This version seems to be more correct than that of Nasavī as one of the terms of the treaty made between Jalāl al-Dīn and the Caliphate in 623/1226 was that the former would insert the name of the Caliph in Khuṭbah in those places where it was excluded by Sultān Muḥammad (cf. *Howorth*, III, p. 12).

³ *Ibid.*

him would have been to instal in the Caliphate some claimant from the 'Abbāsīd House itself. However, the impending Mongol invasion did not give him much time to put his plans into practical shape. In any case it cannot be denied that this move on the part of the Khwārazm Shāh was an open assertion of that right over the Caliphate, which, with all decency of secrecy, had been exercised during the Saljūqid period. Matters had now reached such a stage that the Sultān could retaliate upon the Caliph by omitting his name from the Khuṭbah in his territories, if the latter was not willing to mention his name in the Khuṭbah at Baghdād; and, more than this, while the Caliph could not depose a Sultān, from his position, the latter could depose the Caliph by securing a *fatwā* from 'Ulamā'.

So long as the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate survived, however, the Sultanate had still to reckon with the force of public opinion. How much veneration was still felt for the Caliphate as a religious institution can be gauged from the attitude of such contemporary writers as Ibn Athīr and al-Iṣṭahānī. Ibn Athīr, for example, in referring to the pre-eminence of the noble House of the 'Abbāsīds, goes so far as to say: "Any one who sought to bring evil upon it was punished for his action or for his evil intentions."¹ Even writers who were in the service of the Sultanate could not afford to ignore the existence of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate, but, recognizing the necessity of the latter

¹ *Ibn Athīr*, XII, p. 207.

institution, only tried to find a new place in it for the numerous independent monarchs that had arisen in dominions once belonging to the Caliphate. Nizām al-Arūdī, a writer of the twelfth century, while assigning relative positions to Caliphate and Kingship, propounds a theory to suit the exigencies of the time. The author says: "So long as such a man (Prophet Muḥammad) lives, he points out to his people what things conduce to well-being in both worlds by the command of God, glorious is His name, communicated to him by means of the angels. But when, by natural dissolution, he turns his face towards the other world, he leaves behind him as his representative a code derived from the indications of God Almighty and his own sayings. And assuredly he requires, to maintain his Law and Practice, a vicegerent who must needs be the most excellent of that community and the most perfect product of that age, in order that he may maintain this law and give effect to this code; and such an one is called an Imām. But this Imām cannot reach the horizons of the East, the West, the North and the South in such wise that the effects of his care may extend alike to the most remote and the nearest and his command and prohibition may reach at once the intelligent and the ignorant. Therefore must he needs have vicars to act for him in distant parts of the world, and not every one of these will have such power that all mankind shall be compelled to acknowledge it. Hence there must be an administrator and compeller, which administrator and compeller is called

a Monarch, that is to say, a king; and his vicarious functions (*niyābat*), sovereignty. The king, therefore is the lieutenant (*nā'ib*) of the Imām, the Imām of the Prophet, and the Prophet of God (Mighty and Glorious is He)".¹ The above theory clearly does not justify any monarch in ousting the Caliph altogether from the temporal power; more so if the Caliphs could rule their territories as efficiently as the Sultāns themselves. Were any Sultān to try to do so, he must run the risk of alienating all the sympathies of 'Ulamā', Muslim princes and the general public. The Khwārazm Shāhs, in consequence, could rely upon little support from any direction in their attempt to secure the supremacy of the Sultanate. To make matters worse, they were known to be in constant alliance with the infidels, *i.e.*, the Qara Khitays,² against the Ghūrids, who were backed up by the moral support of the Caliphate. The sentiments of the Muslim public towards the family for its inveterate hostility to the Caliphate and disgraceful alliance with the Qara Khitays, were vigorously expressed by Maulānā Ṣahīr al-Dīn Fāryābī, addressing Sultān Takash, in the following strophe:

"O Shāh! since 'Ajam, by the sword, to thee has
been consign'd.
Towards Mustafā's place of repose, an army send,

¹ Nizāmī Arūdī, *Chahār Maqālāh*, p. 10; trans. Browne, p. 11.

² Juzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī*, trans. Raverty, p. 244. Sultān Takash, while dying, had enjoined on his son 'Alā al-Dīn Muḥammad that the latter should never quarrel with the Khitays if he desired to preserve the safety of his dominions.

of Hamadān after the death of Takash in 596/1199 is a sufficient proof of their hatred of the dynasty.¹

On his return from the Baghdād campaign, the opposition to Muḥammad came to a head—on the one hand, the military class headed by his mother, Turkān Khātūn were, for reasons of their own, openly hostile to the Sultān; on the other, the 'Ulamā' could hardly forgive him for the *fatwā* extorted from them authorizing the deposition of the Caliph. Even his war with Chingīz Khān could not be represented in the colour of a religious war, since it was the slaughter, by Muḥammad's governor, of a caravan consisting of none but Muslims that supplied the immediate pretext for hostilities.² Not only had he himself to pay the penalty for his treacherous and unscrupulous conduct, but it affected also the fortunes of his gallant son, Jalāl al-Dīn, who certainly deserved a better fate. The latter was regarded with the same hostility as his father by the Muslim public and rulers, and even by the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate. When, pursued by the Mongols, Jalāl al-Dīn reached Zauzān from Nīshāpūr in 618/1221 and desired to fortify himself in the citadel of the town, he was forced to leave the place owing to the hostile attitude of the inhabitants.³ When he approached the Caliphate for help against the Mongols, he not only failed to secure it, but had even to face an army sent by the Caliph to drive him out.⁴

¹ *Rāwandī*, p. 399.

² *Juwaynī*, II, pp. 60-61; Juzjānī, *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī*, trans. Raverty, p. 27.

³ *Juwaynī*, II, p. 134.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

On the other hand, after the death of the Caliph Nāṣir, peace was made between him and the Caliphate in 623/1226, on the terms that the Sultān would not exercise any rights of suzerainty over certain princes who were to be considered as the feudatories of the Caliph; and that he would re-insert the Caliph's name in the public prayers in Persia whence it had been excluded by his father. The Caliph in return sent the deed of investiture for Persia to Jalāl al-Dīn, together with some rich presents. He was styled as Khāqān, and also Shāhinshāh, but the title of Sultān was not granted to him. Thenceforward he called himself "servant of the Caliph" in his letters, and addressed the latter as his Lord and Master.¹ The peace was made too late and it did not serve any useful purpose for the Sultān, as the Caliph could not, and the other Muslim rulers did not, give him any substantial support when he was attacked by the Mongols. In 627/28-1231, he made his last and final effort to induce the Muslim rulers of Rūm and Shām to form a league against their common enemy, the Mongols, but jealousy and mistrust on their part prevented them from making any such useful alliance.² Finally, fleeing from the Mongols, the gallant prince was murdered in Kurdistān in 628/1231.³ Thus ended the dynasty of the Khwārazm Shāhs who had united under their rule

¹ *Nasavī*, p. 247; *Howorth*, III, p. 12; *D'Ohsson*, III, pp. 35-37, but *Ibn al-Fūti* (p. 14; A.H. 627) does not say more than that Jalāl al-Dīn received robes of honour and sent an ambassador to the Caliph.

² *Juzjānī*, *Ṭabaqāt-i-Nāṣirī*, trans. Raverty, p. 298.


³ *Juwaynī*, II, pp. 189-90.

most of the countries incorporated in the empire of the Saljūqs.

Though it seemed that the 'Abbāsid Caliphate had thus emerged victorious and successful in its struggle with the Sultāns, it is clear in retrospect that it had lost all control over the temporal rulers in Persia. The fact that the Caliphs were now in possession of a comparatively larger area than before should not mislead one into thinking that they had retrieved their lost position. They had acquired these possessions as temporal rulers and not, by any means, as the religious heads of Islām. The legal theory of the Caliphate had never in fact corresponded to the realities of the situation. By the doctrine of the election and the assertion of a supreme religious authority it concealed the fact that the historical Caliphate had become a temporal authority supported by military force. It was thus a natural consequence that stronger powers should in time seize the temporal functions of the Caliphate. Then, as always happens, a semblance of the past, a fiction, is persisted in, in order to avoid a violent wrench with the past and the shock that each innovation gives to the conservative mind. Thus, as the real power passes from the hands of the Caliph, the insignia of the suzerainty for the sake of form are still kept intact. A deed of investiture is issued by the Caliph on the occasion of every new ruler, his name is placed on the coinage and recited in the Khuṭbah. With the lapse of time, the necessity of such a deed of investiture is felt only with the change of a

dynasty and, before long, that too is dispensed with; and some sort of bare recognition, *e.g.*, the receipt of "Sultanian robes" from the Caliph, is considered enough. This last stage was reached during the time of the Khwārazm Shāhs. The Sultanate that had risen through its incompetence, on the other hand, had to remain; Nizām al-Mulk justifies its existence like a courtier; while Ghazālī puts up with it as an indispensable necessity. Hence it is safe to conclude that before it came to an end, the Caliphate had ceased to exercise any influence whatsoever on the political organizations which arose in Persia. The violent end that overtook the Caliphate at the hands of the Mongols did little more than remove a phantom authority, even though, in order to appease the tender consciences of the Muslim public, the name of the Caliph had still survived in the Khuṭbah and coinage. A study of the political factors, which obliged the Muslim Mongol rulers to reject even this privilege to the Cairine Caliphate, will be very interesting but it must form the theme of an independent work.





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INDEX

- Abbasid Caliphate, 4-6, 18, 20, 22,
 24, 26, 28-32, 37, 39, 40, 48, 50-52,
 60, 63, 70, 78, 83, 88, 91, 92,
 105-109, 112, 115, 116, 120, 125,
 151, 154, 156, 158, 166, 168, 172,
 174
 'Abd al-Malik, 80-83
 —Allah b. Maymun al-Qaddāh, 5
 —Allah b. Ṭāhir, 18, 20-26, 29
 Abū 'Alī Ḥasan (Ḥasnak), 94, 95
 —'Alī Ibn Muhtāj, 76, 77, 80
 Abū'l-'Abbās, 4
 —'Abbās Māmūn (the Khwār-
 azmshāh), 96
 —Fadl Tamīmī, 93
 Abū Bakr, 3
 Ādharbaijān, 142, 146
 'Aḍud al-Daulah, 53, 56, 58, 65
 Afghānistān, 36
 Aḥmad b. Ismā'īl, Amīr, the
 Samānid, 42
 'Āishah, 3
 Al-Aḥkam al-Sultāniyah, 11
 Al-Jasīrah, 18
 'Alā al-Daulah b. Kakawayh, 97
 'Alī, 50, 166
 —Ibn 'Isā, 8, 9, 42, 48
 —Ibn Muḥammad al-Māwardī, *see*
 Māwardī
 'Alid Ḥasan b. Zayd, 24
 Amīn, 18, 19
 Arsalān Shāh b. Tughril, 150
 Az-Zāhir, Caliph, 94
 Baghdād, 1, 6-9, 18, 19, 23, 25, 26, 30,
 34, 44-46, 49, 50, 52-55, 59, 61, 63,
 67, 70, 73, 74, 93, 99, 106, 108,
 111-115, 118, 119, 128, 130-148,
 150, 159-164, 167, 168, 172
 Bahā al-Daulah, 64, 82
 Black Stone, 6
 Browne, E. G., 4
 Bukhārā, 77, 86, 87
 Buwayhids, 40, 49-52, 54-57, 59-62,
 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 75, 82-84, 99,
 104-108, 117
 Chingīz Khān, 172
 Dirham b. Naṣr b. Ṣāliḥ, 30
 Egypt, 4, 5, 18
 Fakhr-al-Daulah, 58, 83
 Fāryābī, Maulānā Ṣāḥir al-Dīn, 170
 Faṭimid Caliphate, 5, 93, 94, 115
 Gibbon, 3

Ghaznah, 98, 100
 Ghaznavids, 68, 88, 91-93, 97, 100,
 105, 106, 108, 110
 Ghazzālī, Imām, 120, 126, 160, 175
 Ghūrids, 159, 162, 163, 170

Ḥafṣah, 3
 Ḥakīm, Caliph, 93
 Hamdān b. Al-Ash'ath (Qarmāṭ), 5
 Hamdānids, 50, 72
 Hirāt, 17
 Ḥusayn, son of 'Alī, 3

Ibn al-Furāt, 9
 —Athīr, 143, 147, 167, 168, 171
 —aṭ-Ṭiḡtaḡa, 8
 —Khūrdādāhbīh, 22
 Ibnū'l-Amīd, 81
 Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad, 77
 'Imād al-Daulah, 77
 —al-Dīn Zangī, 142, 143
 'Irāq, 4, 23, 138-141, 143, 144
 Iṣfahān, 81, 97, 99, 150
 Ishāq b. Ibrāhīm al-Mus'abī, 21
 'Ismat al-Daulah, 58

Jalāl al-Daulah, 54-56, 66, 107
 —al-Dīn, 172, 173
 Juwaynī, 165

Khurāsān, 5, 19-23, 25-28, 30, 32, 37,
 41-44, 48, 77, 79-83, 90, 93, 101,
 108, 110, 153
 Khwārazm Shāhs, 156-159, 162-168,
 170, 171, 173, 175
 Kirmān, 23, 152

Kutāb al-Fakhri, 8

Lane-Poole, 115

Maḥmūd (of Ghaznah), 40, 87-99,
 101-104, 109, 137

Malik Dā'ūd b. Sultān Maḥmūd, 146
 —Shāh (Sultān) 132, 133, 148-150
 152

Māmūn, Caliph, 1, 3, 18-21, 25, 29

Manṣūr b. Nūḥ, 81, 84, 89

Mas'ūd (Sultān), 143-147

Mauṣil, 73, 112, 139, 146

Māwardī, 'Alī Ibn Muḥammad al-,
 11-13, 67-69, 92, 102, 104, 124, 125,

Mecca, 6, 62

Merw, 109

Mu'āwiyah Ibn Abī Sufyān, 71

Muayyad al-Daulah, 83

Muḥammad (Prophet), 15, 169

—b. Al-Qāsim, 25

—Ḥabīb, Prof., 98

—, Sultān, 139

Mu'izz al-Daulah, 50, 51, 63, 71, 79,
 80, 90

Muktafī, Caliph, 6

Muqtadī, Caliph, 130, 133

Muqtadir, Caliph, 9, 42, 45, 48

Muqtafī, Caliph, 146, 147

Musta'in, Caliph, 23, 24

Mustakfi, Caliph, 50, 51, 76, 79

Mustarshid, Caliph, 139, 140, 142-
 145

Mu'tadid, Caliph, 8, 39

Mu'tamid, Caliph, 40

Mu'tasim, Caliph, 6, 7, 21, 25, 26

Mutawakkil, Caliph, 1, 2, 7, 9, 23

- Mu'tazz, Caliph, 8, 23
 Mutī', Caliph, 51, 52, 73, 74, 76-80, 82
 Muwaffaq, 5, 8, 39

 Nasavī, 167
 Nāṣir, Caliph, 151, 160, 165, 166, 171, 173
 —al-Daulah, 77, 81
 Nishāpur, 80, 109, 172
 Nizām al-'Arūḍī, 169
 —al-Mulk, 100, 122, 124, 125, 131-133, 175
 Nizāmīah Madrasah, 129
 Nūḥ b. Naṣr, 77, 78, 80

 Persia, 30, 32, 38, 62, 75, 91, 106, 108, 138, 151, 154, 158, 172, 174, 175

 Qā'im, Caliph, 109, 113, 129
 Qādir, Caliph, 55, 82, 89, 91-94, 99
 Qarākhānids, 87, 96
 Quvurd b. Chagrī Beg, 152

 Raḍī, Caliph, 3
 Rukn al-Daulah, 77, 79-82, 111

 Ṣaffārīds, 27, 30, 31, 33-40, 42
 Sa'īd b. Al-Ḥusayn, 5
 Saljūqs, 106, 108-110, 115, 116, 143-145, 147, 151, 152, 156, 160, 174
 Sāmānids, 40-48, 75-80, 82-89, 105

 Samsām al-Daulah, 53, 83
 Sanjar, Sultān, 137-139, 143, 148, 153, 156, 158, 163, 164
 Sayf al-Daulah Ṣadaqah, 135
 Sayyid 'Alā' al-Mulk al-Tirmidhī (Caliph), 166
 Sharaf al-Daulah, 53
 —al-Dīn, 150
 Sijistān, 17, 26, 30, 31, 45
 Siyāsat-nāmah, 122
 Sulayman Ibn Kathīr al-Khuzā'ī, 17
 —Shāh b. Muḥammad, 148-150, 153
 Sultān al-Daulah, 56
 Syria, 5, 6

 Ṭabaristān, 24, 26, 37, 45, 46
 Ṭāhir, 18-20
 —b. Muḥammad b. Amr, the Ṣaffarid, 44
 —Dhu'l-Yamīnayn, 17
 Ṭāhirids, 17, 18, 22-31, 40
 Tai, Caliph, 53, 58, 82, 89
 Tigris, 3
 Tughril Beg (Sultān), 109-115, 118, 129, 130, 143, 144, 160

 'Umar, 3
 'Utbī, 101

 Wāthiq, Caliph, 1, 21, 92

 Yūsuf al-Dimishqī, 129

